# SECURITY

## 1NC

#### Discourses of security are a neoliberal regime aimed at the total pacification of the public, protecting the state and capital through normalization of bourgeois values and suppression of dissent.

Neocleous 18 [Mark, Prof of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel Univ, “The bleak rituals of progress; or, if somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no,” in J. Peter Burgess, *Socially Responsible Innovation in Security*, p.133-6, GDI-JCR]

Witness, for example, the phenomenon that has been described as neoliberalism. Much can and has been made of the ways in which neoliberalism involves a transformation of the individual: ‘economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul’, as Margaret Thatcher (Sunday Times, 1981) once put it. Taking such a claim seriously means reading neoliberalism not simply in terms of its destructive power, for example in destroying certain kinds of rights and institutions, but also in terms of its productive power: in its ability to create new kinds of social relations, new ways of living and new political subjects. The literature on the new neoliberal subject recognizes more than anything that what is being produced is an entrepreneurial self and a productive subject: a monetized, atomized and calculating subject that is required and expected to endlessly perform as a neoliberal subject in the social realm as well as in the marketplace (Dardot and Laval, 2013). This production of new subjectivities, however, is also very much an orientation of the subject around security: new political subjects forged through security, operating for security and organized around security. In other words, security- conscious neoliberal subjects. The connection between security and capital is thus integral to the neoliberal revolution and part of neoliberalism’s productive power and disciplinary core. (As with so many aspects of neoliberalism, what is of most interest is its disciplinary moment, and at the heart of this disciplinary moment lies the logic of security.) The explosion and expansion of security in the last two decades, while conventionally connected to the problem of terrorism (the ‘war on terror’), might just as properly be connected to the attempt to engrain neoliberalism into the hearts and minds of political subjects. Moreover, because the neoliberal subject is expected to be an active subject, this activity is also expected to respond to the demands of security as well as the demands of capital. As is well known, under neoliberalism it is no longer enough for us to simply work, earn our money, go home and spend it. Now we must believe in the work we are doing and actively show that we believe in it, identifying with the organization and signing up to the company’s mission, vision and values. The neoliberal workplace has become a ‘community of desire’, as Frédéric Lordon puts it, and yet this poses a problem for capital, which constantly questions the worker’s desire. In Lordon’s example: the employee- subject swears that they have no other passion than the manufacture of yoghurt, our company’s business, but can we really believe them? (Lordon, 2015, p. 84). The answer has to be no, and so the expected desire must be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. A similar point might be made about the neoliberal polity, and likewise about the neoliberal security state: the citizen- subject swears that they have no other interest than the security of the social order, but can we really believe them? The answer must again be no,2 and so the expected desire must also be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. Herein lies the basis for all the actions we are now being trained to undertake as security- conscious neoliberal subjects, such as being trained in ‘resilience’, being taught to be constantly ‘prepared for emergency’, and being encouraged to report any friends, family, lovers, neighbours and colleagues who we suspect might be doing something ‘suspicious’ (Neocleous, 2013, 2016, 2017). Part of the novelty of neoliberalism lies precisely in the idea that this active subject is not expected to remain content with the simple exchange of security for obedience, but, rather, is to be actively mobilized around the logic of security. Security has become a neoliberal mobilization regime: the people mobilized in the name of security as well as capital. Such mobilization is yet another way of incorporating the people into security and another way in which security expresses its desire to exist without reply, just like capital and the state. Part of the illusion of security is that we are expected to bow down before it without even asking what it is or how it came to be granted such a status. To exist without reply, security seeks to nullify all dissent and suppress any rebellion even before such dissent and rebellion have begun. Any objections or resistance to any of the policies – not least the economic policies – being carried out by the powers which claim to exercise security on our behalf are met either with security measures of the most coercive kind or with the expectation that reason must abase itself before it – all our critical faculties set aside as security and its leading defenders tell us to shut up, listen and obey. Those arguing against austerity, for example, are treated first and foremost as a threat to national security. Thus, far from security being emancipation, as some people working in the academic sector of the security industry like to claim and which is the very belief that security wants us to hold, the articulation of security as an overarching principle of politics – the idea, in other words, that security is the absolute foundation of all politics, or that security has to be the starting point for any political thought, or that security is the grounds on which we must accept the protection of the state, or that what all of us would most like for Christmas is security – is nothing less than the articulation of a demand for obedience. Security is in this sense central to the containment of social change, nothing less than the principle and process of pacification, if by ‘pacification’ we understand not simply the military crushing of resistance but, rather, the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2011, 2017; Neocleous, Rigakos and Wall, 2013). What does this obedience in the name of security produce? The answer is not difficult: obedience itself. Obedience produces obedience, as Foucault once commented (2014, p. 270) about what he called ‘pastoral power’. It reproduces itself as a system of obedience. That is, one accepts the principle of security in order to become obedient and one reproduces this state of obedience in a striving for the mythical state of security. Hence one is expected to manage oneself in the way that a security operative would have us be managed. This is the very point to which Hobbes alludes in the final paragraph of Leviathan; it is the very same point understood by all contemporary politicians when they speak the language of security; and it is the point implicit in much of the discourse and policies surrounding terrorism, which is why so much anti- terror legislation concerns itself with the obedience of the population. Obedience thereby becomes a permanent way of being, and we are encouraged and expected to believe that obedience is essential to the security of the subject. Obedience becomes fundamental to the principle of raison d’état, demanded by the state for security reasons, and our training in obedience a training of and for political order. And, given the security–commodity nexus, what we are being made obedient for is nothing other than the domination of our lives by capital. Security, then, demands that we bow down to security. It demands that we feel secure in our insecurity as bourgeois subjects but also insecure in our security as bourgeois subjects. It demands that we commit ourselves not to making history but, rather, to the eternal recurrence of the same: to securing capital and the state rather than anything against it or opposed to them. Like capital, security wants us to believe that it is our fate. Opening his book Politics and Fate, Andrew Gamble asks: ‘If politics were at an end, if this was our fate, what would this mean for us?’ (2000, p. 1). One answer: it would mean nothing less than being stuck in an endless security experience. ‘How was your security experience today?’, the questionnaire at Heathrow airport demands, after making us undergo a series of security rituals. An endless security experience, then, but one in which we are constantly asked to assess, measure and confirm our happiness in being able to participate in the rituals and thus in the process to confirm the extent to which security dominates our lives. A second answer to Gamble’s question: it would mean being subjected to one security innovation after another, including those innovations sold to us as being somehow ‘socially responsible’.

#### \*\*\*Optionally Insert Additional Specific Links\*\*\*

#### War and apocalypse are inherent to the world order. Redirecting the affective economies of war can’t happen through plans for conflict prevention – only new affective attachments that affirm being in excess of regulative models of international relations can truly affirm life.

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.229-30]

As I find little inspiration in the technological optimism of the singularity or a cosmopolitan future and no hope in the inevitability of power politics, I want to try to make more visible where I see the possibilities of making a life amid a dying or worse yet expanding Eurocene civilization. What I offer here is not an alternative world order or a new categorical imperative. Instead, I want to sketch out what possibilities I think might exist in the terrain of apocalypse and war for those of us moderns no longer interested in being along for the ride. 1 The possibility of catastrophe, while always present, is more or less open to creative intervention. Even if there is no way out, so to speak, sadism is not the only condition for persisting. So rather than start from the position of how to end war or transcend the Eurocene, I would rather think about what other becomings are in the neighborhood of the Eurocene’s martial order but are in flight away from this epoch’s cruel trajectories. This puts me in stark contrast to many thinkers in international relations (IR) who most often seek peace. This is because rather than attend to these subtle and deeply ecological practices of war and homogenization, liberal international relations theory, whether it be the democratic peace theorist or the providential tone of cosmopolitans, tries, like Kant, to expel war from the world while maintaining a modern order entirely indebted to it. Despite Kant’s predictions for an end of war as part of “nature’s secret plan,” or as the cosmopolitan “desire” of man, or Hegel’s completion of the liberal democratic state, global war and apocalypse are not things that can be outlawed, regulated, and governed out of existence as they are too intimate with the very order these visions of the world hope to elevate over war and competition. To understand global war and apocalypse as a becoming is not only to lay bare the facile and destitute liberal understanding of peace and the future but to open up explorations of a becoming otherwise than the Eurocene. Such a becoming is likely to be illegible to the current indexes of progress and global order. The normative markers of peace—the absence of conflict—need not define the limit of possible becomings other than war. Becoming agonistic, becoming active, becoming rage, becoming justice, becoming quiet, becoming still, becoming disobedient, becoming graceful, becoming kind, becoming indifferent, becoming defiant, becoming gentle, becoming sacrifice, becoming fire (as many monks in Vietnam did and at least three individuals in the United States have in the face of the Iraq War), becoming generous, becoming courageous, becoming feral . . . The restoration of belief in the world requires an affirmation of being in excess of a regulative or repressive model of peace and progress. War and the drive to homogenization endemic to the Eurocene cannot be disowned or expelled. They must be diverted by other incipient becomings. Other forks must be taken. This does not require that the world slow down. It might require that we unblock certain flows corralled by the arborescent strategies of fortress state craft. Redirecting the affective economies of war toward other attachments—arguments, justice, compassion, forgiveness, politics, resistance, grief, art, beauty, the world—cannot be accomplished by repression or separation; that is a recipe for ressentiment. To understand the processes of becoming that enliven and rigidify the Eurocene is to understand the possibility of becoming something else. If we externalize or banish the Eurocene to the place of evil or outside ourselves in the name of some new alliance, we fail to understand just how indebted the modern form of life is to the Eurocene. In this moment—returned to us by a kind of attunement to depth of this catastrophe—we might find other practices, bodily dispositions, emotions: grief rather than rage, compassion rather than revenge, determination rather than resignation. For some the otherwise will only give contrast to the power of hate or rage to overcome other impulses, but in others it may spawn other directions; new questions, alternatives to the dissatisfaction, or burnout from rage, hate, and revenge. I am a pessimist but I am not a nihilist.

# \*\*\*Impact Debate

## 2NC Root Cause

### 2NC No Solvency

#### Solvency is impossible. War is the structuring logic of the Eurocene.

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.59-61]

War as defined by classical war studies suggests a distinct class of actors, interests, aims, and expertise. As a result, the study of war as well as much of the social mobilization of war presumes an exteriority of war and warfare from other sectors and institutions like the economy or the state. For those who study military history, war—in this limited understanding—can certainly be decisive in the rise and fall of nation-states and even transformations of the global system when that system is only indexed by the states that populate it, but the pursuit of these histories still presumes a kind of exceptional character of war. War following this line of thought is a cataclysmic event that interrupts the otherwise normal character of daily life. For others, particularly in the field of strategic studies, warfare is a tool, an instrument whereby states and sometimes organizations pursue ends beyond the limits of politics and persuasion. War compels and determines a course of action as an orchestral direction of overwhelming force. For those who hope to abolish war, a parallel exteriority animates their theorizing about war. War, according to these thinkers, is reducible to the self-interest of hegemonic states, the militarism of soldiers, and the self-amplifying loop of profit and power. Presidents, generals, CEOs, arms dealers, and patriots come together to pursue war as an end in itself. Again, those actors and those pursuits are treated as outside the normal realm of human social relations. But what if war is history? What if the very form of life that created, was reinforced by, mutated with, and emerged from the Eurocene is warlike? State-making, territorialization, expansion, annihilation, settlement, and globalization are all warlike relations. I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form of life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy or discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form of life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, a war ecology. I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations— from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to all-out combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities for a war metaphor. To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world. The importance of shifting the point of emphasis or break between war and other “big processes” is to emphasize the way collectively making death comes to be its own organizing ecology rather than just an instrumental means for other ecologies, such as racism or sexism or capitalism, that are often more obviously invested in ordering—subordinating orders— than destruction. Furthermore, I do not think, given the extreme level of violence and deprivation necessary to create the global ecology we now inhabit, that it is “a stretch” to call war the constitutive fabric of planetary relations. Instead, war as an intensive difference takes possession of other categories, at which point phase shifts take place in categories like racism or economics. What was the slow, lethal burn of post-slavery policing escalates into the fury of outright combat in the streets, a race war in the streets of 1921 Tulsa or the 2015 streets of Baltimore. Even in our sacred texts of democratic theory, the pulsing tributaries of war run throughout descriptions of political formation. John Locke argued with little dispute that slavery was the institutionalization of war.4 And W. E. B. Du Bois said of the process of reconstruction after slavery that war had begun again, and in fact had never ended.5 Do we think that the same could not be said for the vast carceral project directed at black people described so well by Michelle Alexander or Loïc Wacquant?6

#### Our impact comes first—Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 04 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

### 2NC AT Proximate Causes

#### War is a way of life – focus on particular decisions, legal codes and events distracts from the subterranean affective ties that animate the structures of war as a way of life

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.74-7]

War is what escapes and deterritorializes constraints. Contrary to those like Martin Heidegger or Theodor Adorno who see war as a pure instrumentality, the ignoble novelty of violence demonstrates that the enframing of war is never complete. The standing reserve of warfare (soldiers, bullets, bombs, civilians to be protected, totals of enemies to be killed, etc.) is never wholly subsumed as a resource or instrument. The fog of war, unforeseen escalation, levée en masse, low-tech assemblages, blind allies, ad hoc militias, and the defensive advantage of weakness express the creative elements of war as they have been named; however, this list is not exhaustive. It is not an exaggeration to say that no historical development of humanity has entirely escaped the gravitational pull of war. It would be more accurate to say that war has organized a common and highly dispersed martial form of life that thrives in the Eurocene. We do not like to ask the question, but what if ever-present violence has become a way of being, a form of life? What would it mean to speak of war as a “fabric of immanent relations” rather than merely a regrettable means for politics?49 As scholars of war and geopolitics, in my estimation, we do not take seriously enough the metamorphoses of war. War is often relegated by analysts to the status of an effect or an object rather than a concept unto itself. So wars are declared; wars are waged; wars are ended; war is even outlawed. People do not speak of war as they do the political, the ethical, and so on. We need to consider what centuries of wars do. What is war’s analogue to the political as the political is to politics? This is important if we want to consider that just maybe the martial is more central than the political or ethical to the forms of life that thrive and expand in the Eurocene. Like politics or ethics, each tactile act in warfare is another comportment of the body, a technique of musculature, posture, style, gait, each with its own possibility not just to survive war but to live war.50 And the life that emerges, spreads. This raises a series of questions ignored by normative investigation of how we ought to fight or what would constitute a just war. For example: How long can peace be absent before the body finds its satisfaction in an assemblage of war rather than in the “beauty” or justness of peace? When does a body or collective find the transition to peace to be as abrupt and violent as the outbreak of conflict? And are we really so convinced of a future “pacific” human society, as Kant was in his Theses for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), that we cannot imagine warfare ceasing to be an aberration? Hasn’t it already for the powers that organize the international order? The stakes here are not trivial; there is no providence that guarantees we are meant to live in peace, which means there are also no natural laws to prevent us from fully becoming war. And how many centuries has war come to define the expansion, integration, and annihilating homogenization of planetary relations? How many generations of bodies since 1492 have been created by a state of war? To answer these questions, the body in war has to be taken up as a body rather than a rational agent weighing the costs and benefits of conforming to norms or following international legal codes. There is no agent before the body. And the swing of a machete and the sight of a gun may be no different from the infra-assemblage of our bodies than the swing of a bat or the sighting of a jump shot. As Erin Manning puts it, this is “the body, more assemblage than form, more associated milieu than Being.”51 What differs is a minimal difference in affect rather than a transcendental moral calling. Manning again states, “Affect promises nothing. It creates across and beyond good and evil.”52 Therefore, the body is charged no less by hate, anger, rage, and fear than it is by joy, pleasure, and generosity. It is just charged differently. 53 The swing of an arm can be the opening of a dance or the mad plunge of a bayonet. For Merleau-Ponty, this is what characterizes the human, the body, and contingency made form: “Man is an historical idea, not a natural species. In other words, there is no unconditioned possession in human existence, and yet neither is there any fortuitous attribute. Human existence will lead us to revisit our usual notion of necessity and of contingency, because human existence is the change of contingency into necessity through the act of taking up.”54 The affective field, the habit of the muscles, and the encounter by which each of these is engaged alters the effect of the movement, which is what is signified by the making of “meaning,” or what Merleau-Ponty calls the “taking up.” The effect is made sensible—bodily and habitual—and retrospectively we call this meaning. The movement itself is indivisible and intentional rather than instrumental and willful.55 At first glance, this appears as a contradiction, intentional but not willful; however, Merleau-Ponty has a process in mind that requires us (intention) but is not reducible to our interiority (will). He describes the making of a new body as a process of meaning-making whereby “the new meaningful intention only knows itself by donning already available significations, which are the results of previous acts of expression. The available significations suddenly intertwine according to an unknown law, and once and for all a new cultural being has begun to exist.”56 In war, new bodies are made, but not by war any more than war is made by bodies. Instead, there is what Massumi describes as an “instantaneous back-and- forthing between now and the future, and between disparate domains of activity. . . . The strike of paradox renders the gesture inventively ‘undecidable’— in addition to being true.”57 In the slight difference between axe swings—one to chop wood, the other to sever arms—is the incipient possibility of different “cultural beings” and the longue durée of different forms of life. This incipience is contained not in the decision but in between the world and the body and then subsequently in the worlds those bodies make. The in-between of incipience is also not restricted to the human. A slight difference in urban development—one high-rise to promote downtown living and another to contain racial difference—may just as easily extend from the indiscernibility of reality and enable or amplify a particular becoming, or make it more durable or more contagious. Similarly, we should puncture the myth that the preparation for war and the prosecution of war are different in kind. Instead, we should treat the body and the body of war as an “ecology of process.” 58 In preparation—the becomings of war—it is not just the habit of sighting and pulling triggers, innovating new strategies and the means to eliminate populations like the cities of Dresden or Hiroshima. It is the affective mood, the technological and urban regulators and amplifiers of the flows that slow and congeal into new habits—like dropping a bomb from thirty thousand feet and other incipient possibilities, pre-adaptations, that might at another moment find expression, like refusing to launch nuclear weapons in a time of crisis.59 War makes worlds and worlds make war. Shifting our interests from events and acts to processes and habits directs our attention to how the outbreak of war may be subterranean in habitual activities that are not seemingly warlike. We should not be fooled by the common sense that because things are not always at the fever pitch of war, war is not working behind the scenes in our imaginative, judging, and bodily faculties as well as our ports, freeways, internet connections, satellite feed, and toxic runoff, emotional and molecular. Some preparations for war move too slow to be seen.60 If we want to attend to war’s invitation to be thought, we must make more vivid those preparations for warfare that often get lost in political realist discussions of armaments and troop movement, like the slow accretion of carbon over a century or two, the reorganization of waste, the resignification of belonging, and other more gradual processes in the conversion of lifeworlds to “operational atmospheres” for past and future wars, exposing what Sloterdijk calls “new surfaces of vulnerability.”61 The consequences of a life of war far exceed any particular battle or even world war.

## 2NC Nuclear Imagery

#### The 1AC is addicted to the bomb—evoking images of atomic destruction legitimizes the use of nuclear weapons on a broader scale and condones any “lesser” form of violence

Lamarre 2008 [Thomas, Professor in the Department of Cinema and Media Studies, East Asian Languages and Civilizations at the Univ of Chicago, “Born of Trauma: Akira and Capitalist Modes of Destruction,” positions, vol. 16 no. 1]

Images of atomic destruction and nuclear apocalypse abound in popular culture, familiar mushroom clouds that leave in their wake the wholesale destruction of cities, towns, and lands. Mass culture **seems to thrive on repeating the threat of world annihilation,** and the scope of destruction seems continually to **escalate**: planets, even solar systems, disintegrate in the blink of an eye; **entire populations vanish.** We confront in such images a **compulsion to repeat what terrifies us**, but repetition of the terror of world annihilation also **numbs us to it, and larger doses of destruction become necessary: increases in magnitude and intensity,** **in the scale and the quality of destruction and its imaging**. Ultimately, the repetition and escalation promise to inure us to mass destruction, producing **a desire to get ever closer to it** and at the same time making anything less than mass destruction feel a relief, a “**victory**.” Images of global annihilation imply a mixture of habituation, fascination, and addiction. Trauma, and in particular psychoanalytic questions about traumatic repetition, provides a way to grapple with these different dimensions of our engagement with images of large-scale destruction. Dominick LaCapra, for instance, returns to Freud’s discussion of “working-through” (mourning) and “acting out” (melancholia) to think about different ways of repeating trauma. “In acting-out,” he writes, “one has a **mimetic relation** to the past which is **regenerated or relived** as if it were fully present rather than represented in memory and inscription.”1 In other words, **we repeat the traumatic event** without any sense of historical or critical distance from it, precisely **because the event remains incomprehensible.** In this conceptualization, the repetitious escalation of violence in the imaging of nuclear destruction entails **an acting out of our historically traumatic relation to** weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and especially **the atomic bomb**. We face today a proliferation of scenarios that replay our fascination with WMDs in the lineage of the bomb — starships blasting planetary systems out of existence, battles for survival in postapocalyptic worlds. But do these scenarios allow us any critical or historical distance from the trauma of nuclear destruction (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and nuclear escalation (the nuclear testing and arms race of the Cold War)? We must ask if this apparent acting out of trauma affords any possibilities for working through it. This question remains urgent. With many nuclear weapons still poised for launch and with a gradual breakdown of responsibility in chains of command, nuclear holocaust is as much and maybe more of a danger today than ever before.

## 2NC Endless War

#### Liberal biopolitical governance risks unending war against all threats to the species—that apocalyptic violence will inevitably turn against the species itself.

Dillon and Reid ‘9 (Michael, professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College and Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, “The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, pg 30-33, JS)

One way of expressing the core problematic that we pursue in this book is, therefore, in the form of a question posed back to Paine on account of that definitive claim. What happens to the liberal way of rule and its allied way of war when liberalism goes global in pursuit of the task of emancipating the species from war, by taking the biohuman as its referent object of both rule and war? What happens to war, we ask, when a new form of governmental regime emerges which attempts to make war in defence and promotion of the entire species as opposed to using war in service of the supposedly limited interests of sovereigns? For the liberal project of the removal of species life from the domain of human enmity never in practice **entailed an end to war**, **or to the persistence of threats requiring war.** Paine makes this clear in his original formulation. Under liberal regimes, Paine observes, war will still be defined by relations between the human and its enemies. The enemies of the human will simply no longer be ‘**its species’** (Paine 1995: 595). What that meant, in practice, was that the liberal way of rule had to decide what elements and what expressions of human life best served the promotion of the species. Those that did not were precisely those that most threatened it; those upon which it was called to wage war. Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, **even if it arises within the species itself.** Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composability of living systems and of living material. **The greatest source of threat to life becomes life.** It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely not that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modern discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death outwith the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern ‘political science.’ Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose very laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These, additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, or, indeed, pre-empt its expression by positively creating new nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated through the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic. The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devises remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which the very liveliness of life itself is now said to depend. Biohumanity—itself an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically—is therefore both threat and promise. The corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species **must be cast out from the species** as such. ‘Just war’ in the cause of humanity here—a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003)—takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itself; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian Homo lupus than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault’s analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account of the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of the life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, **any such war to end war becomes war without end;** thus turning Walzer’s arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 2000: 329-335). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and **unending process**. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is little particularly startling about this claim. Immanent in the biopoliticization of liberal rule, **it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression.** As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so the properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new king of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider, for example, Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master… he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. (Kant 2005; emphasis added) ‘Nowhere else but in the human species.’ Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism’s strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. **Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough**. In a massive, quite literally **terrifying, paradox**, however, since the biohuman **is the threat**, it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the ‘figure’ of Al-Qaeda, the very dispositive of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war—the biohuman—is no longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view to respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

## 2NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Their truth regimes are a self-fulfilling prophecy

Davis ‘6 (Doug, assistant prof. of English at Gordon College, Future-War Storytelling: National Security and Popular Film, ReThinking Global Security, ed by Andrew Martin and Patrice Petro, pg 16, 2006, JS)

Fictions of nuclear terrorism have become part of a priviledged class of storytelling that represents the strategic facts of U.S. national security. Straddling facts and fiction, they are “strategic fictions,” tales of catastrophic future wars whose scenarios everyday citizens and defense planners alike treat as seriously as historical fact. Strategic fictions become an **intrinsic part of U.S. national security strategy** during the world war with the formulation of a policy of nuclear defense built on an imagined catastrophic future war. Imagined nuclear terrorism and other kinds of indefensible catastrophic attacks now occupy the central place in the imaginary of national defense once held by the vision of nuclear war. The events described by these stories and scenarios are not real, but they could be. For national defense planners, that is reality enough. The catastrophic near-future worlds these imaginary narratives build **are**, in a dramatic way, **the future of our world**. The threats they represent are a **license to act, to arm, and to war**.

# \*\*\*Alternative

## 2NC Alternative Solvency

#### Our alternative is to vote negative to criticize the truth claims of the 1AC. This allows the unearthing and challenging of the seemingly neutral power-knowledge relationships that are complicit in perpetuating the very harms they seek to end.

Edkins ‘6 (Jenny, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, December 2006, “The Local, the Global and the Troubling,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 9 No. 4, pg. 499-511, JS)

Rather than starting with a reading of traditional academic analyses of the Northern Ireland conflict and offering a critique of particular ways in which the conflict has been represented and analysed in the literature, this chapter takes a step back. It considers not how or why the existing literature on the 'troubles' may be considered to be lacking in its analysis or its proposed solutions to the problem of Northern Ireland, but rather examines how that literature could be argued to be founded on certain prior assumptions, about the conflict and about the role of academic analysis, that are perhaps in need of challenge. I do not engage with the specific literature on Northern Ireland - I am not an expert on that particular topic - rather, I put forward a series of considerations about the ways in which work about conflicts, famines, genocides and other traumatic events is or could be framed. I argue that framings that prevail in much academic or intellectual work are of a distinct 'problem solving' type, and that the narratives that they produce **limit what can be achieved** in practical, on-the-ground terms and can even be argued to **perpetuate the 'problem'** to which they attempt to provide a 'solution'. This is particularly the case, I will argue, where we are concerned with events of a violent, or what could be called traumatic, type. In summary, then, the chapter addresses 'the problem of Northern Ireland' by looking at how problems like this are constituted as 'problems' in the first place, and how this then conditions what forms of 'solution' become possible. Moreover, it argues, as does Nick Vaughan-Williams (2006) that such problematisations are often in part at least to blame for the persistence of the 'problem' they appear merely to identify. In a sense the challenge that will be posed here is one that could be, and indeed has been, applied to much intellectual work in our particular tradition. The responsibility of intellectuals more generally is of course one that has been widely debated, and has resurfaced recently in relation to the so-called 'war on terror' (Smith 2004; Edkins 2005). To what extent can work arising from the ivory tower of academia have any relevance to the practical political choices faced by policy-makers and their opponents on a daily basis? How best can concerned academics intervene in the politics with which they would so like to be involved? Or, indeed, are they perhaps already deeply implicated in that politics, so that the question of intervention does not arise? There are two related but distinct preliminary points that are worth making here. First, intellectuals are of course not as separate from political and social structures as might seem to be the case. Antonio Gramsci addresses the question of whether intellectuals are 'an autonomous and independent social group' (Gramsci 1971: 5) as they so often appear. He argues against looking for criteria that distinguish intellectuals as such 'in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations' (Gramsci 1971: 8). We should focus not on what defines 'an intellectual' but rather on what categories are historically made available for intellectual activity and how struggles for dominance between different groups or classes can be conceived in these terms. He distinguishes 'traditional intellectuals,' on the one hand, who have an apparent neutrality and absence of class-belongingness, but whose status and authority derives from their historical position and whose role is as 'the dominant group's 'deputies', exercising the … functions of social hegemony and political government' (Gramsci 1971: 12) and 'organic intellectuals,' on the other, who are part of a subaltern group or class that is engaged in a struggle for dominance. 'Traditional intellectuals' are those who are commonly recognised as intellectuals: academics, writers, scientists and so on. 'Organic intellectuals,' on the other hand, though not recognisable as intellectuals, articulate the 'new modes of thought' (Gramsci 1971: 9) of their group. Organic intellectuals serve to help disrupt rather than reinforce the prevailing hegemony. The second preliminary point is that contemporary intellectuals in the Western context operate within a particular ''regime' of truth' (Foucault 1980a: 133), one that constitutes as 'truth' knowledge that is the product of scientific methods of working. Michel Foucault argues that the figure of what he calls 'the specific intellectual' is of central importance in present day struggles. Specific intellectuals, such as atomic scientists for example, who have a 'direct and localised relation to scientific knowledge and institutions' (Foucault 1980a: 128) constitute a political threat because of their ability 'to intervene in contemporary political struggles in the name of a “local” scientific truth' (Foucault 1980a: 129). In other words, because of their status as experts, and despite the fact that 'the specific intellectual serves the interests of State or Capital' (Foucault 1980a: 131), they remain in a strategic position to intervene on behalf of local struggles. There are dangers, of course: the risk of remaining at the level of local struggles, of manipulation or control by other interests, and of not being able to gain widespread support. Nevertheless, the specific intellectual should not be discounted (Foucault 1980a: 131). What is important is the relation between 'truth' and power, and the way in which: Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and **makes** function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged of saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980a: 131) Foucault argues that, in our societies, the dominant regime of truth is centred on scientific discourse and the institutions that support this. The specific intellectual has a particular class position, as Gramsci noted too, and particular conditions of work, but more than that, a particular connection to the way that the politics of truth works. This gives such an intellectual the possibility of struggle at the level of the regime of truth. Of course, 'this regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism' (Foucault 1980a: 133), which means that interventions that challenge the regime of truth **constitute a challenge to the hegemony of the social and economic system with which it is bound up.** It is in this context of a particular, scientific regime of truth and the role of the intellectual that I want to discuss the ways in which the academic search for 'causes' and 'solutions' to the Northern Ireland conflict operates, and how this mode of working can prohibit change. The role of the intellectual, as both Gramsci and Foucault have argued, can be **central to change and contestation**, but it can also be part of the structures that prohibit change and keep existing structures and problematisations in place. I suggest that the particular form of intellectual work that identifies 'problems' and then proposes 'solutions' is problematic. It ultimately reinforces or ***reproduces*** certain ways of ***thinking*** and ***conceals*** the way that ***identifying something as a problem in the first place*** ***is already to take a particular stance*** in relation to it. I argue that the alternative in the case of violence in particular is to engage in intellectual activity that ***brings to light*** struggles hidden in detailed historical records or localised knowledges - an activity that Foucault calls genealogy - ***and emphasises the necessity for a gradual remaking of the world***, not through narrative accounts that regularise and normalise history in terms of cause and effect, but through a ***slow re-building, brick by brick.*** Cause and Solution The question the present volume addresses specifically is whether a search for causes and solutions is in some way constitutive of the very problems that analysis purports to attempt to resolve. There are two ways of interpreting this question. First, it can be read as asking whether what academics propose as 'causes' of the conflict originate *from the analysis of* the conflict (in other words, were the causes there already, waiting to be identified and analysed), or whether they come from the imagination of academics and only later are found in the *'real world'* of the conflict. In other words, did the theorising of academics predispose them to find certain things 'out there' in the 'real world' and thus prompt behaviour of a type that then made the real world appear to be as the academics had proposed? To put it simply, is academic theorising a self-fulfilling prophecy? Does the way we see the world, influenced at least in part by academic analyses, affect how we act in the world and thus produce a world that resembles academic theorisations? These questions, although interesting, are still framed within a very particular way of thinking, one that operates with an assumed separation between 'thinking' and 'the world'. They raise the question of whether intellectual analysis in the social world can be seen as independent or whether it should rather be regarded as constitutive of the world. There is a strong argument for the latter position. Adopting this view brings into question a scientific regime of truth, to the extent to which such a regime depends on notions of objectivity. However, alongside this concern there is another. To what extent does the way in which 'problems' like conflict are approached have a specific impact too? Is it just the question of objectivity that is problematic here? Or is the search for causes and solutions itself a very particular form of academic analysis of conflict, and one that has particular implications? The idea that conflicts have causes, and that if we could understand what those causes were we could remove them and put an end to conflict, reflects a specifically **modernist, Western, academic approach**, where answers are sought in **technical terms**. The point is that even if it is accepted that theories in some sense constitute the world, it is still often tacitly assumed that that 'problems' exist 'out there': solutions may be problematic in terms of objectivity or the impossibility of separating theory from practice, but often the existence of problems themselves (conflict, famine) to which 'solutions' are sought is not questioned. It might be useful to examine this further. The literature on famines is interesting in this regard. Much of it is centred on the idea that famines have causes, and that we can 'end' famines through scientific, social scientific or economic research. The assumption is that if we can find out what the causes of famines are then hopefully we can remove them. Early accounts that constitute 'famine' as an object of study in relation to 'population' - Malthusian accounts - regard famine as an almost inevitable consequence of population growth. If human populations expand (it is taken for granted in these accounts that they will), then the size of the population will at some stage outstrip the growth in food production, which takes place, according to these accounts, at a slower pace (Malthus 1992). Famines will then occur that will bring population and food supply in line again. Arguments like this in terms of population growth and resources have been made in relation to conflict and genocide as well as famine (Uvin 2001). They are similar to views that see famines as the consequence of environmental degradation or climatic factors. There are two problems with these accounts. First, they set to one side the way in which 'famine' as we think of it now is produced as an object of study at a particular historical point: this is no longer questioned (Edkins 2000). In the accounts discussed above, there is an assumption that famines are a 'natural' phenomenon. This way of looking at famines has been disputed for some time, and the view that famines are 'man-made' strongly argued (George 1976). However, even among those who want to emphasise political, structural or economic causes rather than climatic or environmental ones, there remains a sense that 'famine' is an appropriate object of analysis, and that the 'causes' of famine can be understood in terms of scientific, social scientific or economic 'laws'. Secondly, there is an assumption that famines take place because of a technical failure: they happen because of a breakdown of agricultural systems, or a failure of social support systems, or a problem with economic resources (Edkins 1996). If we can find out what the cause of this failure is then we can act to put it right. However, famine is not something that just happens: in many cases it is not a failure, but rather a process of exploitation (Ramgasami 1985) or even, in some cases, a deliberate act akin to a genocide (De Waal 1997; Edkins 2002). It is also a process with beneficiaries as well as victims: while some starve, others make profits because of increased prices of foodstuffs, or by taking the land of those who emigrate, for example (Keen 1994). By treating it as a phenomenon that has 'causes' we are taking out the politics involved. Famines are not just things that happen because the rain fails or because the potato becomes diseased. They are more complex, and more political, than that. They happen because particular people take particular forms of action - when they could do otherwise. What the way of thinking I have described does is constitute famines as events that have causes, and that most usually can be seen as the failure or breakdown of an otherwise benign system. They close off the possibility of seeing famines as events, like genocide for example, that involve the particular actions or inactions of certain people, people who could in some instances at least be held responsible for what happens. It does not recognise that there will be those who will resist any attempt to put in place 'solutions' that propose such things as welfare systems to cushion the poor in bad times or aid provided in such a way that it cannot be exploited by the parties to a conflict. It is assumed that everyone is behind the effort to make sure that famines do not take place, and that all that is missing is the know-how to do this. It forgets that very many people benefit in a wide variety of ways from the system as it stands, which is one that could be seen as effectively *producing* famines: famines are arguably the product *of the system* rather than of its failure. Thinking in terms of 'causes' and 'solutions', then, is an approach that in the case of famines **makes it impossible to see certain aspects** of the situation: **it makes the politics of what is going on *invisible***. This then means that the search for 'causes' or 'solutions' is more than just constitutive of the reality it aims to reflect: **this approach is complicit in perpetuating the very thing it seeks to 'end'**. Seeing famine as a failure or a breakdown limits the questions we ask. **We need to look at the politics *of it***, not just treat[ing] it as a problem, a technical malfunction of an otherwise benign system. Treating it in this way **enables the economy of oppressions** and benefits that surrounds it ***to continue***. We need to consider the possibility that famines happen because the social and political system in which they are embedded is working too well rather than because it has failed. The same sort of argument applies, I would want to suggest, to the case of conflict. An abstract study of conflict in terms of cause and solution can be similarly problematic. The Local and the Global If the search for causes and solutions can be counterproductive, what do we do? One possibility, as has been mentioned in the case of famines, is **to pay attention not to *causes* but to *functions***: we should look not at what causes conflict, but what does a particular conflict dod? Who does it benefit and how? How does constituting the 'conflict' as an object of study produce certain effects? This demands a focus not on 'conflict' in *general* but on the *local*: the specific detail of particular instances.

#### Dissensus is able to radically reframe our demands and open up space for subjugated epistemologies—the alternative is the only chance to reclaim the political sphere from elites

Swyngedouw 8 (Eric, Geography School of Environment and Development University of Manchester, “Where is the political?,” Based on Antipode Lecture, IBG/RGS annual conference 2007, London, 29 August – 1 September and on James Blaut Memorial Lecture, Annual Conference of the AAG, Boston, 16-21 April 2008, <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/research/hmrg/activities/documents/Swyngedouw.pdf>, JS)

The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify inequalities or unfreedoms, exemplified by the demands of many activists and others who are choreographing resistance to the police order, but, in contrast, it is the demand to be counted, named, and recognized as part of the police order. It is the articulation of voice that demands its place in the spaces of the police order: it appears, for example, when undocumented workers shout “we are here, therefore we are from here” and demand their place within the socio-political edifice. These are the evental time-spaces from where a proper political sequence may unfold. The political is about the unconditional enunciation of the right to égaliberté, the right to the polis; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in an oligarchic police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. This is of course what Rancière also refers as the scandal of democracy that maintains a singular presence, yet is radically split into two processes: the oligarchic police process on the one hand and the principle of equality expressed through the process of emanciptation on the other (Rancière 1998). Democratic politics, therefore, are radically anti-utopian; they are not about fighting for a utopian future, but are precisely about bringing into being, spatialising, what is already promised by the very principle upon which the democratic political is constituted, i.e. equality. If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, “a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority”. (Hallward 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of “floating subjects that deregulate all respresentations of places and portions.”(Rancière 1998: 99-100): “In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it.” (Rancière 2003a: 201) The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the policy order claim their right to speak, acquire speech, and produce the spatiality that permits and sustains this right. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms, voids and excesses that constitute the police order, and tests the principle of equality. The political, therefore, always operates from a certain minimal distance from the State/the police1. Politics proper, then, is the confrontation of the political with the police order, when the principle of equality confronts a wrong instituted through the police order. It appears thus when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, “when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Rancière 1998: 11): “[p]olitics in general … is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible” (Rancière 2003b: 3). A proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustices or inequalities, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Therefore, a proper politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative: “Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (Rancière 1998: 33) and “… revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière 2006b: 13). The space of the political is to “disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole” (Rancière 2001), it is a particular that stands for the whole of the community and aspires towards universalisation. The space of the political is therefore always specific, concrete, particular, but stands as the metaphorical condensation of the universal. And of course, politics is about the production of spaces and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: “[t]he principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in on” (Rancière 2001: Thesis 8); it occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no foundational place or location: “Politics ‘takes place’ in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on”, it is the disruption of the police order (Rancière 2003c: 7). It can arise anywhere and everywhere. “[S]pace becomes political in that it … becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests” (Dikeç 2005: 172). The political understood in above terms rejects a naturalization of the political, signals that a political ‘passage à l’acte’ does not rely on expert knowledge and administration (the partition of the sensible), but on a disruption of the field of vision and of the distribution of functions and spaces on the basis of the principle of equality. With Alain Badiou, Rancière shares the view that the political event is rare and unusual; they are far from believing that ‘everything is political’, the clarion call of 1970s style progressive movements. While the political event might arise anywhere and everywhere, the political sequence is unusual, eventual, not predictable, and, above all, disruptive. Politics, i.e. the struggle of those who have no name and no voice to enter the space of the police, the contested borderline zone between the political and the police, is an even rarer moment, when those who are part of the situation but not part of the state of the situation become part of the state. This view of the political as a space of dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, stands in sharp contrast to the consolidating consensual ‘post- politics’ of contemporary neo-liberal ‘good’ governance. Of course, it also begs the question as to what to do. How to reclaim the political, as discussed above, from the debris of consensual autocratic post-political post-democracy? Claiming the Democratic Polis The notion of the political articulated in this paper centers on division, conflict, and polemic (Valentine 2005), accepts the constitutive antagonisms that split ‘the people’, that traverse the myth of the One, the singular, and rejects the myth of an archae-political possibility of an organic, sutured, unfractured community, the possibility of a community one with itself. Therefore, democracy always operates against pacification, acknowledges social disruption, and disturbs the management of consensus and ‘stability’. As Peter Hallward, echoing Rancière and Badiou, argues: “[t]he concern of democracy is not with the formulation of agreement or the preservation of order but with the invention of new and hitherto unauthorised modes of disaggregation, disagreement and disorder” (Hallward 2005: 34-35). A political truth procedure, for Badiou, is initiated when in the name of equality fidelity to an event is declared, a fidelity that, although always particular, aspires to become public, to universalize. It is a wager on the truth of the egalitarian political sequence, unleashed by a declaration of fidelity to the communist hypothesis (Badiou 2008), a truth that can be only verified ex-post. Preferred examples of Badiou and Žižek are Robespierre, Lenin, or Mao in their declaration of fidelity to the procedure of communist truth in the revolutionary event. Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly against the radical politics that characterize so much of the current forms and theorizations of resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; rather than reveling in the immanence of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). Politics understood as rituals of resistance is, according to Zizek, doomed to fail politically: “Radical political practices itself is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize, displace, and so on, the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it effectively – the ultimate goal of radical politics is ultimately to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity” (Žižek 2002b: 101). The problem with such tactics is not only that they leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are actually conducive to the flows of global capital and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are already taken into account, even engendered by the hegemomic form” (Žižek 1999b: 264). In contrast, as Alain Badiou (Badiou 2005b) argues, a new radical politics requires formulating and enrolling new great fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different egalibertarian socio-environmental or geographical futures. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures, making the new and impossible enter the realm of politics and of democracy on the basis of the very promise of democracy (egaliberty), but which the oligarchic hatred of democracy systematically undermines or disrupts, and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Politics consists in a “series of actions that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of any parts have been defined (Rancière 1998: 30)” cited in (Dikeç 2005: 181-182)”. Proper egalitarian democracy is “the symbolic institution of the political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise power – a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination. It is the paradoxical power of those who do not count: the count of the ‘unaccounted for’” (Rancière 2000c: 124). Dissensus is the proper name of egalitarian politics: “The notion of dissensus thus means the following: politics is comprised of a surplus of subjects that introduce, within the saturated order of the police, a surplus of objects. These subjects do not have the consistency of coherent social groups united by a common property or a common birth, etc. They exist entirely within the act, and their actions are manifestations of a dissensus; that is, the making contentious of the givens of a particular situation. The subjects of politics make visible that which is not perceivable, that which, under the optics of a given perceptive field, did not possess a raison d’être, that which did not have a name …. This … constitutes the ground for political action: certain subjects that do not count create a common polemical scene where they put into contention the objective status of what is ‘given’ and impose an examination and discussion of those things that were not ‘visible’, that were not accounted for previously” (Rancière 2000c: 124-125) Therefore, the political act (intervention) proper is “not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work …. it changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing constellation (emphasis in original)” (Žižek 1999b: 199). The political becomes for Žižek and Rancière the space of litigation (Žižek 1998), the space for those who are not-All, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place. This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, demands that presupposes or requires a transformation of socio-physical space. Such egalitarian-democratic demands, scandalous in the representation order of the police yet eminently realizable, are like those formulated in the last chapter of the Communist Manifesto (universal and free education, universal and free care for the elderly, universal and equitable voting rights, universal and free health care, collective organization of (produced) natures). When these demands were formulated in 1848, they were scandalous, deeply disruptive and rejected out of hand as impossible by the police order. Yet, four of these five demands were realized in one form or another in most of Western Europe during the 20th century: the passion for the real (Badiou 2007) embodied by these demands fuelled the passage to the act that instituted them. That constitutes, for Badiou or Ranciere, a proper political sequence, and one that can be thought and practiced irrespective of any substantive social theorization – it is the political in itself at work. Of course, the current neo-liberal police order has already substantially eroded these democratic gains while traversing the symbolic order, one that now sees these demands again as scandalous and impossible. These are today among the key arenas where the principle of freedom and equality is perverted and undermined, where the scandal of democracy erupts most violently. Another example of such political sequence erupted when, in 1981, Solidarnosc’s demands for better working conditions on the Gdansk shipyards translated into the universal demands for political rights against the oligarchic bureaucratic order of state capitalism and their apparatchiks in Poland; when the latter acknowledged the demands of the activists, their police order’s symbolic edifice and constituted order crumbled and revealed the empty locus of power. They launched a proper political sequence that would overturn the symbolic order and the distribution of functions and places associated with it. Or when civil society groups took to the streets of East Germany and demanded different rights, it started a sequence that would transform existing authoritarian state forms. Their subsequent history of course also signaled their accelerated incorporation into a post-political European order as the opened dissensual political space soon closed down again. It is the sort of demand expressed when illegal and other immigrants in Europe or the US claim that ‘we are here, therefore we are from here’. The illegal immigrant already foreshadows of course the idealized neoliberal subject, the one without political inscription, without papers (and therefore no rights); the illegal immigrant already stands in as the subject neoliberalisation seeks to universalize, the one without papers, homo sacer, and who, consequently, has no other choice than to sell him- or herself to the highest bidder: “Nowadays, when the welfare state is gone, this separation between citizens and non-citizens still remains, but with an additional paradox that non citizens represent the avant-garde within the neo-liberal project, because they are indeed positioned within the labor force market without any kind of social rights or state protection. Thus, if we examine this problem in such a way, the sanspapiers and the erased are the avant-garde form of sociality which would prevail if the neo- liberal concept is to be fully realized, if it would not be important anymore if someone is a citizen or not, if everybody would be defined only according to their position in the labor market and the labor process” (Pupovac and Karamani 2006: 48). Such new symbolizations through which what is considered to be noise by the police is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the spatial should start from, where a possible re-politicization of public civic space resides. These symbolizations should start from the premise that the promise of democracy, political equality, is ‘wronged’ by the oligarchic police order, and where those who are unaccounted for, unnamed, whose fictions are only registered as noise, claim their metaphorical and material space. Reclaiming the democratic polis as the space of dissensus, disagreement, and as the space where places for enunciating the different, for staging the voices of those unheard or unnoticed are constructed, egalibertarian voices that aspire to universalisation, is exactly where a proper democratic politics should reside. And it is exactly these practices that urgently require attention, nurturing, recognition and valorization. They demand their own space; they require the creation of their own material and cultural landscapes, their own emblematic geographies. These are the spaces where the post-political post- democratic consensus is questioned, where the right to égaliberté is asserted, practices of radical democratization experimented with, and democracy conquered; not an instituted formal arrangement that cannot but subvert itself, but one that aims at overtaking and replacing instituted post-political post-democracy.

#### Critique solves the aff better

**Saito 6** (Natsu Taylor, Georgia State University College of Law, “Reflections on Homeland and Security,” CR: The New Centennial Review 6.1 (2006) 239-267, MUSE, JS)

In its current terror wars, the U.S. government has repeatedly characterized the threat as an external one. The enemy comes from without to destroy the homeland. "They" hate "Us" (and our freedom). They will stop at nothing to destroy us (National Security Strategy 2002). Upon closer examination, however, we find that—just as the borders and identities that are supposed to demarcate in from out are porous and shifting—those who comprise the enemy do not necessarily come from without. They are, however, increasingly rendered "other" and situated on the outside, figuratively and sometimes literally. At times, however, this process of defining and rendering those who attack us as enemy outsiders comes into conflict with the racialized concept of the insider. No one disputes that the bombings of the federal building in Oklahoma City and the Olympic plaza in Atlanta, the actions of the unabomber, or the mailing of anthrax-laden letters to government offices were terrorist attacks. But these were all, apparently, perpetrated by white [End Page 251] men—not only citizens but classic Americans with no foreign ties to blame. For the most part, this incongruity has been allowed to slip away quietly; somehow, these events are no longer referenced in the context of the War on Terror. Timothy McVeigh (Jones and Gideon 1998), Eric Rudolf (Burkoff 2004, 650-51), and Ted Kaczynski (Mello 2000) have been prosecuted and convicted under normal criminal laws and procedures, and the identified anthrax suspect seems to be under investigation indefinitely (Greenhouse 2002).15 Even John Walker Lindh, a white U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan while allegedly fighting for the Taliban, was treated as an internal criminal rather than an outside terrorist. He was taken by the military to Alexandria, Virginia, turned over to civil authorities, and charged with conspiring to kill Americans. As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced, "the great strength of America is he will now have his day in court" (Seelye 2002; Cole 2002). In fact, Lindh soon appeared in a civilian criminal court where, represented by counsel and supported by his family, he pled guilty to reduced charges (United States v. Lindh). Yet in other cases, U.S. citizens suspected of similar crimes have not been afforded such constitutionally guaranteed due process. Instead, they have been unilaterally declared to be outsiders—enemy combatants—and that designation, which has no intrinsic legal meaning, has been used to deny them virtually all the rights supposedly attached to citizenship. Yaser Esam Hamdi, like Lindh, was taken prisoner in Afghanistan and was apparently on his way to Guantánamo when it was discovered that he was a U.S. citizen of Middle Eastern descent, born in Louisiana. He was then placed in a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and held incommunicado for nearly three years. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf, and in June 2004, the Supreme Court held that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker" (See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 533). The Court did not require that the "neutral decision maker" be a federal court or that constitutional protections normally pertaining to criminal proceedings be extended to such "citizen-detainees."16 [End Page 252] Rather than providing Hamdi with even minimal due process, the government chose to remove him beyond any border penetrable by the U.S. Supreme Court. As reported by the New York Times, "Yaser E. Hamdi, an American citizen captured in Afghanistan and once deemed so dangerous that the American military held him incommunicado for more than two years as an enemy combatant, will be freed and allowed to return to Saudi Arabia. . . ." (Lichtblau 2004, A1).17 In light of its consistent history of attempting to deport politically undesirable aliens on the basis of secret evidence (Akram 1999), the government's desire to deport Hamdi rather than give him a hearing is not particularly surprising. In Hamdi's case, however, his citizenship complicated the government's ability to classify him as a politically undesirable alien. As law professor Leti Volpp explains: In the American imagination, those who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" may be theoretically entitled to formal rights, but they do not stand in for or represent the nation. Instead, they are interpellated as antithetical to the citizen's sense of identity. Citizenship in the form of legal status does not guarantee that they will be constitutive of the American body politic. In fact, quite the opposite: The consolidation of American identity takes place against them. (Volpp 2002, 1594) Thus, in return for his release, Hamdi not only had to agree to deportation to Saudi Arabia but also to renunciation of his U.S. citizenship (Lichtblau 2004).18 Even more interesting is the case of Jose Padilla, a Puerto Rican born in Brooklyn and thus, like Lindh and Hamdi, a U.S. citizen by birth. Unlike Lindh and Hamdi, he was not captured in combat but was arrested at Chicago's O'Hare Airport on a material witness warrant (Iijima 2004, 134-38; Newman 2003/2004). Two days before a scheduled court hearing, he was declared an enemy combatant and ordered into military custody. Initially held in New York, he was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina where he remains nearly four years later. The Supreme Court heard Padilla's case but failed to reach the merits, holding that the case had been filed in the wrong jurisdiction. Padilla refiled in South Carolina, where [End Page 253] the federal district court held that the executive did not have the inherent power it asserted to detain indefinitely a U.S. citizen, arrested on U.S. soil, as an enemy combatant. Accordingly, the court ordered the government to criminally charge Padilla or release him. This was rapidly reversed, however, by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which in September 2005 held that the government could indefinitely imprison Padilla without trial based on its assertion that he "represents a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United States" (Padilla v. Hanft, 388). Padilla, like his homeland of Puerto Rico, has been declared "foreign in a domestic sense," and apparently the government "has the power to keep [him], like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period" (Downes v. Bidwell, 372). But this travesty should not surprise us. American Indians have long been treated as enemy combatants even during times of peace.19 Well into the twentieth century, American Indians were generally required to obtain a permit from a federal Indian agent—or in some cases the military—simply to leave the territory to which they had been assigned. In the 1879 Standing Bear case, a federal court held that a group of Poncas, sent to a reservation in the Indian Territory of Oklahoma, who attempted to return to their traditional lands in eastern South Dakota without permission could be arrested by the army (United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook; Tibbles 1972). During the 1870s and 1880s, the U.S. government shipped the entire Chiricahua Apache population, including not only children, elders, and women but also those men who had fought for the United States against their renegade relatives, to the Fort Marion and Fort Pickens military prisons in Florida. Later sent to the Mt. Vernon Barracks in Alabama, they were confined in an utterly alien climate until the winter of 1913-1914, resulting in a death toll of some 40 percent (Leider and Page 1997). It was not until 1909 that a court formally ruled that American Indians could not be classified—or treated—as prisoners of war merely because they were Indians (United States v. By-a-lil-le; Harring 1994, 198-203). And then, of course, there were the nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens by birth, incarcerated for years during World War II without any semblance of due process20 on the basis of military [End Page 254] assertions that it was impossible to tell the loyal Japanese American from the disloyal. In General John L. DeWitt's words, "The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted" (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 1997, 66). They were, in other words, collectively deemed enemy combatants. Notably, the evacuation orders were directed at "all persons of Japanese ancestry—alien and non-alien." "Non-aliens" were, of course, those "born on United States soil" and "possessed of United States citizenship," but as "non-aliens" rather than "citizens," they could be presumed disloyal on the basis of race and national origin and incarcerated indefinitely without trial, indeed without any of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights (Rostow 1945). Throughout U.S. history, any movement that threatens the status quo has been labeled a threat to the national security and, when possible, foreigners are blamed. Un-American, thus, has both a literal and a figurative dimension. As early as 1798, Congress passed the first Alien and Sedition Acts based on the Federalists' claim that the Jeffersonians were agents of France attempting to bring the French Revolution's reign of terror to the United States (Curry 1988). Those who fought for the abolition of slavery were deemed seditious (Curtis 1997). Catholic immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were untrustworthy because their primary allegiance was to the pope, labor organizing was the work of foreign agitators, and immigrants were to blame for the popularity of anarchist and socialist movements in the early 1900s (Zinn 1980, 206-89; Goldstein 2001, 3-101). Those who opposed the war to occupy the Philippines (1898-1902) and U.S. involvement in the First World War were accused of sedition and even treason (Goldstein 2001, 103-35; Miller 1982, 77, 156-66). In the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights and anti-war organizations were routinely labeled communist front groups, and, more generally, anyone advocating social or political change was deemed a threat to the national security. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (also known as the Church Committee) reported in the mid-1970s, this practice was used as an excuse by the FBI and numerous other federal agencies to engage in thousands of [End Page 255] counterintelligence operations against U.S. citizens, using means that were lawful only when employed against spies, saboteurs, and other such agents of foreign powers.20 One of the most significant, and generally overlooked, aspects of the PATRIOT Act is its legalization of the use of such means previously employed illegally against U.S. citizens. Thus, for example, Title II expands the definition of "foreign intelligence information" to include not only information relating to attacks or sabotage by foreign powers or their agents, but "information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to (i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States" (§203[a], emphasis added). Thus defined, any citizen's statements on any matter of U.S. foreign policy, including economic policy, may be deemed "foreign intelligence information" and, as a result, disclosed to virtually any federal law enforcement, intelligence, immigration, or national security official. In addition to generally expanding surveillance powers, the Act extends provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to domestic activities as long as foreign intelligence is also a purpose, rather than the purpose, of the investigation. This information can then be used in criminal prosecutions, eviscerating the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause for searches and seizures, as has already been done in drug-trafficking, blackmail, and pornography cases (Chemerinsky 2004, 1624– 27; Lichblau 2003). On numerous fronts, the government is invoking the threat of terrorism to expand dramatically its domestic criminal law enforcement powers in direct violation of constitutional guarantees. Playing upon the fears generated by the specter of an enemy attacking the homeland from without, the executive, backed by the Congress and the judiciary, has thus turned its expanded arsenal of state police power toward combating both ordinary crime and political dissent within the homeland. In turn, those within who are deemed threats to the status quo are increasingly portrayed as outsiders. The right to engage in political protest is characterized as a fundamental American value, but under the PATRIOT Act, those who violate any federal or state law while engaging in acts "dangerous [End Page 256] to human life" that appear intended to "influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion" can be charged and prosecuted as "domestic terrorists" (§802[a]). Under this definition, Dr. Martin Luther King would have been a domestic terrorist, and it can certainly be applied today to those who, for instance, fail to obey an officer's order to disperse while blocking an intersection in protest of the war in Iraq or police brutality or any other government policy. Acts of civil disobedience that would at most warrant minor misdemeanor convictions can now result in 15-year prison terms. Even when confronting massive illegality on the part of the government, we are to be constrained, it seems, to symbolic protests; in other words, only the least effective means of dissent will be considered legal. Those who literally or figuratively venture outside the carefully cordoned-off free speech zone will be cast as terrorists, outsiders bent on bringing down the homeland, individuals who are, therefore, the enemy. In a very literal sense, this has been proposed by the Justice Department in its draft Domestic Security Act of 2003. Commonly known as PATRIOT II, this proposed legislation was leaked to the press and, probably because of widespread public criticism, has not been introduced in its totality. Several of its provisions, however, have been enacted with little debate. One proposal, as yet unadopted but illuminating the trajectory of this War on Terror, would allow for the expatriation of a U.S. citizen who joins, serves in, or provides material support to a terrorist organization "engaged in hostilities against the United States, its people, or its national security interests" (§501). "Material support," "terrorist organization," and "national security interests" are each extremely broadly defined and "hostilities" is left undefined, with the result that this provision has virtually unlimited potential for rendering U.S. citizens stateless. They (we?) would, in very concrete terms, become the enemy without—residing, perhaps, at Guantánamo Bay or in a Saudi prison. Returning to First Principles Beyond the more tangible aspects underlying the construct of homeland security—the land, borders, and people purportedly being protected—lies [End Page 257] another dimension, that of American values. The importance of defending these values is most frequently invoked when the concrete manifestations of U.S. policies appear at odds with their stated intent. In the current terror wars, the U.S. government justifies its exercise of unilateral power, its disregard for international law and institutions, and its violation of human rights and humanitarian law both at home and abroad by casting this as a war of good against evil. As inimitably put by George W. Bush shortly after September 11, 2001, "The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning further acts, are evil people. They don't represent an ideology, they don't represent a legitimate political group of people. They're flat evil. That's all they can think about, is evil" (Bush 2003b, 22). In this construction, the United States has an historic responsibility, particularly as the world's sole superpower, to destroy evil because the United States embodies the core values of the forces of good. Articulated in a variety of ways, there are three fundamental values at issue here. While characterized as uniquely American, these values are recognized as the legitimate aspirations of all peoples. The first is freedom, or liberty: "Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us"(Bush 2003a, 17). The second value is democracy. Although referenced less frequently in the rhetoric accompanying the domestic War on Terror, a democratic form of government is recognized as necessary to the flourishing of human freedom, and the leaders of the "forces of evil" are consistently characterized as dictators and tyrants. As Bush stated before the U.S. Congress, "Americans are asking: Why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other" (2003a, 14). As noted in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy (2002, n.p.), the rule of law is the third essential component of the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" because it guarantees power will be exercised in a manner consistent with the democratic processes that in turn protect [End Page 258] human freedom. Addressing Congress in 2001, Bush described America's current enemies as "the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century" (Bush 2003a, 14). He recognized that the alternative to the rule of law is the exercise of raw power as he continued: "[B]y abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: In history's unmarked grave of discarded lies" (14). Subscribing to the principles of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law does not, however, necessitate the presumption that these principles are being defended. Indeed, all the evidence indicates that they are being undermined in the name of homeland security. By every tangible measure, the freedom of most people currently subjected to the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction is being restricted. The structural guarantees of democratic process, embodied, for example, in the U.S. Constitution's provision for checks and balances, are being eviscerated by unilateral executive action, by legislation that undermines constitutional guarantees and limits judicial review, and by the judiciary's deference to the political branches of government. Furthermore, the rule of law is being replaced by the exercise of power, as compliance with not only the U.S. Constitution but virtually all international law is treated as optional by those in power. President Bush was accurate, of course, in recognizing that the alternative is fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. In The Dual State, written in 1940, Ernst Fraenkel described the transition in the German government from a normative state, "endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order," to a prerogative state, defined as a "governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees" (Stolleis 1998, 8, 193n3). It is this prerogative state, cloaked in the rhetoric of homeland security, that we now confront, and the question is what we will do about it. In returning to first principles, we confront our roots, and in so doing, we must again confront our primary signifier, Christopher Columbus. The "la-la-la" response described above may appear superficial, but its pervasiveness indicates that it serves a significant social purpose, an essential function that is reflected in its underlying logic. Regardless of whether this [End Page 259] psychosocial response of repression and denial is couched in scholarly or flagrantly anti-intellectual terms, the subtext is the same: We are here now, and it is good. Few of us have anywhere else to go, and most of us believe that we benefit from the United States' disproportionate control of the world's wealth, power, and natural resources. More equity might be preferable, but for us, the risks of finding out overwhelm the possible benefits. Being thus committed to the status quo, at least in its most fundamental form, we will ordain it as right, natural, and inevitable. Adopting this logic necessarily entails ignoring or denying law, history, and/or contemporary social realities—an approach, one might note, that displays the classic signs of psychosis. But most Americans, apparently, are willing to do so because to engage in intellectual, ethical, or emotional debates about a foregone conclusion produces only guilt, not change. The temptation, even here, is to say "sure, you've got a theoretical point, but that level of change is unrealistic and we're trying to talk about what's happening now in this so-called War on Terror." This sort of facile dismissal is, however, at the heart of what's happening now. We are being told by those in power that the status quo—the homeland, with all it embodies—is right, natural, and inevitable, and that it is being threatened by our enemies. It would be unrealistic to consider any alternatives when the end has been predetermined, and it would be unproductive to take seriously the realities of the death, devastation, and social repression entailed in its preservation. The truth, however, is that our contemporary reality is neither right, natural, nor inevitable, and our refusal to confront it is what allows the American state to continue to consolidate its power, using its base of ill-gotten land and natural resources to extend its economic, political, and military might throughout the world and, concomitantly, to root out an ever-expanding circle of those deemed to be the enemy within. While confronting the widely accepted truths that provide the foundation for the status quo can appear to be a daunting task, it is important to note that the critique summarized in this essay is an internal one—one the framework of [End Page 260] freedom, democracy, and the rule of law not only facilitates but necessitates. According to the very legal system upon which the United States relies for its legitimacy, and upon which it bases its claim—according to Justice John Marshall—to be "a government of laws, and not of men" (Marbury v. Madison, 163), the claims made by the United States to the homeland are unsustainable. The conception of a stable and readily identifiable border is undermined by the same governmental policies and practices that rely on this notion. The construct of American is used to justify the protective measures being implemented, but U.S. law, policy, and practice fail to ensure that the protected class includes all those over whom the United States exercises jurisdiction, making it as indeterminate as the border. Justifications for increasingly repressive state action rest on the assertion that the enemy is foreign to and in conflict with the American values being preserved, in direct contradiction to the fact that those purportedly secured by such measures are, with increasing frequency, being labeled as the enemy. This attempt to point out the contradictions inherent in the status quo and its methods of preserving itself is not a critique based on morals or ethics, or on natural rights, indigenous law, or even international law, except to the extent the United States explicitly relies on the latter. Such analyses can be, have been, and should be made. But it is not necessary to do so to see that the current U.S. paradigm is unsustainable on its own terms, according to its stated values and its own laws. And this means that far from being unrealistic, engaging in an internal critique of any particular practice, policy, or law is quite feasible. Each individual piece can be readily tied to the larger whole if those of us engaging in the critique are willing to question our own fundamental assumptions honestly and confront their implications.

## 2NC Radical Imagination

#### Their truth claims rig the game and preclude possible solutions—you have an ethical obligation to vote negative even if we’re wrong.

Reinsborough ‘10 (Patrick, contributor to San Francisco U journal: Affinities, Organizing Director of the Rainforest Action Network, Giant Whispers: Narrative Power, Radical Imagination and a Future Worth Fighting For, Affinities: A Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, and Action, Vol 4, No 2 (2010), <http://journals.sfu.ca/affinities/index.php/affinities/article/view/68/207#_edn1>,)

Facing the Slow-Motion Apocalypse We find ourselves in a unique era. Unfettered, globalized corporate capitalism has dragged our planet into an ecological endgame. As the planets basic life support systems buckle under the weight of capitals industrial footprint, cracks are spreading not only in the systems physical operating structures, but also in the control myths that have helped bolster them. Our current era is a slow-motion apocalypse – the gradual unraveling of the routines, expectations and institutions that comfort the privileged and define the status quo. But by apocalypse we are not referring to a certain flavor of Christian ideologys much foreshadowed Jesus-the-Sequel-world-ending-cosmic-smack-down. Rather let us dig a little deeper to the original Greek word apokalypsis combining the verb kalypto meaning to cover or to hide, with the prefix apo meaning away. In this context the word apocalypse literally means to take the cover away, or to reveal something that has not been seen.[v] The intersecting crises of the 21st century––most visibly driven by looming ecological collapse––are laying bare the contradictions and inadequacies of the dominant culture. *The unavoidable visibility of crisis opens up political space*. These can become moments of psychic break –– 9-11, Katrina, BPs Gulf oil disaster––*when unique events challenge mass assumptions and expose the limitations of conventional wisdom.* As we see more eco-spasms, resource grabs, economic disruptions and mass displacements, the myths that glue the system together will strain under pressure and more people previously unconnected to social movements will be open to new ideas and interpretations. *But what forces will harness the inevitable psychic breaks of the near future?* As the slow-motion apocalypse accelerates*, will the fallout trigger progressive change or fuel right wing backlash? Will the crises of the future unleash popular momentum for social transformation or will they serve as an excuse for mass manipulation and repression by desperate elites struggling to maintain business-as-usual?* The fight to answer this question will occur on the lopsided terrain defined by the corporate-controlled media, repressive state power and the entrenched interests of the elite. Crisis may create opportunity but, unfortunately, crisis alone doesnt level the playing field for social justice. *We face not only escalating* technologies of social control *but also even more sophisticated propaganda techniques for normalizing these mechanics of repression.* There is a booming perception-management industry with plenty of highly paid professionals working to carefully invoke and exploit the historic control mythologies of *fear,* greed, and isolation to ensure the solutions to any given crisis do not challenge the status quo. Our *movements must swim upstream against* the dominant cultures strong currents of racism, sexism, homophobia, alienation from nature, and the *normalization of violence.* History has shown us all too clearly that *if we allow the elites to* frame popular understanding of a crisis *they will* deflect blame onto those least responsible *but already too marginalized to effectively defend themselves.* Hence, in the U.S. we have seen right-wing efforts to scapegoat poor people of color and defame the Community Reinvestment Act to explain Wall Streets housing bubble. Islamophobia is used to sell imperial resource wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the immigrants, on whom the current economy depends, are criminalized and blamed for unemployment. Winning the Battle of the Story As advertisers learned long ago, people will only go someplace they have already been in their minds. Imagination helps us fill in the gaps of possibility between now and then, perhaps and indeed, maybe and yes. Currently, many of the best storytellers and image-crafters in our culture are hired guns that sell us an imagined vision of ourselves, complete with the appropriate brand of carbonated beverage, designer jeans, or suitably inspirational political candidate. In a macro sense*, the radical imagination is always engaged in the battle of the story––the wide-ranging fight to frame the big debates and assign relevance and meaning to current events and issues*. Whose stories will be heard? Which points of view will become accepted as conventional wisdom? Which will be marginalized and dismissed? Will collective desire be harnessed for the common good, or hijacked for private gain? These are the real-world implications of narrative power. If our movements are going to win the battle of the story against the systems corporate spectacles and fear-mongering manipulations, we need to scale up both our skills and our infrastructure. The best way to build this capacity while keeping it anchored in democratic and accountable organizing is to grow it from the ground up. In this day and age every activists toolbox and every social change organizations strategy should include an applied understanding of narrative power: how to analyze dominant culture stories, reframe issues, and craft effective messages. Building the skills of grassroots activists provides an essential foundation for effective movements but it is only a first step in a broader strategy for social justice movements to contest the dominant stories of mass culture. To win major structural changes in society our movements need to apply the same rigor to the realm of narrative power analysis as many movements bring to analyzing economic and political power relations. Already many organizers are crying out for better mechanisms to help diverse constituencies build shared understandings of the control mythologies that undermine their efforts. Not only can common analyses of these obstacles help us amplify and reinforce one anothers stories, they can also help accelerate the process of building alliances, identifying collectively held beliefs and setting shared goals. But the work of distilling different visions into common stories that serve the range of engaged interests is difficult work that must confront deeper issues of representation, self-determination and the tension between short and long-term political goals. To support diverse constituencies in articulating a common narrative requires infrastructure: the development of new spaces, processes and institutions. Fortunately many long-term organizers are thinking along these ambitious lines and reclaiming the central role of narrative strategy in movement building. One particularly exciting initiative that bubbled up at the 2010 United States Social Forum[vi] is the Echo Justice participatory research project. This grassroots effort will gather information from organizers in the field about how they frame their struggles and will begin a narrative map of the control myths that obstruct systemic change in the U.S. The initial pilot project, which is being shepherded by movement support groups like the Center for Media Justice[vii], Praxis Project[viii], Movement Strategy Center[ix] and smartMeme[x], used the Social Forums Peoples Movement Assembly process[xi] to instigate deeper conversations about the role of transformative framing and shared storytelling across our different struggles and movements. In order to have vibrant and effective movements the radical imagination must not only inform our vision but also provide an ongoing impetus to innovate our movement building. Strategy and analysis certainly require their rational and quantitative components, *but in an era as volatile as the present our movements must also embrace fluidity, improvisation and paradox. The radical imagination is the impulse that leaps between unexpected synapses, bridges between different cultures, and offers a portal between distant worldviews.* To remain true to its spirit we *must* remember to constantly reassess our own assumptions, whether they govern organizational form, the terms of the debate, or our definitions of allies and opponents. We must grow movements that are hard-wired to adapt. Polishing the Chains of the Climate Crisis? As a number of theorists have pointed out, it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine a truly different one.[xii] Indeed as the escalating ecological crisis makes the end of our current world increasingly obvious, *the role of the radical imagination in articulating an alternative world is growing more urgent.*

## 2NC Pessimism Good

#### Embrace failure as a refusal of the extortion of hope and the demand for policy prescriptions to “make things better.” Only this can open new avenues for living.

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.24-6]

Why would I bother with the “night side” of ir theory?47 In part, I wish to move away from the rationalist fallacy among both defenders and critics of empire. There is a shared belief in the strategic competence of nations like the United States. Even those most vocally critical often see in the covert operations and vast military occupations a kind of purpose or conspiracy. The debate about empire then becomes about its moral virtue rather than the factual question of the strategic competence of imperial states. However, the lives of millions annihilated in Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and now increasingly throughout the continent of Africa do not reflect an amoral strategic competence. The mass murder in pursuit of the war on terrorism and its vision of nation-building is the result of lethal stupidity.48 In some sense, the investigative journalism of Jeremy Scahill and Glen Greenwald attributes too much reason and order to the catastrophic floundering of the American empire. 49 To see even a dark vision of order in the last thirty years of U.S. policy is itself a form of optimism. No one is in control, there is no conspiracy, and yet the killing continues. A pessimistic reading of U.S. empire and the geopolitical history that precedes it is neither tragedy nor farce. It is a catastrophic banality lacking in any and all history, a pile of nonevents so suffocating that we often hope for a conspiracy, punctuating event, or villain worthy of the scale of violence. 50 For those of us who continually rewatch the reruns of The Walking Dead and Jericho on our laptops in bed, we are waiting for relief in our privileged but increasingly fragile bubble. I know I am not the only one who finds respite from the weight of politics’ “cruel optimism” by watching fantasies of cruel pessimism. A pessimistic understanding of global politics helps explain how we could come to a place where there is a sense of relief in watching everything come to an end.51 Failed IR affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption. In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake. That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions. What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue.

#### Only pessimism can save us from nihilism – willing failure is an affirmative act that yields a life worth living

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.26-8]

Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.”52 Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think. If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred- year- old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about. The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons.53 In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves.54 This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary. How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it. The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens.

## 2NC Accept Death

#### Stop trying to survive, start trying to perish better

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.237-8]

So why study apocalypses? In part because we can learn a lot about the Earthling condition from how that condition has and will be punctuated by events far beyond our control.22 We live in a world sensitive to perturbation, prone to turbulences of various kinds, and it is out of that noise that creativity can be cultivated even if only by alliance rather than willed individualism. So to come to grips with apocalypses means also to think about the scales of action and efficacy with which we can participate while also cultivating attentiveness to what kinds of living things we want to intervene with and on behalf of. This is the mess that we find ourselves in. Transformation is possible but its possibility may be indifferent, or at least inured, to our existence. This puts the emphasis on how to live and how to die rather than whether we live or die. This is, I think, also present in the cacophony of apocalypticisms. There are minor strains of what, much more than Kant’s sense of enlightenment, we ought to call maturity. This time it is not the knowledge of our unique capacity for reason that should be championed and cultivated but the limited hold we have on this world and just how vulnerable we are to forces beyond our control. Maturity as humility and tragedy bares the marks of what many have called the Anthropocene much more than the particular consequences of sea-level rise in the course of any one human life. Whether our current trajectory toward climate turbulence succeeds in mass extinction cannot exclusively cause or prevent the apocalypse before us. The confrontation with the Earth system, its fragility, and its capricious grip on life will irreversibly change what it is to be human. So there must be both concern and sanguinity in preparing ourselves for what is already happening. We need to find an immortality, what Whitehead called perishing, worthy of the event of humanity. What this means is that we should not be fighting so hard to avoid perishing as a species, if that even means something, but rather we should be trying to perish better. This is a dangerous endeavor. For all the reasons Connolly’s work has fought so hard against negative critique and the debilitating stupor of Theodor Adorno, Giorgio Agamben, and other followers of the dark arts that see this life as damaged or in need of redemption, we have to find a place to take the catastrophism of the universe seriously while also following Deleuze’s invitation to intensify belief in this world.23 This might ask too much of words and ideas. Connolly warns that catastrophes “shatter the bond of trust in the world that had tacitly bound you to humanity and the world.”24 Or even worse yet, apocalypses may, as Bataille writes, “conceal a possibility of enticement.”25 I hope that we, particularly in the extravagant and luxurious countries of the world, are reaching a point of saturation in which apocalypse is becoming so obvious as to no longer paralyze or entice but to finally provoke. I suppose we will see.

## 2NC Alternative—AT Cede the Political

#### Their claims are patently-false intellectual blackmail—refusal of their threat enables better politics to emerge.

Brown ‘5 (Wendy, Professor of Poli Sci, UC Berkeley, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics,)

On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the political realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prying apart immediate political constraints from intellectual ones is one path to being "governed a little less" in Foucault's sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degoverning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remember that the "immediate choices" are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor.

#### Our alternative is critical to coalition building and re-injecting joy into leftist politics.

Brown and Halley ‘2 (Wendy, Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, and Janet, Law @ Harvard, Introduction. Left Legalism/Left Critique p 31-32)

Critique offers another source of pleasure related to this one. It can interrupt the isolation of those silenced or excluded by the binds of current legal or political strategies; indeed, it can produce conversation in which alternative political formations might be forged. Far from being the isolated reproach of a malcontent, critique can conjure intellectual community where there was none, where the hegemonic terms of political discourse only set one for or against a particular issue or campaign but did not permit of alternatives. The relief effect, in other words, can be **contagious**, releasing from political intellectual constraints not only the authors of critique but an audience interpellated by it. To consider this in terms of the concrete project of this book: if part of the reason the left feels so small and beleaguered today pertains to the fact that legalism has nearly saturated the entire political culture, thus making left projects nearly indistinguishable from more mainstream liberal ones, then critique of the sort this book features enables the possibility of discerning and reclaiming left projects within liberalism, thereby connecting with one another those who have a common concern with certain kinds of political problems, constraints, and ideals. In this light, critique binds to operate as the basis of the **resuscitation of left communities**; it can be formative and potentially connective, an image which stands in **sharp contrast** to the now conventional view of critique as either destructive or irrelevant. This discovery of others who share one’s worries and discontents with existing political practices or reform strategies, this opening of conversation outside the lines of existing practices also sketches a sensibility that itself might be worth cultivating both politically and intellectually. This is a sensibility extralegal in character, one that presses against the limits in part to understand their binding force, one that is irreverent toward identity categories and other governing norms, and above all, one that is unattached to the intellectual suffering that attends intellectual isolation. It wants to recover the pleasure of connection in intellectual and political work; indeed, it casts pleasure as that which makes such work both rich and compelling.

## 2NC AT Perm

#### The perm links harder – assimilation of the K ensures the victory of security logics. What is needed is ruthless critique that rejects any effort to make security more socially conscious or less exclusionary. Just say no.

Neocleous 18 [Mark, Prof of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel Univ, “The bleak rituals of progress; or, if somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no,” in J. Peter Burgess, *Socially Responsible Innovation in Security*, p.129-39]

Given the predominance of this trope of security, it is easy to think that the Left must have some kind of position here, offering policies or innovations that are somehow meant to be ‘socially responsible’, which is the general assumption underpinning this book. Such policies or innovations tend to be structured around a number of key principles. The first works with the concept of balance, arguing that security is important but must be balanced with something else such as liberty, or privacy, or democracy. The second approach involves criticizing the ‘privatization’ of security, with the implication that security should be distinct from the realm of the market and the power of corporations. The third approach starts by pointing to the irrationality that permeates security policy, such as the fact that more people are killed each year by drowning in their own bathtubs than by acts of terrorism, and suggests that once we see through the absurdities of existing security policy, then we will be able to have a more rational security regime. Finally, a fourth approach suggests that current security policies are too discriminatory and that we need to move towards a non- discriminatory security politics which does not target minority groups in an exclusionary fashion. The problem with these approaches is that they essentially accept the message implicit in the Hobbes- Cameron position about the universal desire for security. They presuppose that what is at stake really is something called ‘security’ and that this is achievable if only security policies were better organized, had more realistic or sensible targets, and were less discriminatory and less subject to the corporate interests working in the security field. In other words, they presuppose that security really is a universal good that could be achieved if the right (‘socially responsible’) policies were in place. The problem is that once one makes these presumptions, security will always win. Understanding security’s imperative to win requires a grasp of security as the leitmotif of bourgeois modernity. It requires understanding that security can never be disconnected from the powers of war and police to which it belongs, and therefore never disconnected from capital which operates with and through these powers. It requires an understanding of security not as a universal value but as a mechanism of domination deployed by state and capital, and that this deployment of security is part and parcel of the wider politics of fear which underpins bourgeois modernity. Far from being something that could ever be genuinely achieved, security exists for the opportunities it offers to get things done in its name. Security is a mechanism to mobilize, discipline and punish. In other words, security is a power for the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2000). This power lies partly in the fact that in a so- called ‘age of rights’, security is often presented to us as the most fundamental of all rights. According to the United Nations, the fundamental rights of all human beings are ‘life, liberty and security’. This claim repeats the revolutionary discourse of rights in the eighteenth century, and one thinker who noticed the implications of such a claim was Marx. In late 1843 in an exchange with Bruno Bauer over ‘the Jewish question’, Marx runs through the various declarations of the rights of man announced by various states in the late eighteenth century, along with the constitutions which tended to follow such declarations. Marx points out that the rights in question, though revolutionary in some (liberal) ways, are still nonetheless the rights of a member of bourgeois society, ‘of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community’. ‘Let us hear what the most radical Constitution, the Constitution of 1793, has to say’, he suggests, and then notes Article 2 of that Constitution: ‘These rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality, liberty, security, property’. Marx works through these ideas. Liberty, for example, is ‘the power which man has to do everything that does not harm the rights of others’, according to one Declaration, or ‘being able to do everything which does not harm others’, in another. Liberty is thus ‘the right to do everything that harms no one else’. J. S. Mill would later confirm this in his articulation of the ‘harm principle’ in On Liberty, but Marx treats it as nothing less than the ‘right of … separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself ’. The practical application of this right to liberty is man’s right to private property, Marx notes, ‘the right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose of it at one’s discretion … without regard to other men, independently of society’. This ‘right of self- interest … makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it’. Such observations essentially launch Marx’s critique of both rights discourses through the rest of his work, but note what he says about security at this moment. On the one hand, the rights discourse is the realization of equality, which is nothing but the equality in which each person is regarded as such a self- sufficient monad. It is also, on the other hand, the raison d’être of security. Marx cites Article 8 of the French Constitution of 1793 – ‘security consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property’ – before making the following comment: Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property. As such, security is the insurance of the egoism of bourgeois society (Marx, 1844/1975, pp. 162–164). Marx has put his finger on the core ideological concept of bourgeois modernity: security. Security underpins and overrides the other egotistic rights associated with bourgeois modernity – liberty, property, equality – in order that bourgeois egoism and capitalist order be guaranteed. Now, I have previously taken Marx’s comment to be a precursor to his claim a few years later in The Manifesto of the Communist Party about the bourgeoisie constantly ‘revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society’. The ‘constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation’ which accompanies bourgeois rule is what gets described today in the language of insecurity (Marx and Engels, 1848/1984, p. 487). Understood in terms of what has become the most important political trope of contemporary politics, the suggestion seems to be that at some fundamental level the order of capital is an order of social insecurity. And yet, at the same time, this permanent insecurity gives rise to a politics of security, reinforcing security’s place as the fundamental concept of bourgeois society. I have previously argued that this can be interpreted in terms of the ways in which security serves as a key principle of police power in constituting and regulating capital and its modes of coercion and control – the security of the community coincides with the security of the commodity – and have suggested that what is therefore now needed more than anything is nothing less than a critique of security (Neocleous, 2008, also 2000, 2014, 2016; Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). If we take seriously a comment Marx makes (1843/1975, p. 142) in his debate with Ruge, that the main task before us is not to change the world in the way envisaged by some socialists but, rather, the ruthless critique of all that exists, including and especially politics, law and religion, then we might say that for us right now the target of such a ruthless critique has to be that new political religion called ‘security’. Such a critique must have as its target all the ‘innovations’ performed in security’s name, including those claiming to be ‘socially responsible’. Capital creates insecurity and insecurity creates a demand and desire for security. To this demand and desire, capital responds with all its usual creativity, in the form of innovation after innovation. Security is therefore highly productive for capital. To be productive for capital, security must first be translated into the materiality of the commodity. Marx notes that as soon as something emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing that transcends sensuousness, in such a way that gives the commodity a mystical value. If this is so for the commodity in general, then commodities presented in security terms are at an added advantage as they appear to serve the satisfaction of a very basic, and yet also very indeterminate, human need. But Marx’s point is that commodity production per se is far from obvious and trivial. Tracing the contours of the production of security commodities takes us to the heart of the process whereby security becomes fetishistically inscribed in commodified social relations. This is the basis of the security industry. The expression ‘industry’ here refers not only to the connection between security and the commodity form but also to the rationalization, distribution, production and consumption of security. It likewise incorporates the spectacle of security.1 The security industry does not engage in security because of an interest in actually eradicating insecurity. But neither does it do so because it is interested in ‘social control’ or ‘surveillance’. Rather, it has a far more mundane interest: making a profit. To make a profit the security industry must sell security. And to sell security it must play on fears and insecurities, must generate further fears and insecurities, and must pander to the idea that our fears and insecurities are very real and must be dealt with in some way. The security industry therefore interpellates consumers as both sovereign subjects (‘the customer is king’) and as fearful subjects (‘the customer is insecure’). The customer must be reminded time and again of just how insecure they are, revealing more than anything the extent to which capital has found a way of dominating and terrorizing human beings within their very hearts and souls. This is one reason why struggles against ‘security measures’ alone are always so limiting: without connecting security to capital, such struggles never address the basic antagonism of bourgeois society. The security industry is thus where capital and security come to contemplate themselves in a world of their own making, playing a key role in the fabrication of the much wider culture of fear and insecurity that is used to shore up both state and capital. Where the state uses fear and insecurity to sustain support for the national security project, the security industry turns the fear and insecurity into the consumption of commodities. Where the security state thus perpetually offers more and more ‘solutions’ in the form of new security policies, the security industry offers ‘solutions’ in entirely commodified forms, as more and more commodities are simply marketed as solutions to one insecurity after another. The security industry thus uses its purported concern for human beings and their security to reinforce the logic of both security and the commodity form across the face of society. To the extent that both capital and the state live off the production of fear and insecurity, they must also ensure that security is something never really achieved. Behind the slogan ‘Security now!’ lies the real double- sided message: on the one hand, ‘Security with the next security product’ (the message from capital); on the other hand, ‘Security with the next security measure’ (the message from the state). Yet both the security industry and the security state perpetually cheat us of what has been promised. The promissory note is endlessly prolonged, revealing that, ultimately, the promise is illusory: all that is confirmed is that the real target will never be reached. Security is revealed to be an illusion. Part of security’s illusory power requires a passive acceptance of all the things done in security’s name and all the things state and capital want us to take most seriously as needing securing: property and commodity, law and order. Security wants us to believe that nothing other than that which is called security is good, or at least that whatever else might be considered good is nowhere nearly as good as security itself. Moreover, it wants us to believe that that which is good must be secure. Security thereby subjugates living humans to security itself. In so doing, it masks the real impoverishment of human life. Worse, it functions in such a way that this impoverishment is understood as the very thing that needs to be secured. If the main task of ideology is to get us to believe that ‘the bourgeois way of thinking is the normal way of thinking’ (Marx, 1859/1987, p. 315), then security is ideology par excellence, integral to the system of domination which now encloses the world, where each individual trembles lest they be found guilty of transgressing the boundaries imposed by security and its demands. This is why security is so demanding: it is nearly impossible to unravel the demands that security imposes on us and the immense labour that security incessantly performs on us, a labour that in turn produces new demands on us as subjects, new norms by which we are measured, new targets towards which we should be striving, new mechanisms through which hopes and dreams are to be thwarted. Witness, for example, the phenomenon that has been described as neoliberalism. Much can and has been made of the ways in which neoliberalism involves a transformation of the individual: ‘economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul’, as Margaret Thatcher (Sunday Times, 1981) once put it. Taking such a claim seriously means reading neoliberalism not simply in terms of its destructive power, for example in destroying certain kinds of rights and institutions, but also in terms of its productive power: in its ability to create new kinds of social relations, new ways of living and new political subjects. The literature on the new neoliberal subject recognizes more than anything that what is being produced is an entrepreneurial self and a productive subject: a monetized, atomized and calculating subject that is required and expected to endlessly perform as a neoliberal subject in the social realm as well as in the marketplace (Dardot and Laval, 2013). This production of new subjectivities, however, is also very much an orientation of the subject around security: new political subjects forged through security, operating for security and organized around security. In other words, security- conscious neoliberal subjects. The connection between security and capital is thus integral to the neoliberal revolution and part of neoliberalism’s productive power and disciplinary core. (As with so many aspects of neoliberalism, what is of most interest is its disciplinary moment, and at the heart of this disciplinary moment lies the logic of security.) The explosion and expansion of security in the last two decades, while conventionally connected to the problem of terrorism (the ‘war on terror’), might just as properly be connected to the attempt to engrain neoliberalism into the hearts and minds of political subjects. Moreover, because the neoliberal subject is expected to be an active subject, this activity is also expected to respond to the demands of security as well as the demands of capital. As is well known, under neoliberalism it is no longer enough for us to simply work, earn our money, go home and spend it. Now we must believe in the work we are doing and actively show that we believe in it, identifying with the organization and signing up to the company’s mission, vision and values. The neoliberal workplace has become a ‘community of desire’, as Frédéric Lordon puts it, and yet this poses a problem for capital, which constantly questions the worker’s desire. In Lordon’s example: the employee- subject swears that they have no other passion than the manufacture of yoghurt, our company’s business, but can we really believe them? (Lordon, 2015, p. 84). The answer has to be no, and so the expected desire must be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. A similar point might be made about the neoliberal polity, and likewise about the neoliberal security state: the citizen- subject swears that they have no other interest than the security of the social order, but can we really believe them? The answer must again be no,2 and so the expected desire must also be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. Herein lies the basis for all the actions we are now being trained to undertake as security- conscious neoliberal subjects, such as being trained in ‘resilience’, being taught to be constantly ‘prepared for emergency’, and being encouraged to report any friends, family, lovers, neighbours and colleagues who we suspect might be doing something ‘suspicious’ (Neocleous, 2013, 2016, 2017). Part of the novelty of neoliberalism lies precisely in the idea that this active subject is not expected to remain content with the simple exchange of security for obedience, but, rather, is to be actively mobilized around the logic of security. Security has become a neoliberal mobilization regime: the people mobilized in the name of security as well as capital. Such mobilization is yet another way of incorporating the people into security and another way in which security expresses its desire to exist without reply, just like capital and the state. Part of the illusion of security is that we are expected to bow down before it without even asking what it is or how it came to be granted such a status. To exist without reply, security seeks to nullify all dissent and suppress any rebellion even before such dissent and rebellion have begun. Any objections or resistance to any of the policies – not least the economic policies – being carried out by the powers which claim to exercise security on our behalf are met either with security measures of the most coercive kind or with the expectation that reason must abase itself before it – all our critical faculties set aside as security and its leading defenders tell us to shut up, listen and obey. Those arguing against austerity, for example, are treated first and foremost as a threat to national security. Thus, far from security being emancipation, as some people working in the academic sector of the security industry like to claim and which is the very belief that security wants us to hold, the articulation of security as an overarching principle of politics – the idea, in other words, that security is the absolute foundation of all politics, or that security has to be the starting point for any political thought, or that security is the grounds on which we must accept the protection of the state, or that what all of us would most like for Christmas is security – is nothing less than the articulation of a demand for obedience. Security is in this sense central to the containment of social change, nothing less than the principle and process of pacification, if by ‘pacification’ we understand not simply the military crushing of resistance but, rather, the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2011, 2017; Neocleous, Rigakos and Wall, 2013). What does this obedience in the name of security produce? The answer is not difficult: obedience itself. Obedience produces obedience, as Foucault once commented (2014, p. 270) about what he called ‘pastoral power’. It reproduces itself as a system of obedience. That is, one accepts the principle of security in order to become obedient and one reproduces this state of obedience in a striving for the mythical state of security. Hence one is expected to manage oneself in the way that a security operative would have us be managed. This is the very point to which Hobbes alludes in the final paragraph of Leviathan; it is the very same point understood by all contemporary politicians when they speak the language of security; and it is the point implicit in much of the discourse and policies surrounding terrorism, which is why so much anti- terror legislation concerns itself with the obedience of the population. Obedience thereby becomes a permanent way of being, and we are encouraged and expected to believe that obedience is essential to the security of the subject. Obedience becomes fundamental to the principle of raison d’état, demanded by the state for security reasons, and our training in obedience a training of and for political order. And, given the security–commodity nexus, what we are being made obedient for is nothing other than the domination of our lives by capital. Security, then, demands that we bow down to security. It demands that we feel secure in our insecurity as bourgeois subjects but also insecure in our security as bourgeois subjects. It demands that we commit ourselves not to making history but, rather, to the eternal recurrence of the same: to securing capital and the state rather than anything against it or opposed to them. Like capital, security wants us to believe that it is our fate. Opening his book Politics and Fate, Andrew Gamble asks: ‘If politics were at an end, if this was our fate, what would this mean for us?’ (2000, p. 1). One answer: it would mean nothing less than being stuck in an endless security experience. ‘How was your security experience today?’, the questionnaire at Heathrow airport demands, after making us undergo a series of security rituals. An endless security experience, then, but one in which we are constantly asked to assess, measure and confirm our happiness in being able to participate in the rituals and thus in the process to confirm the extent to which security dominates our lives. A second answer to Gamble’s question: it would mean being subjected to one security innovation after another, including those innovations sold to us as being somehow ‘socially responsible’. Innovation is one of the dominant ideas of our time. ‘Innovation is everywhere’, notes Benoît Godin. In the world of goods (technology) certainly, but also in the realm of words: innovation is discussed in the scientific and technical literature, in social sciences like history, sociology, management and economics, and in the humanities and arts. Innovation is also a central idea in the popular imaginary, in the media, in public policy, and is part of everybody’s vocabulary . (Godin, 2008, p. 5) As Godin notes, innovation has become the emblem of modern society and a panacea for resolving any and all of society’s problems. Despite its close association with the seemingly neutral terrain of technology, innovation is in fact a deeply political concept. But as a political concept, its connotations have changed dramatically over the centuries. ‘Innovation’ was for centuries a pejorative term, because innovation itself was regarded as a vice. Innovation, Godin notes, was regulated by Kings for centuries, forbidden by law and punished. Advice books and treatises for Princes and courtiers support this understanding, and include instructions not to innovate. Books of manners and sermons urge people not to meddle with innovation, and bishops visit parishes to make sure that the instruction is followed. From the Renaissance onward, innovation is also a linguistic weapon used by political writers and pamphleteers against their enemies (Godin, 2013, p. 8, 2015, pp. 5, 10–11). Entrenched ideas about the power of ‘tradition’ and ‘order’ meant that the innovator and innovation were suspect. On the one hand, in religious terms, innovation was considered heretical: ‘innovation and heresy were practically synonymous’ (Preus, 1972, p. 2). On the other hand, in political terms, innovation was considered revolutionary, as witnessed by Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, in which Burke castigates the ‘spirit of innovation’ found among revolutionaries. According to Burke, innovation is the result of a ‘selfish temper’, ‘confined views’ and a ‘furious spirit’; a good and proper politics consists in a ‘sullen resistance to innovation’ (Burke, 1790/1968, pp. 119, 181, 211, 237, 320, 325, 1795/1992, p. 271). The fact that no revolutionary ever thought of describing their own politics in terms of ‘innovation’ tells us that ‘innovation’ was a term used pejoratively by anti- revolutionaries against those questioning the political order. Innovation was thus a word used for polemical purposes and in a pejorative way, ‘a linguistic weapon used against an enemy: the revolutionary, the republican and, in the nineteenth century, the socialist’ (Godin, 2013, p. 17, also pp. 6–8, 11–12, 2015, p. 5). All of that gradually changed with the conceptual revolution associated with the emergence of new time (neue Zeit) or modernity (Neuzeit) in the late eighteenth century. Core to the formation of the new time of modernity is what Reinhart Koselleck identifies as a shift in which key concepts play on the general criterion of modernity’s ‘dynamization’ and ‘acceleration’. Such concepts no longer simply define a given state of affairs but instead ‘reach into the future’ (Koselleck, 2004, p. 80, 2002, pp. 154–169). The concept which most clearly captures Koselleck’s point about dynamism and the future is the one on which he focuses, namely ‘revolution’, but the point applies equally to ‘innovation’ (Nowotny, 2008). In the history of the concept ‘innovation’, a transition period therefore occurs between the late eighteenth century and the mid- nineteenth century in which an increasingly neutral use of the term coexists with the pejorative use, and then the pejorative use slowly dies out as an increasingly positive understanding of the term coincides with the neutral, to the point that by the twentieth century, innovation had become a more or less entirely positive term (Godin, 2015, p. 16). The shift coincides with the embrace of innovation by both capital and the state. People start to talk about the age of industrial capital as a new ‘age of innovation’. The ‘spirit of innovation’ no longer describes revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the existing order but rather those who seek to contribute to its continual ‘improvement’ and ‘civilization’ (two other keywords in capitalist mentality – see Neocleous, 2014). The ‘spirit of innovation’ becomes part and parcel of the ‘spirit of capitalism’, as innovation itself becomes the foundation for something called ‘progress’, a category which is itself ‘specifically calibrated to cope with modern experiences, namely that traditional experiences are surpassed by new ones with astonishing speed’ (Koselleck, 2002, pp. 219–220). Capital is a category of movement and ‘innovation’ a term that gives voice to this movement, in the process becoming part and parcel of bourgeois ideology. Now, on the one hand, this indicates that innovation has become part of the self- understanding of the bourgeois revolution, for as well as implying technological advance, it also connotes all those things which the bourgeoisie likes to see in itself as a class: creativity, productivity, liberty and progress. This is summed up most precisely in Joseph Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1911), which identifies innovation as the central feature of economic development and the entrepreneur as the central figure behind it (Schumpeter, 1911/1983). Bourgeois thought has transformed this into a more generalized theory of commerce (albeit rooted in a certain conception of technology) and then generalized it further still into ideas about ‘organizational innovation’, in which the ‘spirit of innovation’ is assumed to reside not so much in individuals but in the organization itself. (Such spirit was initially associated with the capitalist firm, but very quickly became applied to the organization per se.) From there the term has come to incorporate positive changes in politics, law and culture as well, reflecting its fundamental place in society’s conception of itself. Either way, ‘innovative’ is now a form of praise and people are criticized for not being innovative enough. Individuals, organizations, companies, capital, nations and states are all expected to know what innovation means, to treat it as an unconditional good and to take part in the process (Nowotny, 2008, p. 141; Godin, 2013, p. 18). Rather like security, innovation has become more or less a duty. On the one hand, then, ‘innovation’ has become a concept around which capital and the state operate and cooperate. On the other hand, socialists have sought to give innovation a ‘social’ twist. Starting in the nineteenth century, social reforms began to be conceived of as social innovations and, at the same time, social innovations began to be considered in terms of their contribution to social reform – or, better still, considered in terms of their contribution to something understood by social reformers as ‘progress’. I suspect that the commitment to socially responsible innovations (in security or anything else) has something to do with the idea of progress. Koselleck’s claim that ‘since the nineteenth century, it has become difficult to gain political legitimacy without being progressive at the same time’ (Koselleck, 2002, p. 230) applies in particular to the ways in which social reformers (‘progressives’) like to use key concepts such as innovation. Thus, alongside the discourse of technological or commercial innovation, ‘one now hears discourses on “social innovation”, meaning either major advances in the social sciences, policy/institutional reforms for the betterment of society, or solutions to social needs and problems, coming from the community sectors among others’ (Godin, 2008, p. 46). For progressives, the concept of progress contains the idea that innovations can and should be a good thing, so long as they are delivered in the spirit of liberty and democracy. For progressives this means that innovation has to be, in the style of most of the contributions to this book, socially responsible. To put it in Arendtian terms for a moment (Arendt, 1963), one might say that socially responsible innovations are a means of importing ‘the social question’ into the concept of innovation. How does this affect the claims made here about security? If ‘innovation is a concept that everyone understands spontaneously – or thinks he understands’ (Godin, 2015, p. 3, emphasis added), then that is even more the case with what we are expected to accept as a ‘socially responsible innovation’, and it is especially the case with socially responsible innovation in something else that we think we understand, namely security. Now, one might note here Helga Nowotny’s point that the concept of security and the idea of a rationality promising security are inherently unable to keep pace with the acceleration and expansion of possibilities opened up by the world of continuous innovation (Nowotny, 2008, pp. 15, 39–40, 140). In other words, continual innovation surely contributes to the constant change and everlasting uncertainty that is the foundation of much that goes by the name of ‘insecurity’. But that is not my point. My point, rather, is that if socially responsible innovation is a concept specifically calibrated to cope with the quintessentially modern experience of the constant revolutionizing of the instruments and relations of production – the fact that ‘all that is solid melts into air’, in Marx and Engels’s felicitous phrase – in such a way that something ‘progressive’ might still come out of the experience, so we might say that the idea of socially responsible innovation in security is an idea specifically calibrated to cope with the quintessentially modern experience of the constant revolutionizing of everything that goes under the name of security. Yet to organize and mobilize in the name of socially responsible innovation in security is nonetheless to organize and mobilize in the name of security. Moreover, as I have been trying to suggest in the first half of this chapter, it is likewise to mobilize in the name of capital. What ‘socially responsible innovation in security’ gives us, then, is little more than yet another way of participating in the logic of security. Adopting a term straight out of the discourse of capital (‘innovation’), and adding to it one of the key terms of corporate neoliberal power (namely ‘corporate social responsibility’), socially responsible innovations in security appear to be little more than new ways of rendering the social over to the powers of state and capital. One might extend this observation by pointing out that although it is generally assumed that the whole point of innovation is that it surprises – ‘the greater the surprise, the more innovative the idea’ (Nowotny, 2008, p. 103) – rarely is anything actually genuinely surprising offered in socially responsible innovations in security. Quite the opposite, in fact: accepting entirely the logic of security, all such innovations do is try and moderate this logic by somehow recognizing ‘privacy’ or ‘liberty’, or by not being too discriminatory or exclusionary, or by being less under the corporate powers within the security industry. Ultimately, the least surprising thing of all happens: security still wins. Worse, security wins by having the whole of the social offered up to it, and offered up to it by the new ‘socially progressive’ advisors to Princes, those whose political vision commits us to what we are told must be our fate: one security experience after another, one security scare after another, one recovery from each security scare after another, one security innovation after another. The more dominant a concept becomes, the more unimaginable the means by which those living under its spell might break that domination. In the case of security, the only way to imagine breaking its domination is to begin with its ruthless critique. To advocate socially responsible innovation in security is to advocate conformity rather than critique. If somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no.

#### Critique must come first – rethinking political ethics means rethinking the fundamental assumptions of the state & security

Burke 2007 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR at University of New South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics, and Violence, <http://opac.lib.idu.ac.id/unhan-ebook/assets/uploads/files/e40b8-041.beyond-security-ethics-and-violence.pdf>, accessed 7-3-2019 GDI-ALG]

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modern political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

#### Ignorance DA—It has the additional consequence of making us unaware of the terms of the rationality that generate forms of power, precluding successful critique.

Brown 01 [Wendy, Prof of Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, Politics Out of History. p 115-116]

Regardless of whether Foucault is invoking political rationality as a proper or improper noun, the invocation calls attention to the limited efficacy of any resistance or critique that attacks only the effects of a particular rationality rather than the scheme as a whole. In this regard, political rationality may be seen as replacing the notion of "the system" in political thinking, a notion that seeks to reach beyond epiphenomenal injustices in order to criticize the grounds of those injustices: "Those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticize an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake. . . . Liberation can only come from attacking . . . political rationality's very roots."28 **It is precisely the difference between a "rationality" and a "system" that is significant in Foucault's reformulation of the political** and that prevents this seemingly foundational account from being so. For unlike the coherently bounded, internally consistent (or internally contradictory), and relatively ahistorical figure of a system, a political rationality cannot be apprehended through empirical description or abstract principles, nor can it be falsified through general critique. Political rationalities are orders of practice and orders of discourse, not systems of rule; what must be captured for them to be subject to political criticism is their composition as well as their contingent nature. Similarly, the exploitable weaknesses in a political rationality are not systemic contradictions; they are instead effects of fragmented histories, colliding discourses, forces that persisted without triumphing decisively, unintended effects, and arguments insecure about themselves. **Such weaknesses cannot be exploited through philosophical critique that remains internal to or unaware of the terms of a particular rationality.** Genealogical critique aims to reveal various rationalities as the ones in which we live, to articulate them as particular forms of rationality. This articulation enables us to call into question the terms of political analysis from a standpoint outside those terms as well as to discern the historically produced fissures in their construction. Hence Foucault's remark that "the history of various forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is **abstract criticism."**

#### Consensus DA—Permutation brackets off dissent, ensures elite control and incorporates the alternative into the fold—the impact is serial policy failure

**Swyngedouw 8** (Eric, Geography School of Environment and Development University of Manchester, “Where is the political?,” Based on Antipode Lecture, IBG/RGS annual conference 2007, London, 29 August – 1 September and on James Blaut Memorial Lecture, Annual Conference of the AAG, Boston, 16-21 April 2008, <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/research/hmrg/activities/documents/Swyngedouw.pdf>, JS)

The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that ‘the political’ needs urgent attention, particularly in an environment that is sutured by a view of the ‘end of politics’ and the consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition. In the first part of the paper, I shall briefly consider the reduction, accelerating rapidly over the past few decades, of the political terrain to a post-democratic arrangement of oligarchic policing. The latter refers to the domination, to the attempted suturing of social space, by an instituted police order in which expert administration (a science/technology-management-policy assemblage), the naturalisation of the political to the management of a presumably inevitable ordering, and the desire for ‘good governance’ by an administrative elite in tandem with an economic oligarchy has occupied and increasingly tries to fill out, to suture, the spatiality of the political. In other words, the space of the political is increasingly colonised and saturated by the spaces of policies. In a second part, I shall attempt to re-centre the political by drawing on the work of a range of political theorists and philosophers who have begun to question this post- political order. Despite significant differences among them, they share a series of common understandings about what constitutes the domain of the political. The theme of the final section will be to consider the contours for reclaiming political democracy. I shall argue that democracy and democratic politics, and the spaces for democratic engagement need to be taken back from the post-political oligarchic constituent police order that has occupied and filled out the spaces of instituted democracy. It is in these political spaces that utopias as concrete political interventions germinate. The sort of utopia that Žižek argues is urgently needed today: “[t]he true utopia is when the situation is so without issue, without a way to resolve it within the coordinates of the possible that out of the pure urge of survival you have to invent a new space. Utopia is not kind of a free imagination; utopia is a matter of innermost urgency. You are forced to imagine it as the only way out, and this is what we need today” (Žižek 2005).

The Post-Political and Post-Democratic Condition “There is a shift form the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or agora, to a new metropolitan spatialisation that is certainly invested in a process of de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public” (Agamben 2006). Pierre Rosanvallon, in his search for a renewed political democracy, laments the recent obsession with (good) ‘governance’ as the new name of a government that would be sufficient for everyone, that would encompass, suture, the social order. For him, this replaces “politics by widely disseminated techniques of management, leaving room for one sole actor on the scene: international society, uniting under the same banner the champions of the market and the prophets of law” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). These arrangements of ‘good’ governance relate to those who embrace “the development of a new type of civil society that would finally substitute for the world of politics. On this front one finds the naïve representatives of NGOs – leftists who have re-invented themselves as humanitarians – and the executives of multinational corporations, all of whom commune together today in a touching defense of an international civil society. The utopias of the one, alas, are hardly different from the hypocrisies of the others” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). Slavoj Žižek defines such ‘governance’ as post-political arrangements that focus on the administration (policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains: “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, he argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek 2002a: 303). This post-political frame reduces politics to the sphere of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions, one that excludes those who are deemed ‘irresponsible’ (see (Raco 2003);(Baeten 2008);(Swyngedouw 2008a)). It is policy- making set within a given distribution of what is possible and driven by a desire for consent within a context of recognized difference. The stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and disruption or dissent is reduced to the instituted and institutional modalities of governing, the technologies of expert administration and management, to the dispositifs (see (Agamben 2007)) of ‘good governance’: “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account.” (Žižek 1999b: 198) “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Zizek, 2006: 72). This post-political condition takes the scandalous proposition of Marx that the state is the executive branch of the capitalist class as literally true: identifying politics with the management of capitalism is no longer a hidden secret behind the appearance of formal democracy; it has become the openly declared basis for democratic legitimacy. Maximizing the enjoyment of the people can only be achieved by declaring the inability or incapacity of the people (as a political name) to arrange or manage themselves the conditions of this maximization. The power of post-political democracy resides, in other words, in the declaration of its impotence to act politically (Rancière 1998: 113). Moreover, any denunciation or any struggle against this tactic of depoliticisation is regarded as going against historical necessity. Once again drawing on a populist and perverted Marxism, those protesting are deemed to go against the grain of history and belong to an outdated social group embracing transcended ideologies. The irony is indeed how depoliticisation is effectuated by a certain return to Marx (Rancière 2005b: 95). The post-political in its instituted democratic form, of course, elevates the ‘scandal of democracy’ to new heights. This ‘scandal’ refers to the democratic promise of the identity of the state with the people, a promise that must, of necessity, annul the constitutive antagonisms that cut through ‘the people’. While the place of power in democracy is structurally vacant (as it is liberated from the god-given location on which pre-modern state power was legitimized – (see (Lefort 1994)), yet is metaphorically filled with ‘the people’ as sovereign, those who occupy the place of power and democracy must suture the social order, contain the inherent antagonisms of the social order by suturing social space; the totality of the social is presented in the body of the state. This impossibility, the rupture of the democratic condition from within, is exactly where Claude Lefort (but see also Hannah Arendt from a slightly different perspective (Ahrendt 1973)) locates the totalitarian kernel of democratic forms (Lefort 1986). Democracy’s dark underbelly resides exactly in how its identification with the people can drive towards a position where the occupation of the place of power identifies with the whole of the people, disavows the constitutive conflicts within the social order and the gap between the place of political and the social ordering of the people. Post-politics is caught in this tension: the disappearance of the political as the space for the enunciation of dissensus (see below) and the suturing of social space by the post-political order harbours authoritarian gestures (see (Swyngedouw 2000), exactly by foreclosing the possibility for the political to emerge. In sum, post-politics is of necessity a violation of democracy. It requires foreclosing or displacing dissent and manufacturing consent and, therefore, annuls the proper democratic political. Indeed, the tension between the Multiple of the Political and the Singular or the One of Policy (Swyngedouw 2008b) is overlaid by the ‘scandal of democracy’, its impossible core that promises pluralist dissensual arrangements, yet institutes exclusive, singular, consensual practices. Indeed, post-politics refuses politicisation which aims at “more” than the negotiation of interests. A consensual post- politics arises that either eliminates fundamental conflict (usually by invoking the whole of the people – (see (Swyngedouw 2007a) and/or elevates it to Schmittian antithetical ultra-politics (Schmitt 1996). The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement. Propelled on by a drive towards reflexivity, the need to make decisions on processes with high risk low probability (Beck’s risk society thesis) on the one hand and the injunction to choose in the absence of any grounding or guarantee in truth, transfers administrative powers increasingly to a technocratic-scientific elite who is supposed to know and (cap)able to manage the situation. While difficulties and problems are staged and generally accepted as problematic (such as, for example, climate change, social exclusion, economic competitiveness, and the like), they need to be dealt with through compromise, managerial and technical arrangement, and the production of consensus. Consensus, in a very precise sense, is for Rancière the key condition of post-politics: “Consensus refers to that which is censored … Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement don’t only mean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that there is a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argue about it … It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in those places, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it … Consensus is the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world” (Rancière 2003b: §4- 6). Consensus, as the “the annulment of dissensus” announces the “end of politics” (Rancière 2001: §32). This post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus). However, consensus does not equal peace or absence of fundamental conflict (Rancière 2005a: 8). Indeed, in the absence of real politicization, the only position of real dissent is that of either the traditionalist or the fundamentalist. The only way to deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending their ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ rights. The post-political relies on either including all in a consensual pluralist order and on excluding radically those who posit themselves outside the consensus. For the latter, as Agamben (Agamben 2005) argues, the law is suspended; they are literally put outside the law and treated as extremists and terrorists: those who are not with us are irremediably against us, they constitute the enemy. Invoking the Whole/the One of the people, while denying the constitutive antagonisms and splits within the people and that cut through the social order, post-political governance is necessarily exclusive, partial, and predicated upon outlawing those that do not subscribe to the consensual arrangement. That is exactly why for Agamben ‘the Camp’ has become the core figure to identify the condition of our time. In other words, a Schmittian ultra- politics that lurks behind and underneath the post-political consensual order and does not tolerate an outside, that sutures the entire social space by the tyranny of the police (state) and squeezes out the political, pits those who ‘participate’ in the instituted configurations of the consensual post-political order radically against those who are placed outside, like the sans-papiers, political islam, radical environmentalists, communists and alter- globalists, or the otherwise marginalized. The riots in the suburbs of France’s big cities in the fall of 2005 and the police responses to this event were classic violent examples of such urban ultra-politics (see Dikec, 2007). This post-political consensus, therefore, is radically reactionary as it forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental and socio-spatial possibilities and assemblages. There is no contestation over the givens of the situation, over the partition of the sensible, there is only debate over the technologies of management, the arrangements of policing, the configuration of those who already have a stake, whose voice is already recognized as legitimate. Consider, for example, how current climate change policy aims to retro-fit the climate with technological-managerial interventions in order to continue as before, in order to make sure nothing changes fundamentally (see (Swyngedouw 2007a), so that things go on as before! (Dean 2006). Rancière, Mouffe and Crouch associate the political ‘form’ of this post-political consensus with the emergence of post-democatic institutional configurations: “Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests … Consensus demoracy is a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups who have understood that knowing what is possible and negotiating between partners are a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict. But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must exist as parties who then have to choose between two ways of obrtaining their share …. What consensus thus presupposes is the disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society …. It is, in a word, the disappearance of politics” (Rancière 1998: 102) (see also (Mouffe 2005: 29). This arrangement assumes that “all parties are known and a world in which everything is on show, in which parties are counted with none left over and in which everything can be solved by objectifying problems” (Rancière 1998: 102). There is no excess left over and above that what is instituted. There is indeed a close relationship between the post- political condition and the functioning of the political system. Colin Crouch, Chantalle Mouffe and others insist that this kind of consensual post-politics is paralleled by the rise of a post-democratic institutional configuration ((Crouch 2000, 2004). For Colin Crouch, there is a significant decline of government by the people and for the people. Although the formal configuration of democracy is still intact, there is a proliferating arsenal of new processes that bypass, evacuate or articulate with these formal institutions. I have elsewhere defined constituted post-democracy as embodying new forms of autocratic Governance-Beyond-the-State (Swyngedouw 2005) in which the act of governing is reconfigured on the basis of a stakeholder arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, regional, or local government) partakes together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (see Crouch, 2004) in partitioning the sensible, in organizing the ‘distribution of places and functions’. This is the condition of post-1991 democracy. Not only is the political arena evacuated from radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict, but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through disembedded networks of governance. These new glocal forms of ‘governance’, operative at a range of articulated spatial scales, are expressive of the post-political configuration (Mouffe 2005: 103) (Swyngedouw 2007b) (Swyngedouw 2008a). These arrangements of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ are resolutely put forward as an idealized normative model (see (Le Galès 2002) (Schmitter 2002) that promise to fulfill the conditions of good government “in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable” (Stoker 1998: 38). They are constituted as presumably horizontally networked associations, and based on interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors that share a high degree of consensus and trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within selectively inclusive participatory institutional or organisational settings. They imply a common purpose, joint action, a framework of shared values, continuous interaction and the wish to achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently (Stoker 1998) (Rakodi 2003). It is predicated upon a consensual agreement on the existing conditions (the state of the situation) and the main objectives to be achieved. They exhibit an institutional configuration based on the inclusion of private market actors, civil society groups, and parts of the ‘traditional’ state apparatus (Lemke 2002) in which a particular rationality of governing is combined with new technologies, instruments, and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, implementation, and often including policing as well.. The mobilised technologies of governance revolve around individualisation, reflexive risk-calculation (self-assessment), accountancy rules and accountancy based disciplining, quantification and bench-marking of performance. As Lemke (2002: 50) argues, such arrangements announce “a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society actors”. Politics is hereby reduced to the sphere of policy-making, to the domain of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly (and often imposed) participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions. Consensual policy-making in which the stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates over the institutional modalities of governing and the technologies of expert administration or management, announces the end of politics, annuls dissent from the consultative spaces of policy making and evacuates the proper political from the public sphere. In this post-democratic post-political constitution, adversarial politics (of the left/right variety or of radically divergent struggles over imagining and naming different socio-environmental futures for example) are considered hopelessly out of date. Although disagreement and debate are of course still possible, they operate within an overall model of elite consensus and agreement (Crouch 2004), subordinated to a managerial-technocratic regime (see also (Jörke 2005) (Blühdorn 2006)), sustained by a series of populist tactics. What is at stake then, is the practice of genuine democracy, of a return to the polis, the public space for the encounter and negotiation of disagreement, where those who have no place, are not counted or named, can acquire, or better still, appropriate voice, become part of the police. But before we can consider this, we need to return to the possibilities of ‘thinking the political’. Thinking the political I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). For him, radical transformation resides in continuous political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. His emancipatory politics adheres to the sort of activism that asks the constituent oligarchic polity of state and of economy to change, to take the demands seriously. It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their transformation, let alone their replacement in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, it is the obsessive activist, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, such politics of resistance has de facto accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism, centred on a critique of what is and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states: “The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’” In what follows, I shall propose and explore a different foundation of and for the political, one that foregrounds the notion of equality as the foundation for democracy, for égaliberté as an unconditional democratic demand, one that sees the properly political as a procedure that disrupts any given socio-spatial order, one that addresses a ‘wrong’. This ‘wrong’ is a condition in which the axiomatic principle of equality is perverted through the institution of an order that is always necessarily oligarchic. The proper political, therefore, always operates at a certain distance from the state, but is aimed at the transformation of the state (the police). Let me start with considering Jacques Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and the political. For him, the space of the political has become sutured by what he defines as the police (or policy) (Rancière 1998);(Rancière 1995). He explores whether the political can still be thought in an environment in which a post-political consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policy-making’, to managerial consensual governing. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (la police), ‘the political’ (le politique), and ‘politics’ (la politique) (see also (Ricoeur 1965); (Lefort 2000)). The ‘police’ is defined as the existing order of things and constitutes a certain ‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière 2001: 8): the police refers to “all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière 1994: 173). This partition of the sensible “renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised … This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space … It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience” (Rancière 2000a: 13-14). The police refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations and “… sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière 1998: 29). Indeed, as Dikec maintains, the police “relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution – distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on – and the normalization of this distribution” (Dikeç 2007: chapter 2, p. 5). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, that configures a set of activities and occupations and arranges the characteristics of the spaces where these activities are organized or distributed (Rancière 1998: 29). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: “[t]he essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by ‘the police’, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Rancière 2000c: 124). This drive to suturing is of course never realized. The constitutive antagonisms that rupture society preempt saturation; there will always be a constituted lack or surplus, that what is not accounted for in the symbolic order of the police (Dikeç 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess (the ‘void’ for (Badiou 2006)) that constitutes the possibility of the political. The political, then, is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding “the part for those who have no-part” (Rancière 2001: 6). The political is the arena in which Ochlos is turned into Demos, where the anarchic noise of the rabble (the part that has no-part) is turned into the recognized voice of the people, the spaces where that what is only registered as noise by the police is turned into voice. In the Nights of Labor, Rancière explores how the workers in 19th century France, through carving out there times and spaces, became the political subject under the name of the proletarian and, through this, claimed their place in the police order (Rancière 1989). Politics is, therefore, always disruptive, it emerges with the “refusal to observe the ‘place’ allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)” (Robson 2005: 5): it is the terrain where the axiomatic principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’; a ‘wrong’ that is always inherent in the oligarchic spaces of an instituted democratic polity. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; the foundational gesture of democracy is equality. It opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality, a subversion that inheres in the constituted ‘forms’ of democracy and, in an intensified way, in its post- political guise. Rancière is here on the same terrain as Alain Badiou: “[E]quality is not something to be researched or verified but a principle to be upheld” (Hallward 2003a: 228). Emancipatory politics emerge out of a fidelity to the democratic principle of equality; it is the unconditional given of and for democracy. Equality is, consequently, not some sort of utopian longing, but the very condition upon which the democratic political is founded. The truth (in the sense of being true or faithful to something) of democracy is its universalising foundation on equality and the demand for justice, for a just politics. Etienne Balibar (Balibar 1993) names this fusion of equality and liberty ‘égaliberté’, the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç 2001). The very promise of democracy, but which is always scandalously perverted, and therefore necessitates its continuing reclamation, is founded on the universalising and collective process of emancipation as égaliberté. Indeed, freedom and equality can only be conquered: they are never offered, granted or distributed.

Footnoting DA  
**Ashley and Walker ‘90** (Richard, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, and R.B.J., Professor of International Relations at the University of Victoria, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 34, JS)

These fragments of critical readings provide but a few examples of increasingly familiar ways in which scholars of international relations and the social sciences in general often interpret, interrogate, and reply to works of dissidence that speak from disciplinary margins. No doubt other examples could be offered. We think these fragments suffice, however, to illustrate a considerable range of likely critical responses that spans from left to right. Five things about these snippets are notable. First, such critical commentary is not typically offered or received as the normal, proper activity of a discipline or tradition, however that discipline or tradition be defined. Such commentary is typically encountered in a footnote, a review essay, a contribution to the occasional symposium on the discipline's future, a reading semi- nar, or the banter and sideplay of professional conferences. Rarely is it encountered as the main theme of a refereed journal article or a formal research presentation at a professional meeting. In brief, **such commentary is offered as parenthesis**. It is put forth as a pause that is occasioned by the passing encounter with the moment of dissidence and that is bracketed and set off from the real projects to which the commentators and their audiences are soon to return. Second, when critical comments such as these are offered, they are typically pro- nounced in a cool, collected, self-assured voice of an "I" or "we" that neither stum- bles nor quavers with self-doubt. Sometimes, this posture of self-assurance takes the form of nonchalance, even indifference, as if the commentary were roughly compa- rable to a remark about the shrubbery overgrowing the side of a highway one travels. An air of nonchalance is difficult to sustain, however, when dissident events disturb a sense of direction or when marginal works of thought pose questions that are diffi- cult to ignore. On such occasions, equanimity often gives way to exasperation tinged with embarrassment, a sense that it would be better if these things did not have to be said, a regret that voices of dissidence-though sometimes raising interesting ques- tions-are somehow oblivious to the obvious things that truly refined scholars should already know. On still other occasions, such as conversations between teacher and student, when the addressee of these critical readings cannot yet be presumed to be a mature member of the profession, an air of cool detachment might be replaced by a tone of sobriety, even solemnity, that reminds the potentially wayward novice that the reading is a kind of vow that he, like all members, must earnestly recite. Yet all these reading postures-nonchalance, exasperation, solemnity during the rite of passage-have something in common. As gestures in themselves, they at once presuppose and indicate the same location. These postures indicate that such critical remarks belong not at the center of the discipline where its serious and productive work is proudly presented and logically weighed, **but at its boundaries,** at its edges, at the thresholds or checkpoints of entry and exit. They indicate, in the same stroke, that the discipline's territorial boundaries are already marked, that the difference between outside and inside is already given, and that the discipline, the tradition, the "everybody who knows and agrees with this reading" is already assuredly there.

# \*\*\*Framework

## 2NC FW Method First

#### Political method is a prior question to implementation—the impact is serial policy failure—our framework straight turns their political engagement arguments

Dillon and Reid 2K (Michael and Julian, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance, Jan-Mar 2000, Vol. 25, Issue 1, Ebsco)

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, **in every society** the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, **and where there is expertise** there, too, **a policy problematic will emerge**. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of **discrete forms of knowledge** as well as **interlocking policy domains**. Policy domains **reify the problematization of life** in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into **"problems"** that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete **on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems** or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer **difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation**. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that **the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions**. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--**the fate and the fuel of all policy**--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they **constantly find themselves enmeshed**.[35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it **then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure**. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what **"politics**," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

## 2NC FW—AT Roleplaying

#### Role-playing causes passivity, tyranny and denies agency.

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, JS)\*We don’t endorse gendered language

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." **This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity.** The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.** One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

## 2NC FW—AT Policy Relevance

#### That’s not how policymaking happens – the Aff ignores the social power dynamics of how scholarship is produced and appropriated by policy makers.

Eriksson 2014 (Johan, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “On the Policy Relevance of Grand Theory,” *International Studies Perspectives*, 15.1, https://www.academia.edu/12626547/On\_the\_Policy\_Relevance\_of\_Grand\_Theory, accessed 7-14-2019, GDI-ATN)

I find the traditional understanding of policy-relevant scholarship problematic in three particular ways. First, it conveys an idealized rationalist–instrumentalist perspective on the policy process, ignoring wider political and symbolic aspects of policy—on which I will elaborate later. In this rationalist-instrumentalist view, scholarship is produced and screened through peer review to make sure only that which meets scientific standards of logical consistency and explanatory power gets published. Then, in the best of situations, relevant scholarship is communicated to policymakers in dire need of scientific knowledge for effectively managing real-world problems—be it war, terrorism, organized crime, famine, or other such major issues. This notion of “speaking truth to power” expresses a strong belief in the enlightenment function of scholarship and implies a traditional fact/value distinction. In reality, the relationship between theory and policy is much more complicated, as experts cannot deny responsibility for how their ideas are being used (the nuclear bomb), and because the politicization of research can imply a threat to intellectual integrity (Wildavsky 1987; Fischer 1990; Jasanoff 1997). Moreover, there are many other ideas, values, and interests besides scientific theory and research, which influence policymaking (Weiss 1977, 1980, 1992; George 1993; Smith 1996; Jasanoff 1997). Generally speaking, the utilization of scholarship in policymaking is indirect, limited, and rare (George 1993:xvii–xx; Rosenau and Sapin 1994:127–129). Second, and related to the first point, the traditional perspective on policy relevance assumes a sender–receiver perspective: university professors are supposedly “speaking truth” to government officials, who are or should be using this scholarly input in their formulation of policies. This prevailing perspective is understandable given the feeling among many IR scholars that practitioners pay little or no attention to what we have to say (George 1993; Wallace 1996; Walt 2005:42; Nye 2008a,b). Yet the distinction between senders and receivers is problematic. It suggests that communication is one-directional, that only “truth” is communicated to “power,” and that there are only two types of actors involved. What about practitioners trying to influence what scholars say and do —through, for example, prioritizing certain issues above others in research funding? Steve Smith argues that policymakers tend to utilize scholarship when it confirms what they already believe (Smith 1997, 2008). When this is the case, scholars talking to practitioners are echoing “truths” already settled by practitioners. Furthermore, the sender–receiver perspective ignores how both knowledge and policies are produced in complex contexts and processes, which involve a number of different types of actors and advocacy coalitions, with often diffuse and multidirectional patterns of influence. Ideas expressed by scholars reflect and interact with a larger societal context, which includes but is not limited to public policymaking (Buger and Gadinger 2007:95). Moreover, the very € distinction between scholars and practitioners is sometimes blurred. Some individuals are “in-and-outers” (Rosenau and Sapin 1994) going back and forth between, for example, a university position and government assignments or other political positions, such as being members of parliament. Within the world of think tanks, individuals simultaneously play a number of roles—as academic experts, as journalists, as policy advocates, and occasionally as policy shapers and decision makers themselves (Rich 2004). As argued by Lisa Anderson, universities can no longer claim monopoly of scientific (or methodologically rigorous) production of knowledge (Anderson 2003). Think tanks, NGOs, new2 and traditional media organizations, social science corporations, and governmental in-house units of research and analysis produce knowledge and input for policy sometimes competing with, sometimes replacing, that which university researchers produce. Knowledge as well as public policy is formed through epistemic communities and networks of advocacy coalitions, which are blurring the boundaries between scholars and practitioners, academia and policy, and truth and power. Third, the traditional conception of policy relevance confuses relevance with improvement. If only politicians would read and appreciate “the best” IR middlerange theories on topics on political agendas, policies would be greatly improved, and by implication, so would the world (cf. Groom 1984; Wallace 1996; Lepgold and Nincic 2000; Walt 2005; Nye 2008a,b; Jentleson and Ratner 2011:8). This view partly stems from an irritation with the perceived ignorance of policy relevance in large parts of the IR community, and partly from a sense of intellectual superiority. Arguably, this view conveys a skewed account of both theory and the policy process. To make the point clear, it cannot be assumed that influential scholarship necessarily makes policy “better” or that high-quality research always has a better chance of influencing policy than sloppy research or ideas that build on faulty or even false premises. Perhaps, it is not always the academically most acclaimed theories that gain the attention of policymakers, but rather those that provide the most simple, elegant, and accessible worldviews and solutions to problems which are in fact extremely complex. How else is it possible that ideas which are rhetorically elegant yet academically bashed, such as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” can gain significant political attention? In the words of Peter Gourevitch (1989:87–88): “Even a good idea cannot become policy if it meets certain kinds of opposition, and a bad idea can become policy if it is able to obtain support.”

#### No direct correspondence between policy scholarship and policy relevance, but critiques do have policy relevance because they influence the larger cultural context framing knowledge

Eriksson 2014 (Johan, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “On the Policy Relevance of Grand Theory,” *International Studies Perspectives*, 15.1, https://www.academia.edu/12626547/On\_the\_Policy\_Relevance\_of\_Grand\_Theory, accessed 7-14-2019, GDI-ATN)

Moreover, and more importantly for the purpose of this paper, it can be argued that these “great debates” have not been isolated affairs within the ivory tower, but have also reflected paradigms in foreign policy and world affairs. This is perhaps most clearly the case with the first debate between Realism and Utopianism, which was explicitly concerned with how the West should deal with Nazi Germany. Yet, it can also been argued that “grand theory” has continued to shape policy. US foreign policy, for example, is commonly described in terms of a balancing of two main grand theories—on the one hand Realism and its emphasis on “hard power” in military and economic terms, and on the other Liberalism and its emphasis on “soft power,” multilateralism, and the diffusion of democratic norms and institutions.4 Some scholars turned practitioners, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, have embraced a particular grand theory (in this case Realism, in its classical and geostrategic variant), as a theoretical and conceptual guide for their politics (Schwartz 2011; Brzezinski 2012). Likewise, the US postwar containment policy essentially reflected Realist geopolitical ideas—using military and economic means to “contain” the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established by the UN General Assembly in 1948, clearly reflects fundamentally Liberal ideas. Even beyond such perhaps more “obvious” cases of grand theory turned into policy, we should consider Keynes observation of how grand ideas and theories, including ideologies and religious worldviews, shape policy. Importantly, grand theories and grand ideas shaping policy should not be equated with scholars or scholarship shaping policy. As noted earlier, the relationship between scholarship and policy is a complicated one, and the assumption of a simple sender–receiver relationship is far too limited. Scholars and statesmen, as well as journalists, analysts, bureaucrats, business leaders, political activists, and others participate and contribute to a political discourse in which ideas and policies are formulated, critiqued, reshaped, and occasionally implemented. Inspired by John Kingdon and his theory of the agenda-setting process in public policy, I argue that a “garbage can”5 approach gives a more realistic understanding of the production of policy than the sender–receiver perspective. Ideas are “floating around” in the “policy soup” as well as in academia. Rather than tracing the origin or originator of an idea or a particular policy, which will only lead to “infinite regress” (Kingdon 1995:72–73), focus should be on who is advocating a particular idea, who resists it, and what determines how the policy agenda is shaped.6 Some observers lament that many useful scholarly ideas are ignored: That there is a gap between scholarship and policy in terms of direct communication and explicit exchange of ideas and people (George 1993)—a gap that arguably has tended to grow (Wallace 1996; Walt 2005; Nau 2008:636; Nye 2008a,b). Critics argue that this “gap” is exaggerated or simply, they claim scholars and policymakers tend to be likeminded and guided by similar paradigmatic views of how the world hangs together (Buger and Gadinger 2007; Smith 2008; Jones 2009). € These critics also claim that the distinction between objective scholarship (truth) and subjective politics (power) is overstated—arguing that teaching and research are unavoidably normative and very much concerned with real-world issues. Likewise, critics argue that the policy world is not only exercising power but also developing ideas, understanding, knowledge, and explanation, albeit not necessarily according to scientific principles (Smith 2008). Thus, it is essential to make a clear distinction between direct communication and exchange on the one hand and paradigmatic community on the other. There is clearly a gap in direct communication and exchange between scholarship and policy, and in a general sense, this may be growing, although patterns are not everywhere the same. Yet scholars and practitioners often share paradigmatic views on the world, largely reflecting positions taken by some grand theory.

#### Virtually no direct connection between policy scholarship and policy changes

Bertucci et al 2014 (Mariano, [fellow @ Center for Inter-American Policy and Research @ Tulane University], Fabián Borges-Herrero [Assistant Professor of Political Science at CSUSB], Claudia Fuentes-Julio [faculty @ institute of international relations @ Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro], Toward “Best Practices” in Scholar–Practitioner Relations: Insights from the Field of Inter-American Affairs, *International Studies Perspectives*, 15.1, accessed 7-15-2019, GDI-ATN)

The likelihood that scholarly ideas will influence the policy process may be inversely proportional to the politicization of the issue at play. U.S. policies on illegal drug trade, Cuba, and immigration, illustrate this paradox (Shifter 2011:2). There is widespread consensus in both academic and policy circles that U.S. policy is failing in these areas, but policymakers have not been receptive to new ideas from scholars aimed at addressing these failures.18 The complex nature of policy-making processes calls for “aligning-stars” in order for expert knowledge actually to influence policymaking. The outputs of policy-making processes depend on at least three streams and two factors that are only marginally, if at all, directly influenced by scholarly knowledge. The three policy streams flow relatively independently from each other and are as follows: (i) “problem recognition”, or the process through which a given condition (e.g., lack of peace in the Middle East) is transformed into a national security problem of a given country; (ii) “policy alternatives”, or the process through which alternative courses of action are generated in academic and nonacademic circles (e.g., bureaucracy vs. scholars working in think tanks, nongovernmental organizations); and (iii) “politics”, or “the national mood, interest groups campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover” that may or not provide a functional environment for the implementation of available policy alternatives. Added to these, the two main factors that could bring the streams together and open the “window of opportunity” for available policy alternatives to influence policy are individual efforts made by politicians or policy entrepreneurs, or crises such as 9/11. That is, policy-making processes are like “garbage cans” of decision making in which policy outcomes are the result of individual actors attaching available policy solutions to existing problems, whereas scholarly inputs are only one among five processes and factors that may facilitate or impede the influence of scholarly knowledge on practice (Krasner 2009:261). Examples in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Argentina illustrate this point. During Oscar Arias’ presidency in Costa Rica, half the cabinet had PhD degrees, but given the dysfunctional institutional design of the state (i.e., legislative minorities hold substantial veto power over policymaking due to Congressional by laws), it was virtually impossible to bring about policy change.19 In Mexico, receptiveness of policymakers to scholarly ideas tends to fluctuate depending on who is occupying the presidency. Whereas a relatively close relationship between Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) governments and the Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico (ITAM) existed during the 1980s and 1990s, the Partido Accio´n Nacional’s (PAN) administration of Vicente Fox has had something of an anti-academic bent. However, during the PAN’s government of Felipe Caldero´n, there has been a significant interaction between scholars and policymakers, as well as a few scholars-cum-practitioners occupying top-level government positions (e.g., Alejandro Poire´ as Secretary of the Interior and Rafael Ferna´ndez de Castro as Presidential Advisor for International Affairs).20 Argentina’s foreign policy-making process has historically been highly centralized in the hands of a very few political actors, mainly the president. Scholars do not circulate in and out of government and academia, even though Argentine scholars tend to tackle the most pressing issues of Argentina’s international agenda (Russell 2011). Indeed, and in sharp contrast to United States-based IR scholarship, Latin America’s research in IR has traditionally produced relevant and applicable policy knowledge in a language accessible to policymakers. The incentive structure of academia in the region has rewarded non-theoretical knowledge and theory has often been seen as irrelevant in light of the region’s pressing concerns. Whether scholar–practitioner interactions take place varies in different domestic and historical circumstances (Tickner 2011). For example, scholars have been influential in Chile’s foreign policy-making process, but not in Brazil, where Itamaraty—Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—has not only dominated that country’s foreign policy decision-making apparatus but also the production of Brazilian IR scholarship (De Souza 2011).21 The ability of scholarship to influence policy also depends on the pace at which policymaking takes place in different issue areas. The potential for scholarly influence is limited in policy areas with short time horizons, as in the case of day-to-day diplomacy. It is greater in areas with long-term horizons, such as development policy, where scholars have successfully introduced new ideas aimed at empowering women and reducing extreme poverty, as discussed above (Heredia 2012; Lustig 2012).

## 2NC FW—Discourse Key

#### Discourse establishes the parameters for thought and decision-making – critique is a prerequisite to effective policy

Debrix 2002 [Francois, professor of political science @ Virginia Tech specializing in critical geopolitics, “Language as Criticism: Assessing the Merits of Speech Acts and Discursive Formations in International Relations.” *New Political Science* 24.2, GDI-ATN]

In Bosnia’s conflict, Fierke identifies “interfacing games.”28 Two dominant speech acts, a narrative of “threat” and another of “promise,” were juxtaposed (interfaced). Both were the product of the Western actors’ analysis of the conflict and of their interactions.29 Several Western actors (the US, the European Union) mobilized rhetorics of threat vis-a`-vis the local agents involved in the conflict (Bosnians, Serbs, or others) while, at the same time, other Western actors turned to a rhetoric of promise (the UN, for example). These interfacing speech acts, although contradictory, were simultaneously deployed and gave rise to different political responses and expectations (on the part of local actors, Western interventionists, and the international community).30 Furthermore, as the speech acts evolved through contact with other speech acts, these interfacing games did not remain constant either. The language games underwent some transformations as every actor situated within the Bosnian context reacted to these language productions with their own games (the Bosnian Serbs turned to “blocking,” “shelling” and “hijacking”). As a reply to these reactions, the initially interfaced games turned to the rhetorical deployment of new deeds, such as “appeasement” and “concession” on the part of the UN for example.31 Fierke’s essay is a successful constructivist analysis of language made to fit the requirements of a specific international political situation. In the course of her study, she mobilizes notions which are proper to constructivism: language games, rules, deeds, and speech acts. Fierke does not use these notions haphazardly but, on the contrary, with clear critical intent. What such concepts allow her to accomplish is a rejection of structural realist models which often come up with predetermined explanations of political situations even before these situations have a chance to unfold. Still, for a constructivist, such a rejection is not a sufficient exercise. As indicated earlier, the critical work needs to be accompanied by a reconstructive enterprise. Fierke’s article exemplifies this reconstructive task when she intimates that an alternative way of patterning international relations can be deployed.32 What an emphasis on language rules does is show how contradictory speech acts can be made less contradictory once the rules, norms, and patterns governing their production are clarified. Once actors are made to realize what their words are about, and that other actors’ words and deeds operate according to similar patterns, a bridging of the gap between speech acts can be envisioned. At this point, normative possibilities, that is to say, the ability to identify patterns of social actions based on common language rules, take over the constructivist analysis. What is also implicit in Fierke’s attempt at “repatterning” IR is the idea that knowledge about social relations can still be meaningfully acquired. In Fierke’s words, knowledge is what allows the postmodern scholar to “go on.” The rules of language and the emphasis on speech acts “establish the parameters for knowing ‘how to go on’.”33 What language constitutes is the possibility for knowledge about the world to be gathered, albeit in a different, non-positivist, and more contextual fashion.

#### Discursive framing of international politics fabricates the conditions by which particular courses of action become thinkable and necessary

Debrix 2002 [Francois, professor of political science @ Virginia Tech specializing in critical geopolitics, “Language as Criticism: Assessing the Merits of Speech Acts and Discursive Formations in International Relations.” *New Political Science* 24.2, GDI-ATN]

The entire April 2001 diplomatic standoff between the US and China is a discursive formation, a performance of language, which manipulates the notion of “crisis” in order to bring (out of the initial incident) political advantages and desirable ideological outcomes to both parties. Both China and the US partake of the discourse which creates the “crisis.” The discursive production of this “crisis” takes place through the deployment of linguistic terms and devices which evoke the idea that a severe confrontation between both countries can happen at any moment. The very use of the term “crisis” (and related terms) by both governments connotes this sense of urgency. More than the word crisis or any of its derivatives (critical situation, stalemate, confrontation, etc.) though, the general rhetoric used to explain the situation (national defense tropes), the timing of the exchanges (verbal tit-for-tats), additional texts inserted in the exchange (having victims write letters begging to resolve the “crisis”), and the cast of characters discursively mobilized (the dead pilot, the US crew in “custody” on the island, and the authors and translators of the final apology) are what make up the linguistic and performative “substance” of this “crisis.” From a poststructuralist perspective, the linguistic performance begins at the moment when the discursive credibility of the “crisis” is made to depend upon its association with the notion of an “apology.”68 The contested meaning of the term “apology” between both nations guarantees that a standoff will take place. Indeed, when the US refuse to “apologize” for the collision and the landing, the “crisis” is initiated. The Chinese will not release the crew, the tensions will be exacerbated. Similarly, by demanding an “apology,” Jiang’s regime anticipates that the response by the US will be a negative one. The possibility of a diplomatic opening is foreclosed. From the moment this foreclosure is established, the “crisis” and its succession of events are strictly self-referential. Self-referential means that the signification of these events is the product of other discursively produced situations in the “crisis.” The linguistic performance upon which the discursive formation of the “crisis” relies establishes a semblance of dilemma: if nobody takes responsibility and words an “apology,” how can the “crisis” be averted? Yet, slowly but surely, the term “apology” is manipulated to the point where, finally, its meaning is disentangled from that of “crisis.” First, “apology” slides from full responsibility to expressions of regret and/or dialogue. 69 Clearly, regret and dialogue only make sense in relation to the intransigent meaning of “apology” established by the previous discursive context. Continuing on this discursive slide, the term “apology” is then worded by new characters (the dead pilot’s wife, Bush himself) and located in novel linguistic contexts (letters) within which the initially intransigent meaning of the term becomes much more ambiguous (is “very sorry” a full apology?). A poststructuralist reading of the standoff thus presents the “crisis” as a succession of complementary stages through which linguistic manipulations, rhetorical maneuvers and supplementary meanings are performed. Once these are performed, the discursive formation of a “crisis” is established. Similar to what Doty found in the attitude of the US vis-a`-vis the Philippines, the discursive formation of the US–China “crisis” facilitates certain representations (of self and other) which clearly serve both countries’ political interests. By deploying a “crisis” that they will be able to solve, the United States (particularly its president) show that they are in control of international affairs and that no other country, not even China, will dictate America’s foreign policy in the new century. In a sense, through the discursive fabrication of this “crisis,” American national interest and international political supremacy (two traditionally realist concepts) are reinforced. But the discursively produced “crisis” brings political advantages to China too. China uses the management of this “crisis” to remind foreign nations that it is sovereign and independent despite its growing interdependence vis-a`-vis other world economies and financial markets. Not even a “threat” to China’s economic growth can sway Jiang’s regime when it boils down to China’s independence.70 Unlike constructivism, a poststructuralist reading underscores the view that language matters, but not because it creates social norms or rules of behavior generalizable to political relations. Rather, language matters because it fabricates strictly discursive conditions and situations which nonetheless give rise to and support certain political realities. These representations of language (including the norms of social behavior discovered by constructivists) do not have to be substantiated by material realities to yield powerful effects. Their point of reference, rather, is strictly linguistic. Thus, according to a poststructuralist analysis, it was inevitable for a “crisis” to take place between China and the United States, not because of the initial collision between the planes, but because the political outcomes of such a “crisis,” if played out correctly, would be desirable to both countries. From such a critical perspective, there is no reason to believe (unlike constructivism) that such a linguistic play would necessarily modify the actors’ perceptions of one another. The discursive formation did not have to transform the agents’ behaviors to be successful.

# \*\*\*Link Debate

## Security/Fear

### Link—Security—1NC

#### Appeal to security generates a political subject that must eradicate all difference which threatens rational thought.

Campbell & Dillon 93 [David, Honorary Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the Univ of Queensland, Michael, Emeritus Prof of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster Univ, “The end of philosophy and the end of international relations,” The Political Subject of Violence, pp. 29-30]

As violence is the ultima ratio of politics, so security is the foundational value around which the political subject of violence revolves; from which it derives its teleological structure; and to which it constantly appeals in legitimation of its ordering way. Security, then, as it orders and informs the political discourses of modernity, is the vehicle by which the ethic of technology is discreetly conveyed in modern politics. From that ethic derives the characteristic way in which the politics of security makes political order present in specific material conditions of social existence. Subject to scrutiny from within the interpretive frame of the end of philosophy, it turns out, however, that **security is** more than a mere goal, even the chief goal, of the rationally ordered means-ends calculus which defines the political subject of violence. It **is**, rather, **the generative** and immanent principle of **formation of** that **political subject. To bring security into question**, therefore, is to bring the entire axiomatic foundation and architecture of this political construction into question. In the process, that questioning further **problematises the foundation of** epistemic **realism which underpins** the intellectual **discourses which** claim to account for and **speak the truth about the political subject of violence**; notably the discipline of international relations, **whose** disciplinary **response to this un-securing** of its own boundaries **has** naturally **been to elicit**, from the grip of epistemic realism in which it seeks to fasten itself ever more strongly, **more security against its new enemies**. It is security, then, which furnishes the foundation of the modern political subject; which subject is the political subject of violence. Security is **the condition**, better to say state (in order to allow the play of this word to do further work for us), **which** that subject **is** ostensibly **driven to seek for itself** and, in pursuing its own **security**, seek **to deny to its enemy**. The politics of security has, therefore, to be summoned before the end of philosophy thesis also, and it is precisely that task which James Der Derian's chapter - 'The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard'- commences. "The goal of this inquiry', he notes, 'is to make philosophically problematical what has been practically axiomatic in international relations.’ Adopting a Nietzschean voice, he begins by arguing that the first step is to ask, ‘whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values’. Der Derian proceeds by offering a 'tentative and preliminary' genealogy of security; designed, as all genealogies are, to stimulate our appreciation of 'the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, [and] to assess its economy of use in the present'. He begins by observing, first, that ‘within the concept of security lurks the entire history of Western metaphysics'. This marks the extent of its discursive register. He, therefore, commends Derrida's description of onto-theological thought -'as a series of substitutions of center for center' in a perpetual search to locate a secure 'transcendental signified' - as an equally accurate description of the politics of security as well. The political subject of violence, rapaciously invoking security, comes in a variety of guises, however, depending upon where its particular idiomatic expression happens to locate the centre: God; rational subject; nation; state; people; class; race ... The very plurality of candidates indicates what we already experience phenomenologically. **There is no secure centre**. Metaphysically, therefore, **the enemy is that** very uncertainty **which causes** the **doubt**, of which Caygill tells, **that the rational subject** of both thought and politics **was designed to dispel**. As a metaphysically determined conception of the political and form of political order, modernity's politics of security must, therefore, also always have uncertainty as its generic enemy. This is what Der Derian means when he indicates, following Nietzsche, that the paramount value of security is its abnegation of the insecurity of all values**. The enemy of** the politics of **security is** the very heterogeneity, **difference** and otherness - in Levinasian terms, radical alterity **that cannot** and will not **be assimilated into rational thought** or practice **because it** simply **always** exceeds their categories - that **threatens the** knowledgeably- **secure self-possession** which is the ideal of the sovereign subject. With the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the total effacement of the face of the post-war enemy of the Western powers, that is precisely what their leaders have admitted. The enemy of political modernity is uncertainty and contingency itself.

### Link—Security—2NC

#### Transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for truth and rationality—domesticates life

Der Derian 93 [James, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” The Political Subject of Violence, pp. 102-105]

The desire for **security is** manifested as **a collective resentment of** difference **that which is not** us, not certain, not **predictable**. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, **the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable**, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" **The fear of the unknown and** the **desire for certainty** combine to **produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the** highest sign of a sovereign self, the **surest protection** against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes** identified as **evil**, and evil provokes hostility - **recycling the desire for security**. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, **creates** a **people** who are **willing to subordinate** affirmative **values to the 'necessities' of security**: 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'."The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The **security** of the sovereign, rational self and state **comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile**. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

### Link—Resilience—1NC

#### Resilience is the internalization of catastrophe as the never-ending condition of existence – violence is normalized as we absorb the very conditions of our annihilation. This imagery of the subject-under-siege empties out the value to life and produces a nihilistic hatred for the world that explodes in ever more violence.

Evans and Reid 14 [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, Resilient Life, 2014, pg. 110]

Anybody who has experienced immunization will appreciate the violence of the encounter. The whole process begins with the awareness of some vaguely looming threat which promises in the worst case an extremely violent ending. To pre-empt this happening, the subject is physically penetrated by the alien body with a controlled level of the lethal substance which, although producing violent sickness, is a fate less than death. Such violence unto oneself offers to counter violence with violence such that life may carry on living in spite of the dangers we are incapable of securing ourselves against. It is to give over to a form of self-harm albeit in a way that is actively desired and positively conceived. How else may we live otherwise? Resilience follows a similar logic. It encourages that we partake in the violence of the world to keep death at bay. For in the process of learning to live through the insecurity of the times, the subject is asked to incorporate the catastrophic intellectually, viscerally and affectively, thereby providing certain immunization against a more endangering fate. Indeed, since the ultimate litmus test is to bring to question the worst case scenario, the future cannot appear to us as anything other than completely monstrous. What, however, is actually slain as the future is wagered by the violence of the present may only become revealed with the passage of time. None of this operates outside of the realm of power politics. We only have to consider here (a) the moral judgements and political stakes associated with HIV as a pandemic that is more than simply biological, and (b) the development of viral analogies to explain more generally the problems ‘infecting’ societies from terror to criminality to evidence the point. Immunization is precisely about exposing oneself to something that is potentially lethal, thereby raising the thresh- old level for existence such that violence is normalized on account of our vulnerabilities to that which may be tempered but remains undefeatable. We are drawn here to Stellan Rye’s (1913) silent horror movie The Student from Prague (Der Student von Prag) which has inspired a number of compelling literary and cinematic classics. In this tragic tale of poverty and vio- lence, the impoverished student, Balduin, makes a bargain with the Devil as he exchanges the reflection of image for more immediate compensations. Upon eventually seeing himself, however, the student is avenged by an angry double that begins to wreak havoc as it seeks out revenge in light of its betrayal. Following an eventual violent con- frontation the student has with his double, Balduin shat- ters the mirror that is central to the plot, and invariably destroys the fantasy of endangerment which also became the source of his afflicted curse. Inevitably, however, since the double was an essential element of this Faustian agree- ment, in killing the violent double, so the student kills himself. Otto Rank famously related this to the narcissistic self whose very sense of loneliness and alienation is caused by an anguish of a fear of death; even though it is precisely the violence of the pact which pushes the subject further towards the precipice. Whilst it is tempting to read this in familiar dialectical terms, there is a more sophisticated double move at work here, as the violence is already encoded within the initial act of demonic violation before the tragic encounter. For the double merely highlights the self-propelling tendency, from the fantasy of endangerment to the reality of the catastrophic. There is also a semantic interchange at work in Rye’s Doppelganger as it stakes out the choice between a violated/violent life and eventual death. Since reason or logic prove utterly incapable of explaining the condition of Balduin’s existence, let alone offering any promise of salvation from the oppressive situ- ation to which he is fatefully bound, the double serves as an important metaphor for the narcissism of the times, as the subject wilfully accepts a violation and all the violence this entails in exchange for an illusion or fantasy of secu- rity which proves in the end to have been imbued with the catastrophic from the outset. Our understanding of the fundamental tenets of violence is invariably transformed such that we are forced to think about forms of violation/ intervention prior to any sense of dialectical enmity. Premetic Violence René Girard’s thesis Violence and the Sacred offers a theory of violence that is exclusively bound to the desire to ‘over- come’ tragedy. To develop this theory, Girard specifically relates to the classic Greek play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, which he uses to illustrate the relationship between tragic dispossession and violence. It is through the tale of Oedipus and his return to reclaim the realm from which he was abandoned that we uncover a genesis of sacrificial violence that is linked to some ‘past tragedy’.39 Oedipus thus epitomizes the motif of the lost prince whose modes of contestation can be understood through competing claims to the ‘same object of desire’. The story follows that when two uncompromising entities vie over the same object of desire, violence necessarily erupts. Through Gir- ard’s decoding of the Oedipus myth, what we therefore find is any attempt to re-possess the object of desire neces- sarily requires the guilt of those currently in possession – a sacrificial victim. Thus, to overcome tragedy one must come from the ‘outside’ – a violently destined return that can only be justified by making a claim to the original sin, or what Girard terms a return to the ‘original scene’. However, as Sophocles tells it, such violence is more than simply a reclamation of that which has been taken. The violence of the already dispossessed desires to re-establish the authentic order which has been falsely appropriated – the paradise lost. Importantly, for Girard, such violence is not a relation of difference but is more defined by the logic of mimesis: ‘At first, each of the protagonists believes that he can quell the violence; at the end each succumbs to it. All are drawn unwittingly into a violent reciprocity – which they always think they are outside of, because they all initially came from outside and mistake this positional and temporary advantage for a permanent and funda- mental superiority’.40 Plunging into an opposition which ‘reduces the protagonists into a uniform condition of vio- lence’, all claims to ‘difference’ are effectively ‘eclipsed’ by ‘a resurgence of reciprocity’.41 It has been common to read Rye’s doubling as a clear example of mimetic behaviour. This has found clear applications from Hegelian-inspired revolutionary accounts of dialectical reasoning, to Frantz Fanon’s theory of (post) colonial brutality, onto the exceptional violence of Schmitt’s sovereign decisionism. While accepting how this logic has played a structural role in the demarcation of certain regimes of violence which came to hallmark distinct marks of separation, we need to depart from this logic if we are to make sense of the violence of the catastrophic imaginary. What, in other words, becomes of violence once we reconceptualize the idea of the original scene and its logics of exposure such that violence itself becomes virtually ordained? That is to say, what becomes of violence once it begins to precede any dialectical arrangement? Mimetic violence, we have noted, is objectifiable. Based upon establishing various forms of mystical foundations, it has a distinct materiality to it that permits clear lines of demarcation and embodiment. These work both spatially and temporally. The object for violence is locatable, while the time of its occurrence offers clear (if sometimes contested) conceptions as to its beginning and ending. It benefits, then, from the guarantees of identification and the ability to represent that which must be vanquished at a given moment ‘in time’. The virtual nature of the violence endured by the resilient subject offers no such guarantees. Collapsing the space-time continuum of mimetic rivalry, it is merely projected into the future without the prospect of bounce-back. Internalized, however, into the very living conditions of the subject now permanently under siege, the violence is no less real. As any author of horror fiction will tell, the mind can be a terrifying place to inhabit. Once the source of endangerment becomes unknowable by definition, everything becomes the potential source of a violent encounter. Resilience challenges the logic of mimetic violence, therefore, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it shows us that our only way of dealing with endangerment is to absorb its lethal tendencies. That which has the potential to destroy must become part of society’s make-up and its epistemic fabric. We too, in the process, become more lethally endowed as a result. Invariably, the more lethal we become, the more we end up embracing the biophysical conditions of our potential undoing as a principle form of human conditioning. The body accepts the lethality on account of preparedness. Secondly, there is an outward projection against that which could potentially threaten our existence. But this projection doesn’t connect to any mimetic rival. We have no clear sense of what it is that so endangers in its particular guise, only a generalizable indication that something which is part of the integral whole will eventually bring about our final demise. Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable minefield of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to detonate, along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic topography. But what does it mean to say that violence is now beyond representation? And what type of reality are we producing if we are calling into question the depths of field that once gave qualitative and quantitative meaning to our relations to violence? For Paul Virilio, whose work we may connect to the premetic, this inaugurates ‘the futurism of the instant’ whose kairos shatters all metaphysical meaning: This spells disorientation in knowledge acquired over the course of millennia regarding the spatial environment and the cycle of seasons; an integral accident in knowledge of history as well as of the usual concrete geography that goes with it, the unity of place and time of a secular history. No doubt this is the fatal novelty of the historic tragedy befalling humanity and a progress that will no longer be exclusively technologistical and extra-planetary, but merely human, ‘all too human’. Masochism vis-à-vis an abhorred past that no longer passes muster is now symmetrically doubled with a masochism in relation to a future where, for want of fear, we will, this time, have space, all the space of a miniscule planet reduced to nothing, or as good as, by the progress of our discoveries.42 Nihilism Unbound Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.43 Nietzsche’s intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirability’.44 Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of affirming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reduc- ible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the affirmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselves.45 Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self-annihilation. Central to Nietzsche’s thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Gene- alogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.46 Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illu- sionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant’s Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant’s universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as finite beings – imperfections that significantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more affirmative form of metaphysics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this finite being that must think through the transcendental imagination’.47 In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant’s thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of finitude, even though the finite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difficult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject’s existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our finite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life and death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded’. For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament filters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency.

### Link—Resilience—2NC

#### Strategies of resilience are the political debasement of the subject – it puts the living on a permanent life support system that evacuates all possible alternative futures. It’s a vigilance against death that stops the living.

Evans and Reid 14. Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, Resilient Life, 2014, pg. 167

Even through a brief social detour on fire, however, we can see how the continual framing of life in terms of its biological vulnerability has a more contested history. Indeed, even though the compulsion to view life biologically developed to be one of the defining features of modernity, throughout this period there was nevertheless some belief that the subject was able to secure itself from the problems of the world. This was backed up by the proliferation of various myths about belonging that were central to the creation of political communities. Liberalism, in contrast, operates as if it is ‘limitless’. Its reach, growth and development demand more, and more, and more. However, instead of relating this to a new-found meta- physical awakening that allows us to think that there is more to life than its biological endowment, contemporary liberal biopolitics turns infinite potentiality into a source of limitless endangerment such that all there is to think about is the sheer necessity and survivability of things. In this sense, it is more proper to describe liberal biopolitics as limitless. For rather than taking the open horizon as a space for the infinitely possible, everything is internalized such that it is haunted by whatever remains irreducible to its current sensibility. This inevitably brings us to the vexed question of a death well lived. We don’t need grand theorizing to make the point that mediations on death have a profound impact upon the way we live. Anybody who has known a person with a terminal illness and becomes anxiously consumed with the prospect of dying will appreciate how the thought and presence of death effectively stops them living. They cannot live because the very uncertainties (physical and intellectual) presented by the mere thought of death are a burden that proves too difficult to carry. Hence, working in an opposite direction to Heidegger’s much debated claim that the ‘absolute impossibility’ of thinking about death constitutes the very possibility of being, the possibility of its occurrence is sufficient to instil what in fact is less a fear of death but more a fear of living. But we cannot simply stop there. As we have suggested, what makes the art of living so dangerously fascinating today is that it requires us to live through the source of our endangerment. Trauma and anxiety as such become our weapons, as vulnerability is amplified and played back to us with increasing frequency to their point of normalization. The political significance of this should not be underestimated. Our argument is that the political debasement of the subject through strategies of resilience more than puts the very question of death into question by removing it from our critical gaze. In doing so, it represents nothing short of a profound assault on our ability to think metaphysically. This in turn represents a direct attack upon our abilities to transform the world beyond the catastrophic condition in which we are now immersed. After all, how can we even conceive of different worlds if we cannot come to terms with the death and extinction of this one? Resilience as such is what we may term a ‘lethal ecology of reasoning’, for in taking hold and seeking to intervene in all the elements upon which life is said to depend, it puts the living on a permanent life support system that is hard, soft and virtually wired into the most insecure of social fabrics to the evacuation of all possible alternative outcomes. To open, then, a much debated but still yet to be resolved conflict in the history of political and philosophical thought, we maintain that if the biopoliticization of life represents the triumph of techne over poiesis, and if this very biopoliticization today thrives on the technical production of vulnerable subjects which learn to accept that fate, there is a need to resurrect with confidence the idea that what remains irreducible to life can be the starting point for thinking about a more poetic alternative art for living. As Peter Sloterdijk writes on the all too gradual demise of metaphysics:

### Link—War Impacts—1NC

#### The assumption that “survival” follows from the prevention of war relies on a false binary that ignores war is the structuring logic of the international system and that survival is only ever survival for some.

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.2-4]

It is not unusual that more than fifteen thousand scientists would agree on something. I imagine millions of scientists agree on other questions, like the basic nature of gravity and the atomic weight of cobalt. Yet it is difficult to imagine the need or interest to issue a public statement about these mere descriptions of fact. What makes this concern worthy of a public address is that the statements issued in 1992 and 2017 are attempts to make a claim on a public, in fact the public: the global whole of the human species. The tone of both letters invests the full force of collective scientific expertise, argument making, and powers of persuasion on the case to be made for a threat to the planet. The letters simply assume that if the case is successfully made that humanity faces impending doom, the case for saving humanity will automatically follow as if by some mechanism of logical necessity. Unfortunately, this assumption is not merely off the mark. Global politics for the past five hundred years is proof of the opposite of common sense. There is a centuries-long investment in research, development, and deployment of techniques to ensure that survival is only ever a right for some. This right for some, more often than not, is ensured at the expense of the self-determination and continuation of living for the overwhelming majority of the planet’s human population. Against the banal appeal to a universal humanity or the equally commonplace and catastrophic insistence on an inevitable clash of civilizations, I prefer the idea of “form of life.” Not quite race and more than culture or style, this phrase refers to those ways of being in the world—always lived collectively—without which one would no longer be who or what one is. I want to go further than Ludwig Wittgenstein’s invocation of form of life as one’s particular game of language and gesture—the physiognomy that for him makes one human— into the ways that not just humans but all things creatively striving toward complexity come to make worlds out of their intractable dependence on and contribution to an environment.3 And beyond Wittgenstein’s events of communicative failure, interruptions of these relations and habits threaten existence itself. When efforts are made to wipe out the American bison and buffalo or to militarize borders to interrupt the flow of migrants who follow seasons and crops, it is not just a habit or practice that changes. The interruption of a form of life kills people and frequently cascades into genocides and extinctions. In the case of the buffalo, it was not just the bands and nations of the Great Plains whose precarity was leveraged for the strategic goal of genocide and settlement. The entire prairie ecosystem was targeted, moving on from human inhabitants to predators such as wolves and big cats to make way for leisure hunting and grazing practices that created the dust bowl and the subsequent collapse of riparian habitats throughout the United States.4 I take inspiration from Giorgio Agamben’s more radical reading of Wittgenstein’s form of life in my desire to describe lives that cannot survive being separated from the way they are lived, but like Wittgenstein’s linguistic provincialism, I do not accept Agamben’s species provincialism that form of life either is what defines the human or is exclusively a human attribute.5 Quite the opposite, when form of life is seen ecologically, what becomes apparent is how many different species, practices, histories, cosmologies, habitats, and relations come to constitute what we might call a form of life. Form of life is a particular origami in the “fabric of immanent relations” that defines the torsion between the singularity and the interpenetrated relationality of each and every human and nonhuman person.6 This question will be taken up more substantially in chapter 1, but suffice it to say that form of life, for me, is the current or flow against which we can even identify a change or intervention as violent rather than merely as a change. And geopolitics, the focus of all the following chapters and that which the concerned scientists want to avoid, is the collectively practiced art and science of that violence against other forms of life. In fact, it is this very geopolitics—nation- states making decisions and wielding power at a global scale—that the scientists want to steer away from war toward saving the planet, which is not premised at some foundational level on a general principle of order or the good. Geopolitics is, at its most fundamental level, a husbandry of global life in which thriving is intimately connected to the particular form of life and the particular lifeworld through which one becomes who one is. Geopolitics is structured to be selective, and to ensure that selectivity by lethal force. Therefore, to oppose survival to the pursuit of war as a global question for a global audience (as if that audience were empowered or even capable of issuing a global answer) displays a persistent and willful naïveté of how the global was made in the first place. The geopolitical project of planet Earth is a violent pursuit of a form of life at the cost of others— full stop. However, at the same time, with an often zero-sum game over form of life at its center, global war—the presumed opposite of human survival—is not primarily about direct killing. Instead, the violence of geopolitics is an ecological principle of world making that renders some forms of life principle and other forms of life useful or inconsequential. Emmanuel Levinas is quite helpful on this point. In his investigation of the antinomy between philosophy and war, Levinas came to understand the violence of geopolitics and its pursuit of global war to be less a direct material force and more an organizational principle of coercive steering and depriving: “Violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out action that will destroy every possibility for action.”7 The attack on the conditions of life and its formation as a form of life establishes more than a trade-off between the material costs of warfare and the pursuit of the Union of Scientists for planetwide and environmentally sustainable economic and sexual equality. Geopolitics, enacted through global war, is itself a form of life that pursues a savage ecology, radically antagonistic to survival as a collective rather than discriminatory goal. Geopolitics, as the organizational matrix of global war, has as its enemy the very pursuit of what the scientists see as a commonsense, pragmatically just planet. Therefore, the line between extreme human misery and just transformation is not practically or impractically out of reach because of a lack of will or misuse of resources. For the majority of the planet, the failure to ensure survival is not about an oversight or bad financial management. Instead, the line between misery and something else is heavily policed and enforced with everything, from odious international debt to hellfire missiles. Alfred North Whitehead says every science belies a metaphysics, or something we could call more broadly a cosmology.8 The science in question for Savage Ecology is the Euro-American science of geopolitics. I want to understand the cosmology of geopolitics. Thus, this book is an effort to understand how a particular formation of global war, as the slow accretion of a form of life, came to be a dominant form of life cosmologically at odds with the idea of collective thriving. This geopolitical form of life is so caustic, it calls into question if there has ever been anything as universal as a human species to be threatened, much less saved.9

### Link—War Impacts—2NC

#### Focus on particular conflicts, leaders, and policies obscures the global ecology of war and violence that saturates everything

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.66-7]

Following Sloterdijk’s pronouncement on the becoming atmospheric of contemporary warfare, collective violence is saturating every corner of the Earth system, but like carbon, neither the distributors nor distribution of violence is equitable. Saturation is no excuse for universality. There will never be a we that is human as such. And yet there is also no tribe, history of proper names, or nation-state that can bear the responsibility in any meaningful way. Twenty or thirty generations of malicious and sadistic decisions cannot amount to the collective effect of the heterogeneous relations that produced the Eurocene but neither should we let go of the particular forms of life that congealed around an instrumental approach to collective violence that swallowed and then organized peoples, nonhuman peoples, and things throughout Europe and then the regions those people, nonhuman peoples, and things settled. Mapping something like the totality of those actors and relations is impossible and maybe even counterproductive, but tracing the lineages of warfare that came to enable the expansion of the Europeans until they became a “cene,” a geologically and geopolitically significant order, may gather up a swarm of conceptual machines still buzzing through our contemporary moment. Consequently, I am less interested in why once such an institution or assemblage is in place, a leader at a given moment succeeds in making actual the already present virtual tendencies of war. Consider how difficult it is to reconcile our lost hope for Barack Obama with the expected failure of George W. Bush or how quickly the terror over Donald Trump was normalized once the adults from the military stepped in, precisely because foreign policies of each arrangement of leadership are in many ways indistinguishable, particularly from the perspectives of their victims.19 It is not surprising to me, then, that sovereigns make war, or that they take advantage of democratic paradoxes to do so. The problematic that drives this section is how such a complex, mobile, and global ecology of war so closely aligns and adheres to such a seemingly local decision as a sovereign act of violence or declaration of war. One might take a lesson from the electrification of sound. In order to amplify or magnify a sound and preserve the fidelity of a particular harmonic arrangement, one cannot simply “turn up” the volume. It requires a certain interface between the means of amplification, the ambient qualities of the room, the number of people present, and the resonant capabilities of those people, the furniture, the walls, the floor, and the ceiling. Similarly, political decrees or decisions to produce effects must reverberate and interface with complex assemblages of institutions, economies, ethical dispositions, affective discourses, and other machinic operators. From this perspective, sovereign “decisions,” whether by presidents or suicide bombers, appear to be on both sides of the razor’s edge between cause and effect. Such an approach requires, as Deleuze writes, “not so much . . . convincing, as being open about things. Being open is setting out the ‘facts’ not only of a situation, but of a problem. Making visible things that would otherwise remain hidden.”20 So we have a world full of sovereign violence, but the place of a given sovereign in the distribution of that violence remains obscure.

### Link—Util—1NC

#### Universalist utilitarian claims to “save humanity” belie the violent history of conquest and colonization that has created the status quo

Grove 19 [Jairus, Assoc Prof of International Relations at Univ of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World*, p.38-9]

The utilitarian risk calculus that favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet. Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism—the global environment—follows almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography of racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of contemporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind for the sake of humanity, represents a five-hundred- year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing. I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.11

### 2NC AT Threats Exist

#### No objective condition for danger

Campbell 98 [David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 1998, “Writing Security,” pg. 1-2]

Danger is not an objective condition. It *[sic*] is not a thing that ex­ists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. To illus­trate this, consider the manner in which the insurance industry assesses risk. In Francois Ewald’s formulation, insurance is a technology of risk the principal function of which is not compensation or repara­tion, but rather the operation of a schema of rationality distinguished by the calculus of probabilities. In insurance, according to this logic, danger (or, more accurately, risk) is “neither an event nor a general kind of event occurring in reality.. . but a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals.” In other words, for the technology of risk in insurance, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, consid­ers the event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a cat­egory of the understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intu­ition.”2 In these terms, danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for insurance technology than anything else, except when interpreted as such.

#### Psychology is on our side—their threat claims are psychological projections to account for underlying feelings of instability.

Sullivan et al ’10 (Daniel, Researcher in the Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Mark J. Landau, assistant professor of Psychology at KU, and Zachary K. Rothschild, Researcher in the Department of Psychology at KU, “An Existential Function of Enemyship: Evidence That People Attribute Influence to Personal and Political Enemies to Compensate for Threats to Control Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,” 98. 3 (Mar 2010): 434-449, Proquest, JS)

On the basis of Becker’s (1969) existential theorizing, we have proposed that perceiving the self as having powerful enemies serves a psychological function for the individual by compensating for threatened perceptions of control over one’s environment. Specifically, enemies serve as psychological focal points for what are otherwise diffuse threats to one’s life and well-being that are impossible to fully anticipate or control. This analysis suggests that people will imbue enemy figures with exaggerated influence and power when feelings of control are threatened and that perceiving powerful enemies capable of perpetrating diffuse misdeeds will bolster feelings of personal control by reducing perceptions of chaotic risks in one’s environment. The current studies provide the first empirical tests of these claims. Study 1 showed that when people were reminded of the prevalence of chaotic hazard in their environment, those individuals characterized by dispositionally low feelings of personal control were more likely to view a personal enemy as having influence over their lives, but this effect did not extend to perceptions of a generically aversive other. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of this effect on perceptions of a political enemy in a more ecologically valid context, with an experimental manipulation of perceived control over chaotic hazards. In accord with predictions, situationally reduced feelings of personal control increased participants’ belief that a public enemy figure—the opponent of their chosen candidate in the 2008 U.S. presidential election—was wielding power to surreptitiously manipulate the election. This study furthermore showed that the hypothesized effect was not simply due to an increase in generalized suspiciousness, concern with unwanted election outcomes, or generally negative evaluations of the enemy candidate. Supplementing Becker’s (1969) analysis with M. Douglas’s (1966) account of cultural differences in enemyship, we hypothesized that enemyship will be an especially attractive means of compensating for control threats when the broader social system is perceived as disordered and incapable of providing protection from harm, whereas bolstering the perceived strength of the system will be the preferred response when the system appears ordered and secure. The results of Study 3 supported this hypothesis: Participants led to view the prevailing system as disordered responded to a control threat by viewing a personal enemy as responsible for negative occurrences in their lives and by denying the influence of random forces on negative occurrences. However, these participants were no more likely to attribute positive life events to a friend’s influence. In contrast, and in line with Kay et al.’s (2008) findings, participants led to view the system as ordered responded to control threats by bolstering their belief in the system’s order and strength. Study 4 tested whether perceiving an enemy capable of causing diffuse harms would actually decrease perceived risk in the world and thereby bolster feelings of personal control. As predicted, control-threatened participants who were exposed to an ambiguously powerful enemy (but not one whose powers were explicitly known or who was weak) showed reduced perceptions of chaotic risk, which in turn bolstered perceptions of personal control. Taken together, the current studies are the first to systematically examine the psychological function served by perceiving powerful enemies in the world, while additionally providing evidence of the psychological process by which enemies serve a controlrestorative function, and the situational conditions under which people are more likely to exaggerate an enemy’s power and influence as a means of compensating for personal control concerns.

### 2NC Fear Politics DA

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric makes it ever-present

Coviello 2k [Peter, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse From Now On]

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

#### Turns us into ‘pure warriors’ who endlessly rehearse our own deaths—leaves us unable to confront cruelty in our everyday lives

Borg 03 [Mark, practicing psychoanalyst and community/organizational consultant working in New York City, 03 “Psychoanalytic Pure War: interactions with the post-apocalyptic unconscious”, Journal of Psychoanalysis, questia]

Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer's concept of "pure war" refers to the potential of a culture to destroy itself completely (12). 2 We as psychoanalysts can—and increasingly must—explore the impact of this concept on our practice, and on the growing number of patients who live with the inability to repress or dissociate their experience and awareness of the pure war condition. The realization of a patient's worst fears in actual catastrophic events has always been a profound enough psychotherapeutic challenge. These days, however, catastrophic events not only threaten friends, family, and neighbors; they also become the stuff of endless repetitions and dramatizations on radio, television, and Internet. 3 Such continual reminders of death and destruction affect us all. What is the role of the analyst treating patients who live with an ever-threatening sense of the pure war lying just below the surface of our cultural veneer? At the end of the First World War, the first "total war," Walter Benjamin observed that "nothing [after the war] remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body"(84). Julia Kristeva makes a similar note about our contemporary situation, "The recourse to atomic weapons seems to prove that horror...can rage absolutely" (232). And, as if he too were acknowledging this same fragility and uncontainability, the French politician Georges Clemenceau commented in the context of World War I that "war is too serious to be confined to the military" (qtd. in Virilio and Lotringer 15). Virilio and Lotringer gave the name "pure war" to the psychological condition that results when people know that they live in a world where the possibility for absolute destruction (e.g., nuclear holocaust) exists. As Virilio and Lotringer see it, it is not the technological capacity for destruction (that is, for example, the existence of nuclear armaments) that imposes the dread characteristic of a pure war psychology but the belief systems that this capacity sets up. Psychological survival requires that a way be found (at least unconsciously) to escape inevitable destruction—it requires a way out—but this enforces an irresolvable paradox, because the definition of pure war culture is that there is no escape. Once people believe in the external possibility—at least those people whose defenses cannot handle the weight of the dread that pure war imposes—pure war becomes an internal condition**, a** perpetual state of preparation for absolute destruction and for personal, social, and cultural death**.** The tragedy at the World Trade Center in New York City has given us a bitter but important opportunity to study the effects of the pure war condition on individuals. It allows us to look at how this all-encompassing state appears in psychoanalytic treatment and to observe its influence through the analysis of transference/countertransference dynamics. The pure war condition has been brought grimly to consciousness. In this paper, I will explore how it manifests itself in society, in character, and most specifically in the psychoanalytic treatment of one patient whose dynamics highlight significant aspects of the pure war state. How does treatment happen when, at some level, we perceive ourselves as already dead? Whatever our individual differences, our visions of the psychoanalytic endeavor arise out of the social defense of the culture within which we live and work (I have referred to this as "community character," cf. Borg 350). And whatever our individual differences, in a pure war situation the primary task is simply to sustain the dream of psychic survival. The case of Joyce, who saw the first explosion at the World Trade Center as she rode down Fifth Avenue in a bus after her session with me, exemplifies this task. [End Page 57] The Pure Warrior The philosophy (or practice) of "pure warriors," that is, of people who are preoccupied with the pure war condition of their society, is based on the perpetual failure within them of the dissociation and repression that allow others to function in a situation that is otherwise completely overwhelming. Joyce was one of those who lived on the border of life and death; she could not escape awareness of that dread dichotomy that most of us are at great pains to dissociate. She manifested the state of perpetual preparation that is the hallmark of pure war culture and of the insufficiently defended pure warrior, and also a constant awareness of the nearness of death in all its various forms. She understood quite well, for instance, that when people are institutionalized (as she had been on numerous occasions), "society is defining them as socially dead, [and that at that point] the essential task to be carried out is to help inmates to make their transition from social death to physical death" (Miller and Gwynne 74). Against this backdrop, Joyce sought psychoanalysis as a "new world," the place where she would break free from the deathly institutionalized aspects of her self, and begin her life anew. Her search for a "new world" included the possibility of a world that was not a pure war world—a prelapsarian Eden. Virilio and Lotringer state that "war exists in its preparation" (53). And Sun Tsu, who wrote over 2400 years ago and yet is often considered the originator of modern warfare, said in The Art of War, "Preparation everywhere means lack everywhere" (44). This means that when the members of a culture must be on guard on all fronts, the resources of that culture are necessarily scattered and taxed. The more defenses are induced and enacted, the more psychologically impoverished a culture (or a person) will be. In war-torn nations, resources like food, clothing, and materials for shelter may be scarce in the general population because they are shunted off to the military. Similarly, the hoarding of psychological resources and the constant alert status of the defense system are outcomes of existence in a pure war culture. We can see this scattering and scarcity of resources occurring already in the United States as billions of dollars are shunted from social services to war efforts and homeland security. In pure war cultures—that is, in cultures that enact a perpetual preparation for war—the notion of peace is itself a defensive fantasy, although to survive psychically we distract ourselves from such frightening stimuli as widespread terrorist activities and other events that demonstrate our pure war status. Pure war obliterates the distinction between soldier and citizen. We have all been drafted. According to Virilio and Lotringer, "All of us are already civilian soldiers, without knowing it...War happens everywhere, but we no longer have the means of recognizing it" (42).

### 2NC AT Kurusawa

#### Our argument is not that we should never look to the future—Our link arguments prove we turn their Kurasawa argument—alarmism turns the emancipatory nature of their futurism.

Kurasawa 04 [Fuyuki, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, 2004, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations, Vol. 11 No. 4]

Up to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of the future (II) and a stance of indifference toward it (III). Nonetheless, unless and until it is substantively ‘filled in,’ the argument is **vulnerable to misappropriation** since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory procedures through which citizens can determine the ‘reasonableness,’ legitimacy, and effectiveness of competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. Foremost among the possible distortions of farsightedness is **alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios**. State and market institutions may seek to produce a **culture of fear** by **deliberately stretching interpretations of reality** beyond the limits of the plausible so as **to exaggerate the prospects** of impending catastrophes, or yet again, **by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others** for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as **Trojan horses advancing political agendas** or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. **Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions**. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true.

## Cyber Security

### Link—Cyber Security—1NC

#### The discourse of cyber security creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and undermines effective responses—their impact claims are also presumptively false.

Barnard-Wills and Ashenden ’12 (David, Research Fellow in the Department of Informatics and Systems Engineering, Cranfield University, UK and Debi, senior research fellow in information assurance at the Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University, U.K., “Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk,” Space and Culture XX(X), JS)

This article has developed an overview of the dominant cyber security discourse, drawing on governmentality theory and discourse analysis. It identified a particular way of constructing the “problem of cyberspace” that focused on threat, risk, and vulnerability arising from technological sources and the nature of virtual space. Discourses attempt to suture the political space. For Laclau, this is the operation of ideology (a term he strips of some of its pejorative connotations). All discourses contain ideological elements, and there could not be a society without an ideological dimension. We attempted to show that cyber security discourse, which is currently serving as a basis for cyber security policy in the United Kingdom and United States, and perhaps elsewhere, is but one way of understanding and conceptualizing virtual space. There are a number of implications that arise from this discourse. First, **cyber security discourse supports the militarization of online space**. Haggerty argues that information war, understood as an ongoing feature of the contemporary international environment, **means that war** essentially **becomes permanent**, part of the “ongoing military gamesmanship of cyberspace” (Haggerty, 2006b, p. 252). Constructing cyberspace as a source of national security threat encourages the application of security practices from other environments that may be inappropriate or actively harmful to online activity. The language of attack and defense and of “cyber war” risks pushing out the needs of the civil sector and individual Internet users, reducing openness and increasing surveillance. Security discourses risk shutting down discussion about Internet policy, moving it from relatively open areas of government to the closed world of national security decision making. This risks excluding an important range of actors. Furthermore, **constructing cyberspace as a site of risk and threat poses the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy** as that space is increasingly militarized by various parties. Nations do not operate in a vacuum and **there is the possibility (although not the necessity) of a cyberspace security dilemma**. Governmental assemblages can make political accountability and transparency of decision making diffused through amorphous partnerships. Lessig (1999) argues that indirect regulation misdirects responsibility. When government uses other structures of constraint to affect a constraint it could impose directly, it muddies the responsibility for the constraint, thus undermining political accountability. Burying policy choices in complex networks of actors potentially blurs the link between regulation and its consequences (Lessig, 1999). Care should be taken that cyber security relationships between the public sector and private sector should be transparent and democratically accountable. Focusing purely on technological capabilities and vulnerabilities, wielded or exploited by faceless hostile actors**, pushes out a consideration of the wider political, legal, and normative structure that surrounds these. Presenting technologically advanced societies as highly vulnerable** is to invert a much deeper structural asymmetry between developed and developing countries and between states and individuals. **It also confuses risk calculations, driven by possibility rather than probability or intention.** Focusing purely on technological possibilities exaggerates the impact of “asymmetric” actors and ignores other resources of states. A greater attention needs be paid to the political and international dimensions surrounding cyber security. Finally, the perpetually deferred threat and assumption of vulnerability arises from limited quantitative and qualitative data in the public domain. This allows a cyber security discourse to operate from a position of power derived from “expertise” and makes it hard to debate the claims made by industry for the prevalence of serious cyber threats. This leads to policymaking dominated by possibility and technological capability excluding the broader social, political, and international complex that surrounds and contextualizes cyber security.

### Link—Cyber Security—2NC

#### Cyber-terrorism is a constructed threat propagated by the media—their threat discourse turns the case and empirically has allowed for events like 9/11 to happen.

Conway ‘8 (Maura, School of Law and Government Dublin City University, Working Papers in International Studies Centre for International Studies Dublin City University, “Media, Fear and the Hyperreal: The Construction of Cyberterrorism as the Ultimate Threat to Critical Infrastructures,” <http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008-5.pdf>, JS)

Finally, what were some of the effects of the cyberterror threat image as constructed in the US media and described in the foregoing? While so-called ‘cyberpanics’ may have imaginary origins, they **can also have very real consequences** (Sandwell 2006: 46). The risk of a massive conventional terrorist attack on the US was emphasized by a small number of academics and others before the events of 11 September 2001, but was dismissed by the media (see Nacos 2002: 1f.), which chose to focus on cyberterrorism instead. Key decision-makers were therefore much more attuned to the latter threat than the former. Marcus Sachs,14 who served in the White House Office of Cyberspace Security and was a staff member of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, had this to say in 2003 about the convergence of policymakers’ fear of technology with their fear of terrorism: We were very shocked in the federal government that the attack didn’t come from cyberspace […] Based on what we knew at the time, the most likely scenario was an attack from cyberspace, not airliners slamming into buildings […] We had spent a lot of time preparing for a cyber attack, not a physical attack. (Poulsen 2003) People’s sense of what issues are of political relevance is always an ongoing process, which requires an emphasis on how threat images are discursively constructed, maintained, and altered. This points to why particular emphasis needs to be placed upon the processes whereby (national) security issues communicatively emerge, and the central role of the media in such emergences. The political communication/threat image environment shapes both the information available and the ways in which not just ordinary people, but also political elites, use it in thinking about politics and national security. Demonstrating the effects of the media’s influence on publics and decision-makers is always difficult due to the indirect and complex dynamics involved; clearly, however, **the US media has been highly successful in ‘speaking’ cyberterrorism into existence.** Their reliance on ‘(hyper-)reality-producing dramas’ (Debrix 2001: 153), Pearl Harbor analogies, comparisons of the effects of cyberterrorism with those of WMD, portrayal of hackers as a menace to national security, and general widening of the concept of cyberterrorism, in conjunction with the policy window opened by the events of 11 September 2001 and, consequently, the ability to cast Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida as certain future cyberterrorists has resulted in the hyping of an (imagined) fatal connection between virtual networks and critical infrastructures that, to date, **has very little real form or substance**. This conclusion may not be quite as disturbing as it might first appear, however, for François Debrix suggests that all of the various apocalyptic scenarios, televised simulations, and musings as to the greater lethality of virtual over nuclear attacks have, in fact, ensured that a virtual Pearl Harbor will never materialize. The reason is that the fear of cyberterrorism has been spread so widely and with such success that **should a ‘real’ attack ever occur, it couldn’t match expectations**: ‘Being conditioned to such a degree of generalised panic, any real cyberterrorist attack that does not follow the simulated scenario and produce the anticipated amount of casualties will fall short of being worthy of people’s attention and worry’ (Debrix 2001: 156).

#### Even if they happen there’s no internal link to the impact card.

**Lawson ’11** (Sean, PhD, Department of Communications at the University of Utah, “BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf>, JS)

The empirical evidence provided to us from historians and sociologists about the impacts of infrastructure disruption, both intentional and accidental, as well as peoples’ collective response to disasters of various types, calls into question the kinds of projections one finds in the cyber-doom scenarios. If the mass destruction of entire cities from the air via conventional and atomic weapons generally failed to deliver the panic, paralysis, technological and social collapse, and loss of will that was intended, it seems unlikely that cyberattack would be able to achieve these results. It also seems unlikely that a “cyber-9/11” or a “cyber-Katrina” would result in the loss of life and physical destruction seen in the real 9/11 and Katrina. And if the real 9/11 and Katrina did not result in social or economic collapse, nor to a degradation of military readiness or national will, then it seems unlikely that their “cyber” analogues would achieve these results.

### 2NC Cyber—Militarized Framing DA

#### Their disaster/ war framing of cyber attacks turns the case—it causes the same type of governmental paternalism on display during hurricane Katrina and prevents a broader response to potential threats.

Lawson ’11 (Sean, PhD, Department of Communications at the University of Utah, “BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf>, JS)

Next, a disaster framing portends cybersecurity planning dominated by the same “command and control [C2] model” rooted in flawed assumptions of inevitable “panic” and “social collapse” that has increasingly dominated official U.S. disaster planning (Quarantelli, 2008: 897). The result has been ever more centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic disaster responses that increasingly rely upon the military to restore order and official control first and foremost (Quarantelli, 2008: 895–896; Alexander, 2006; Lakoff, 2006). The result can be a form of “government paternalism” in which officials panic about the possibility of panic **and then take actions that exacerbate the situation** by not only failing to provide victims with the help they need, but also preventing them from effectively helping themselves (Dynes, 2006; Clarke & Chess, 2009: 999–1001). This phenomenon was on display in the official response to Hurricane Katrina (Clarke & Chess, 2009: 1003–1004). In the realm of cybersecurity, there are already provisions for the military’s USCYBERCOM to provide assistance to the Department of Homeland Security in the event of a domestic cyber emergency (Ackerman, 2010). Reminiscent of self-imposed blackouts during WWII, Senator Joseph Lieberman’s proposal for a so-called “Internet kill switch,” which would give the president the authority to cut U.S. Internet connections to the rest of the world in the event of a large-scale cyberattack,5 is the **ultimate expression** of the desire to regain control by developing the means to destroy that which we fear to lose. The war/disaster framing at the heart of cyber-doom scenarios and much of contemporary U.S. cybersecurity discourse risks focusing policy on the narrowest and least likely portion of the overall cybersecurity challenge—i.e. acts of “cyberwar” leading to economic, social, or civilizational collapse—while potentially diverting attention and resources away from making preparations to prevent or mitigate the effects of more realistic but perhaps less dramatic scenarios. But, there are a number of principles that can guide the formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy that can help us to avoid these pitfalls.

#### Their militarized framing of cyber attacks allows the government to militarize and manage the body politic of the internet—it also independently turns the case.

Lawson ’11 (Sean, PhD, Department of Communications at the University of Utah, “BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf>, JS)

The language that we use to frame problems opens up some avenues for response while closing off others. In cyber-doom scenarios, cybersecurity is framed primarily in terms of “war” and, with the use of terms like “cyber-9/11” and “cyber-Katrina,” in terms of large-scale “disaster.” This war/disaster framing can lead to a militarist, command and control mindset that is ultimately **counter-productive**. A war framing implies the need for **military solutions** to cybersecurity challenges, even though most of what gets lumped under the term “cyberwar” are really acts of crime, espionage, or political protest, and even though it is not at all clear that a military response is either appropriate or effective (Lewis, 2010). Nonetheless, the establishment of the military’s U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has been the most significant U.S. response yet to perceived cyber-threats. Such a response **is fraught with danger**. First, the very existence of USCYBERCOM, which has both an offensive and defensive mission, could undermine the U.S. policy of promoting a free and open Internet worldwide by encouraging greater Internet censorship and filtering, as well as more rapid militarization of cyberspace (Cavelty, 2007: 143). For example, some have already called for USCYBERCOM to launch strikes on WikiLeaks, which leaked hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. documents about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (McCullagh, 2010b; Whitton, 2010; Thiessen, 2010). Such a response would only serve to create a “say-do gap” (Mullen, 2009) that potential adversaries could use to justify their own development and use of offensive cyber weapons and efforts to thwart whatever possibility there is for international cooperation on cybersecurity. Second, there is the danger of “blow back.” In a highly interconnected world, there is no guarantee that an offensive cyberattack launched by the United States against another country would not result in serious collateral damage to noncombatants or even end up causing harm to the United States (Cavelty, 2007: 143). Such “blow back” may have occurred in a recent case where the United States military took down a Jihadist discussion forum, causing collateral damage to noncombatant computers and websites, as well as undermining an ongoing U.S. intelligence gathering operation (Nakashima, 2010). Third, there is the risk of conflict escalation from cyberattack to physical attack. If the United States launched a cyberattack against a state or non-state actor lacking the capability to respond in kind, that actor might chose to respond with physical attacks (Clarke, 2009). There have even been calls for the United States to respond with conventional military force to cyberattacks that amounted to little more than vandalism (Zetter, 2009; Dunn, 2010). Finally, a 2009 review of U.S. military strategy documents, combined with statements from officials, further adds to the confusion and potential for escalation by indicating that nuclear response **remains on the table** as a possible U.S. response to cyberattack (Markoff & Shanker, 2009; Owens et al., 2009).

### 2NC Cyber—Epistemology Indict

#### Be skeptical of their evidence—their claims are economically motivated and are empirically denied.

Lawson ’11 (Sean, PhD, Department of Communications at the University of Utah, “BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History,” <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/beyond-cyber-doom-cyber-attack-scenarios-evidence-history_1.pdf>, JS)

But we have not seen anything close to the kinds of scenarios outlined by Yoran, Ergma, Toffler, and others. Terrorists did not use cyberattack against the World Trade Center; they used hijacked aircraft. And the attack of 9/11 did not lead to the long-term collapse of the U.S. economy; we would have to wait for the impacts of years of bad mortgages for a financial meltdown. Nor did the cyberattacks on Estonia approximate what happened on 9/11 as Yoran has claimed, **and certainly not nuclear warfare** as Ergma has claimed. In fact, a scientist at the NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which was established in Tallinn, Estonia in response to the 2007 cyberattacks, has written that the immediate impacts of those attacks were “minimal” or “nonexistent,” and that the “no critical services were permanently affected” (Ottis, 2010: 72). Nonetheless, many cybersecurity proponents continue to offer up cyber-doom scenarios that not only make analogies to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but also hold out economic, social, and even civilizational collapse as possible impacts of cyberattacks. A report from the Hoover Institution has warned of so-called “eWMDs” (Kelly & Almann, 2008); the FBI has warned that a cyberattack could have the same impact as a “wellplaced bomb” (FOXNews.com, 2010b); and official DoD documents refer to “weapons of mass disruption,” implying that cyberattacks might have impacts comparable to the use of WMD (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 2006). John Arquilla, one of the first to theorize cyberwar in the 1990s (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997), has spoken of “a grave and growing capacity for crippling our tech-dependent society” and has said that a “cyber 9/11” is a matter of if, not when (Arquilla, 2009). Mike McConnell, who has claimed that we are already in an ongoing cyberwar (McConnell, 2010), has even predicted that a cyberattack could surpass the impacts of 9/11 “by an order of magnitude” (The Atlantic, 2010). Finally, some have even compared the impacts of prospective cyberattacks to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed roughly a quarter million people and caused widespread physical destruction in five countries (Meyer, 2010); suggested that cyberattack could pose an “existential threat” to the United States (FOXNews.com 2010b); and offered the possibility that cyberattack threatens not only the continued existence of the United States, but all of “global civilization” (Adhikari, 2009). In response, critics have noted that not only has the story about who threatens what, how, and with what potential impact shifted over time, but it has done so with very little evidence provided to support the claims being made (Bendrath, 2001, 2003; Walt, 2010). Others have noted that the cyber-doom scenarios offered for years by cybersecurity proponents have yet to come to pass and question whether they are possible at all (Stohl, 2007). Some have also questioned the motives of cybersecurity proponents. Various think tanks, security firms, defense contractors, and business leaders who trumpet the problem of cyber attacks are portrayed as selfinterested ideologues who promote unrealistic portrayals of cyber-threats (Greenwald, 2010).

## Russia

### Link—Russia—1NC

#### Their framing of Russia is based on a discourse of danger and uncertainty—fear is constructed to stabilize sovereign identity and draw a delineation between the Russian and American body politic—the 1AC is a chain of equivalence which locks in a violent securitized ideology of Russia

Jæger 2k (Øyvind, Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, November 2000, “Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, JS)

Security, to be sure, is about the sovereignty and survival of the state as such–the state as an independent political unit. That does not, however, necessarily imply a privileging of the military sector of the state as is the case with classical security. Following Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994), what pertains to security should be looked at as the speech-act of politics the discursive practice of doing by saying which is at work when states, not least the Baltic ones, are seeking to secure state formations. What is an issue of security, and what not, is delineated through speech-acts in a performative discursive practice coined by Ole Wæver (1997a; 1995; 1994) as securitisation, making security issues of what is spoken of as security: One speaks security, and therefore it is a matter of security. As with sovereignty (cf. Walker 1993), security has no ontological basis outside of discourse. An army is not a threat in and of itself–it is merely an army–but becomes one when denoted in terms of danger. Conceiving of security as a speech-act, Wæver argues that security is not something" out there" with an objective existence and a priori ontology, something that one should strive to acquire as much of as one possibly can. On the contrary, security is an act that comes into play by the very **utterance** of the word security. Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, **one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat**, because it threatens security. In other words, **security is a self-referential practice** that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes. 15 The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat- defence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat **cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defence**, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty. Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus **open up the concept**. It also clears the way **for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues** which through securitisation have raised the concern **in the first place**. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of **reversing the process** by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct,(ie not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). **A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers**. It is a call for more insecurity as **it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem**. As Wæver (1994: 8) 16 puts it:" Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a" **evangelism of fear**" and a discourse of danger are similar–namely to **produce** a certitude of **identity by depicting difference as otherness**. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil (" think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell" 17–so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the " death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world," man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of" danger" are central to the discourses of the" state" and the discourses of" man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of" danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what " we" are by highlighting who and what" we" are not, and what" we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a" discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is" we" are protecting,(ie what is" us", what is our identity and therefore–as representation–what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and–by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the" inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the" outside". To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat–and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re) produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies" othering" difference–making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable–indeed underscored–state focus in the works of both David Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state–transcending sovereignty–on the other. Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the very theoretical substance, and by implication–empirical viability–of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or post- modern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states–firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s enlargement–to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia, the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger. The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a **threat perception** that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet**, conflating Russia with the USSR** and casting everything Russian as **a threat** through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call **a discursive" chain of equivalence**". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is **reiterated** in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value" Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by" instability"," Asia"," invasion", " chaos"," incitement of ethnic minorities"," unpredictability"," imperialism"," slander campaign", " migration", and so forth. The **opposite value** of these markers (" stability"," Europe"," defence"," order", and so on) would then **denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity**. When identity is precarious**, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode**, treating the oppositions as if they were **questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival**. Identity is (re) produced **more effectively** when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of insecurity and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus **securitised** in the Wæverian sense. Continues. Reading Baltic literatures on security, one is not left in much doubt that Russia is the organised political power,(ie the representation of an anthropomorphic collective will). The Russian state is the danger to the Baltic. The danger of Russia is primarily seen as one of encroachment–be it by ways of political or economic subversion, or by downright military aggression–on their state sovereignty. Conflating state and nation, everything Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian is thereby also threatened. The sheer size and might of Russia, and the asymmetric power relations between Russia and the Baltic states itself is **inscribed with danger**. The prevalent economic and political instability in Russia is **denoted as a threat in terms of uncertainty and unpredictability**, that is, **installed as one link in a discursive chain of equivalence casting Russia as anarchy, the binary opposition to state sovereignty**. Baltic state sovereignty is thus **underpinned by a discourse of danger** securitising culture, crime, diseases, alleged smear campaigns and possible invasions alike. In this discourse of danger, the current thaw and policy of liberal reform in Russia is interpreted as a **mere parenthesis** in a brutal history of Russian imperialism, her true nature, as it were. It is widely held among the Balts that the imperial traditions in Russian foreign policy **might resuscitate at any time and imminently pose a threat** to the Baltic states. The bottom line of Baltic threat perception and assessment is one of Russian coercive aggression.

## China

### Link—China—1NC

#### The affirmative’s relationship to China is based on fears of US weakness—causes risky military planning and turns the case

Lim 11 (Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, JS)

The identification of national-level threats is never straightforward; it is often effected on emotional rather than evidential grounds. Within the US, “Japan bashing” emerged during the 1980s vis-`a-vis domestic fears of the waning economic competitiveness of the US and its seeming inability to confront a “flexible” postFordist future. More recently, the US decision in 2003 to attack Iraq on the premise that it possessed weapons of mass destruction proved ultimately groundless: no such weapons were found, while Iraq slipped into anarchy and arguably became a hotbed of terrorist activities only since(see Fallows 2006; Gregory 2004; ´O Tuathail 2004). Mandel (2008:40) thus rightly cautions how “[t]he political manipulation of enemy images by both government officials and members of the mass public clouds over the stark realities surrounding any international enemy predicament. Together, these patterns create both ambiguity and confusion in dealing with the enemy component of global threat”. In the context of this paper, the critical question is whether a “China threat” imaginary is actually produced by forces beyond China; whether what you see is indeed what you get. Even though the US formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a state in 1979, the recognition was arguably conditioned by latent suspicions. As Feldman (2007:np) puts it, the Reagan administration continued to “put little trust in Chinese promises to adhere to a peaceful solution” regarding Taiwan even as it prepared to sign the 1982 communiqu´e2 with China. This “little trust”, Feldman (2007) adds, explains why Reagan gave Taiwan “Six Assurances” and also inserted a secret memo in the National Security Files noting that Taiwan’s defensive capabilities must be maintained at a level relative to China’s. **Reagan’s legacy of “little trust” seems to have permeated subsequent policy considerations**. In 1999, the Pentagon presented several scenarios in its “Asia 2025” study that portrayed China as the most significant threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific by 2025. A decade on, the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates offers this analysis of China: In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the US symmetrically—fighter to fighter or ship to ship—and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options . . . Investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballisticmissiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups (US Department of Defense 16 September 2009). Gates’ geographical imagination of China in this speech is predicated on two inter-related assumptions that exemplify a political realist “way of seeing”. First, China is not recognized as an “ally” of the US, although it is clear that the US is the key driver of such politics of recognition in the first place. Furthermore, it appears that US military “protection” is a precondition to qualify as an “ally”, a logic which automatically casts states without such “protection” as suspect. Second, China’s military-modernization process is ostensibly a “threat” because such efforts could, in Gates’ terms, “disrupt” the “strategic options” of the US in East Asia, even when it is entirely plausible that increased defense spending is to fulfil other valid purposes, such as replacing obsolete military equipment to address new threats by terrorists and maritime pirates, and enhancing remuneration packages for soldiers. Third, America wants to “project power” on its own terms, which is why it becomes “concerned” when so-called non-allies upgrade their defence technologies. This point is further reaffirmed in the Pentagon’s 2010 **Q**uadrennial **D**efense **R**eview: “lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and decisionmaking processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond” (Pentagon 2010:60). However, the extent to which the questions are “legitimate” is clearly a unilateral legal-discursive construction of the US that reflects the enduring effect of political realism in US security thought. These assumptions collectively constitute what Bialasiewicz et al (2007; see also Lott 2004) call America’s “performative” security strategy, through which perceived insecurities are constructed as ontological facts so that “mitigation” measures could be justified. A critical assessment of the motivations behind China’s military modernization policies is thus necessary before it can be ascertained whether a “China threat” exists. First, while China is not recognized as a US “ally”, it does not justify its defense modernization programs through anti-US rhetoric. For Chinese policymakers, it does appear that the critical issue is protection and consolidation of its existing territories (more on this in the third section). According to Luo Yuan, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, “China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity . . . We need to think more on how to preserve national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US” (China Daily 4 March 2010). In terms of defense budget, China’s increased 2010 budget, at around US$78 billion, pales in comparison to the proposed expenditure of the US of US$700 billion. Furthermore, the request for China to be “transparent” in its defense policies is a double-standards practice which undermines the sovereign right of a country to devise its own policies, since the Pentagon is not the most “transparent” or accountable where its own policies— especially the supposed “right” to launch pre-emptive strikes—are concerned. If anything, then, the massive “power gap” between China and the US should suffice to allay concerns about the former’s so-called “threat” (cf Al-Rodhan 2007). Second, it is interesting that whilst not “allies” in name, the US and Chinese economies are inextricably intertwined as the Chinese government currently generates effective demand for US Treasury financial instruments and holds significant US dollar reserves. In addition, China’s growing geo-economic influence worldwide is contingent on a strategic investment of its foreign reserves, which means it has every economic incentive to ensure stability in the global monetary system (see discussion in Lim 2010). Within the US, however, it is possibly this very geo-economic integration with China (especially the US Treasury’s increasing dependence on Chinese financial capital and China’s importance as an offshore outsourcing destination for US transnational corporations) which triggers suspicions of China’s “intentions” and which then generate certain reactive measures to deflect attention from the US economy’s deep-seated problems. In an insightful analysis, Cohen and DeLong (2010:12–13) argue that the US has had a wonderful opportunity to create new “sectors of the future” because of the willingness of developing countries like China to lend it money; what was created, however, was a finance sector that almost bankrupted the economy and deepened the need for foreign backing to support its “quantitative easing” monetary solution. Because the need to borrow more money from abroad—and China is so far the biggest creditor—could lead to the end of the global politico-economic influence of the US, it is perhaps unsurprising that some political actors choose to politicize this phenomenon. As Waltz (2000:15) puts it, “With zero interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration, international becomes national politics”. Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan’s arms purchase requests, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China’s peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country’s acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith’s (2009:42) the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—**could** indirectly **destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.** aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson’s analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation” . . . America’s intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China.

### Link—China—2NC

#### Any risk of a link turns the case—causes violent geo-political enframing of China that causes actual conflict—we control global uniqueness.

Lim 11 (Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, JS)

We live in a world replete with a motley set of security threats: some that we encounter locally on a daily basis, some more geographically removed, some purely imaginary. The situation becomes more convoluted when it comes to assessing “national” security threats, because threat identification presupposes the “nation”, as a collective group of disparate citizens, would somehow be affected by such threats. This is not easy, because addressing one “national” threat (eg state-to-state military threat) may not correspond to the needs for other forms of security (eg access to healthcare services, gainful employment etc). Erroneous threat imaginations could generate a self-fulfilling prophecy—the supposed “threats which never were” might actually turn real. The challenge for accurate threat identifications grows even harder when variegated doses of capitalist realism permeate foreign policymaking and lead to the creation of transnational geo-economic configurations involving putative geopolitical rivals. In this paper, I have illustrated how geopolitical calculations remain significant and might be incommensurable with geo-economic conceptions of security that view integrated, cross-border spaces of/for capital accumulation as a primary precondition of political and social stability. From China’s foreign policies over the past decade, it is evident that **Chinese leaders prefer carving open space for economic development to armed conflicts**. The development of East Asia into a dynamic and fast-growing region within the global system of capitalism is significantly contingent on the Chinese government’s peace-oriented foreign and trade policies towards neighboring countries. Since its politico-economic liberalization in 1979, China—a distinct Cold War “enemy”, together with the nowdefunct Soviet Union—has demonstrated no ideological or military hostility towards its regional neighbors and the US for the past three decades; tout au contraire, relations between these nation-states have strengthened after the Cold War. More significantly, China’s stance towards North Korea’s military provocations—notably its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship and shelling of a South Korean island in March and November 2010 respectively—have mutated from overt acceptance to tacit tolerance, which reflects its importance as a strategic partner in preventing violence (especially nuclear warfare) on the Korean peninsula. The emergence of new geo-economic formations further complicates the picture: both the US and Taiwan are involved in geo-economic configurations with China, and all three economies are experimenting with different forms of regulatory structures that frees up economic space for flows of capital, commodities and people. This corresponds with Cowen and Smith’s (2009:43) observation that “[t]he rise of geoeconomics does not necessarily mean that boundaries and territories become less important, but their strict national articulation may”. On this evidence, it might be difficult to pinpoint China as a direct “national” threat to the US **or any other nation-state**. I emphasized in the discussion that any assessment of a “threat” from China as a result of its geopolitical standoff with Taiwan needs to be critically interpreted because the US—through an ambiguous geo-legal definition of Taiwan—**contributes significantly to the production of this “threat”.** Furthermore, fears within the US of China’s ascendency in the global system of capitalism could be concatenated—either explicitly or subconsciously—to a corresponding fear of the loss of global economic competitiveness by the US. After all, as Harvey (2003:12) reminds us, “[t]here is indeed a long history of governments in trouble domestically seeking to solve their problems either by foreign adventures or by manufacturing foreign threats to consolidate solidarities at home”. But is it necessary to think of US economic relations with China in such zero-sum terms?

atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima. n41 American nuclear submarines are even more devastating. A single [\*118] submarine launched into service in 1990, the Trident II Mk-5, can carry twenty-four submarine launched ballistic missiles ("SLBM"), each of which contains eight nuclear 475-kiloton warheads; one submarine can launch ninety-one megatons worth of destruction, amounting to 341 times the punch packed by Little Boy. n42 To put this in perspective, all of the explosives used by all countries in World War II amounted to five megatons. n43 How powerful is a one megaton blast that could be achieved by targeting all three Minuteman III warheads on a single city? A one megaton blast over London could be expected to kill 1.6 million people and to injure another 3.2 million. n44 Another commentator estimates that a single megaton nuclear bomb detonated one mile above a city would flatten virtually every structure within a radius of four miles, and it would heavily damage buildings within a radius of eight miles. . . . The fireball . . . would produce at least third-degree burns on the body of any person out in the open and within a radius of nine miles from the center of the blast. Those closer to it would be incinerated if they were not otherwise killed by the force of the explosion, the ensuing winds, and the falling structures. n45 $ Q In short, these weapons are designed to be city killers. n46 At the peak of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had thousands of such city killers aimed at each other. n47 France and the United Kingdom had their own nuclear arsenals, also aimed at the Soviet Union (and they were also targeted by the Soviet Union). n48 Today, things look much different. The Soviet Union has broken apart, and our former adversary, Russia, may well be invited to join the North

### 2NC China—AT Empirics

#### They don’t have empirics—our link arguments prove their truth claims are based on flawed interpretations of reality used to justify a militarist foreign policy towards China—That’s Lim—

#### We have better empirics

Lim ’11 (Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, JS)

To be sure, there are historical grounds for scepticisms towards China’s recent military modernization. During the Cold War era, China (as the PRC) was involved in several military conflicts with other states. The three most significant wars fought by the PRC’s military all occurred then: namely, the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 (to assist its beleaguered North Korean ally); the Sino-Indian war in 1962 (over two disputed territories, Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh); and the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979 (as a response to Vietnam’s invasion of PRC-backed Cambodia). For the past three decades, however, China has abstained from warfare. While the Korean War is technically unresolved today and China still trades with and provides aid to North Korea, analysts have noticed recent signs that Chinese support for the cantankerous and capricious North Korean regime, based on former Cold War alliances, is increasingly conditional on the latter’s commitment to peaceful negotiations and renunciation of any warfare (Glaser 2009; Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Moore 2008). Diplomatic and economic relations between South Korea and China improved significantly following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1992, which adds further impetus to a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict. Similarly, China’s relations with India, all Southeast Asian countries (including its former warring foe Vietnam) and even Japan (its former colonial aggressor) remain cordial in spite of their long-lasting territorial disputes.3 To Hyer (1995:42), China’s contemporary reluctance to resort to military force is tied to its growing connections with other states: Despite the fact that irredentist views are common among China’s elite, the dynamics of the international system have forced the PRC to adopt realistic policies toward particular territorial disputes . . . Although China has demonstrated that it considers military force an option, in most cases China has proved to be very pragmatic, willing to compromise to establish legitimate boundaries through peaceful negotiations. In other words, military warfare is arguably a tool of last resort for China when it comes to conflict resolution; the primary policy focus within China appears to be sustaining economic development. Interestingly, then, much attention in media, policy and academic circles has shifted focus to a “war” that China never fought—a “war” across the Taiwan Strait.

## Deterrence

### Link—Deterrence—1NC

#### Deterrence is war—**Aims shifted from an atomic clash to controlling existence—can’t assign a value to life**

Baudrillard ’89 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Simulacra and Simulation. P.32-34)

The apotheosis of simulation: The nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has inulated itself from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the trivialized system of **deterrence**, that **is** at the heart of the media, of the violence without consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the “Strategy of games” (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all “ground-level” events to being nothing but ephemeral scenarios, **transforming the life left to us into** survival, into a stake without stakes---not even into **a life** insurance policy: into a policy **that** already **has no value**. It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real atomic clash is precluded—precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their “strategy” are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. **The whole originality of the situation lies in the improbability of destruction**. Deterrence precludes war---the archaic violence of expanding systems. **Deterrence itself is the neutral, implosive violence** of metastable systems or systems in involution. **There is no longer a subject of deterrence**, nor an adversary nor a strategy—**it is a planetary structure of the annihilation of stakes**. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take place. **The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext,** through the sophistication of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it is itself a system of nullity), **for installing a universal security** system, a universal **lockup and control system, whose deterrent effect is** **not** at all **aimed at an atomic clash** (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance. Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus, the money of destruction without reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence and potential conflicts around the world. **What is hatched** in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, “objective” threat, and thanks to Damocles’ nuclear sword, **is the perfection of the best system of control** that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization **of the whole planet** through this hypermodel of security. The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a puerile game given over to the military. **The political stake is dead, only simulacra of conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes remain.**

### Link—Deterrence—2NC

#### They can’t get offense—deterrence requires crisis

Massumi ‘2 (Brian, Associate Professor of Communications at the Université de Montréal; Everywhere You Want to Be: An Introduction to Fear; http://www.textz.com)

There is a kind of nonexclusive triage of bodies. Bodies are selected, on the basis of certain socially-valorized distinctions, for priority access to a certain kind of apparatus. African-American men, for example, are favored for prison and the army on the basis of their skin color. Women of all races are favored for biopower on the basis of gender: the medicalization of child-birth and social engineering of the child-rearing responsibilities women still disproportionately bear. Priority access to one apparatus of actualization does not necessarily exclude a body's selection by another. The same body can, inevitably is, selected for different apparatuses successively and simultaneously. Prison follows school follows family. Each of these disciplinary institutions is penetrated by varying modes of biopower and testing. A black woman's bodily functions are medicalized and at the same time prioritized for disciplinary institutions. Generic identity is the coincidence of functions that may in practice prove mutually exclusive (capitalist and worker, producer and consumer, criminal and banker)--but then again may not. Specific identity involves a separation of functions in their passage into practice, sometimes but not necessarily with a view to exclusivity, often for mixing and matching. The result is a complex weave of shifting social boundaries. The boundaries are not barriers; they are not impermeable. They are more like filters than walls. A black from the South Bronx may become a big-time capitalist. But the chances are slim. Boundary-setting--or the separation/combination of social functions through a triage of bodies based on valorized distinctions--works less by simple exclusion than by probability. The apparatuses of actualization governing this process are power mechanisms. Power is not a form. It is not abstract. It is the movement of form into the content outside of which it is a void of potential function, of the abstract into the particular it cannot be or do without. It is the translation of generic identity into the specific identities outside whose actualization it does not exist, of humanity into the selves comprising it. Not a form, but a mechanism of formation; not a being, but a coming to being; a becoming. Neither generic nor specific. Power is as ever-present as the subject-form and as infinitely variable as its selves. It is neither one nor the other, and nevertheless not indeterminate. It has definable modes, like the three just mentioned, which are distinguished by the kinds of functions they separate out for actualization in a given body (by the kind of socially recognizable content they give a life). Power mechanisms can also be defined, perhaps more fundamentally, by the temporal mode in which they operate. They may seize upon the futurity of the future-past, in which case they can be characterized as strategies of surveillance: on the look-out for the event. Or they may seize upon its dimension of anteriority, in which case they are statistical and probabilistic: analyze and quantify the event as it happened. The past tense in the Timex ad went along with a fixation on numbers: 85-foot fall, 2,500-foot altitude, inches from the runway, 25-minute flight before landing, aged 52, 160-pound sled, 27 days and 345 miles, three blizzards ... Mechanisms of surveillance and of statistical probabilization buckle into prediction. A power word for prediction is deterrence. **Deterrence is** the perpetual co-functioning of the past and future of power: **the empty present of watching and weighing** with an eye to avert. **It is the avoidance of** the **accident** on the basis of its past occurrence. It is power turned toward the event: in other words, as it approaches the subject-form, the virtual. Power under late capitalism is a two-sided coin. One side of it faces the subject-form. On that side, it is deterrence. **Deterrence** by nature **determines nothing (but** potential: **the potential for the** multiform **disaster of** human **existence**). On the other side, power is determining. There, discipline, **biopower**, and testing give disaster a face. They **bring specificity to the general condition of possibility of deterrence by applying it to a particular found body**. They give a life-form content. A self is selected (produced and consumed). The in-between of the subject-form and the self, of the generic identity and specific identity--the come and go between deterrence and discipline/biopower/testing, between the virtual and the actual--is the same intensive and extensive terrain saturated by the capitalist relation. Power is coincident with capital as social selection and probabilistic control (Deleuze 1990). Power is capitalization expressed as a destiny. **But in this postequilibrium world of deterrence in which the accident is always about to happen and already has, disorder is the motor of control. And destiny** in the final analysis **is only** the necessity of chance: **the inevitability of** **the event**, the evanescence of consumptive production, a life spent, death.

### 2NC Deterrence—D-Rule

#### Nuclear deterrence is a commitment to pure revenge—moral obligation to vote negative

Yin ‘3 (Tung, Professor at the University of Iowa College of Law, Fall 2003, “Disposable Deontology: The Death Penalty and Nuclear Deterrence,” 55 Ala. L. Rev. 111, Lexis)

**The death penalty cannot be justified**, even on the grounds claimed by some hon. Members. But it is also wrong in principle. It is a response to evil that is **evil itself**. It is to act, as a society, not in justice but in **anger**; not in reason but **for revenge**. No matter how clothed it is in the legal process and however much it is attended by all the trappings of the law, it cannot disguise its real nature, which is **cruel and barbaric. We do not uphold the sanctity of human life by taking it**, or underline its precious nature by snuffing it out. In essence, it appears that these nations believe that **killing** someone **as punishment** for that person's misdeeds, no matter how heinous, **is a violation of "human dignity**." This view is perhaps best illustrated by the French government's protests concerning alleged "20th hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen who has been indicted for "conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism, to commit aircraft piracy, to destroy aircraft, to use weapons of mass destruction, to murder U.S. employees and to destroy property" as part of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. n13 The French government has protested the fact that Moussaoui could get the death penalty if convicted, but this protest is not based on the belief that Moussaoui is innocent, that he will not get a fair trial in the United States, or even that mitigating circumstances might ultimately show that he does not deserve the death penalty even if convicted. A spokesperson for the French Embassy stated: "We're confident the Americans will provide for a fair trial. But we oppose the death penalty--as do all the other countries of the European Union--whether it's against Mr. Moussaoui or anyone else. That's just a general principle." n14 Or, as Danielle Mitterrand of France explained, [\*114] "Whatever the crime, believing in the abolition of the death penalty is a philosophy of the mind and spirit. It can't change depending on the circumstances." n15 Translating the position of the other Western nations into traditional criminal law theory is not a simple task; however, their opposition appears deontological, in the sense of being based not on practical or consequentialist (i.e., utilitarian) rationales. n16 That is, they remain opposed, even if one could show that the death penalty served some utilitarian purpose (such as deterrence). That opposition, however, is flatly **inconsistent** with the theory of nuclear deterrence, which these same countries rely on, either directly, in the case of France and the United Kingdom (which are armed with nuclear weapons), or indirectly, in the case of other U.S. allies (who rely upon our nuclear umbrella). Sometimes known as "mutual assured destruction," nuclear deterrence rests on the threat that a country must retaliate against another country's civilian population in response to a first strike. The idea of nuclear deterrence is that no one will launch a nuclear attack because the price of that attack--nuclear retaliation--is too high to bear. The morally questionable practice of targeting civilian populations is justified due to the positive outcome of such a practice: the avoidance of nuclear war. But anyone accepting this deterrence theory must be open to accepting capital punishment if it were shown to have a positive outcome. Moreover, once deterrence fails, the act of retaliation cannot serve any useful purpose: it cannot stop the first strike and, thus, cannot protect the target country. Therefore, **any country subscribing to the theory of nuclear deterrence must be prepared to retaliate for a first strike, knowing that doing so achieves no purpose other than retribution.** Retaliation cannot stop the incoming missiles. Thus, **any country willing to accept the benefits of nuclear deterrence holds a moral framework that is incompatible with an opposition to the death penalty.** It may be that foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds. Certainly, there is a danger in extolling consistency as its own paramount value to the exclusion of what exactly it is that one is being consistent about. n18 But if being consistent can be defined as "harmony, regularity, or steady continuity throughout," n19 and consistency can be defined as "harmony of conduct [\*115] or practice with profession," n20 then it seems reasonable to put the burden on those who are inconsistent to demonstrate that consistency would be foolish. This is especially true in the specific comparison at issue here, where the other Western nations are criticizing the United States based on a rigid, morality-based principle. I do not argue, however, that other Western nations possessing nuclear weapons (or relying upon them) are obligated to use capital punishment. There are a number of nondeontological reasons to abolish the death penalty, including the fact that it costs more to try to impose a death sentence than to imprison someone for life. And certainly other countries are free to be inconsistent in governing themselves. But these nondeontological reasons do not justify failure to cooperate in extraditing death-eligible suspects to a country that retains the death penalty. I. Credible Nuclear Deterrence The theory of nuclear war that developed during the Cold War was known by its apt acronym "MAD," which stood for "mutual assured destruction." n21 The idea behind MAD was that two nuclear superpowers could maintain an uneasy and wary peace by promising to respond to a nuclear attack with a massive retaliatory strike aimed at annihilating the attacker--especially its civilian population. n22 This "eye for an eye" approach has a conceptual ease to it, and the fact that the Cold War lasted for over forty years without an actual nuclear incident between the United States and the former Soviet Union suggests that it was effective. A. Mutual Assured Destruction and the Arms Race MAD, however, did not come into being at the same time as the nuclear bomb. Just after World War II, U.S. military plans called for the use of nuclear weapons for what might have been considered non-retaliatory purposes. n23 Because the former Soviet Union and its allies had military forces [\*116] that greatly outnumbered those of the United States and its allies in Europe, "it was thought, reasonably enough, that the only way to halt an invasion of Western Europe was to destroy the Soviet armies before they could overrun the continent." n24 In other words, the United States was prepared to drop nuclear bombs on the Soviet army if it tried to invade Western Europe. Thus, in 1948, when the United States had about fifty nuclear bombs and the Soviet Union had none, the nuclear weapons were aimed at military, industrial, or transportation targets; civilian casualties were expected but not intended. n25 Even in 1950, when the United States had somewhere between 292 and 688 atomic bombs, the explosive yield of such bombs was small enough and the delivery mechanism--basically the same as was used in World War II (bombers)--was uncertain enough that the United States could not even be sure of destroying Moscow, much less the whole of the Soviet Union. n26 This policy began to mutate in 1954, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that the United States would respond to Soviet provocation by launching "massive retaliation," which everyone understood to mean "a full-scale nuclear attack." n27 The critical catalyst for this policy change was the development of the hydrogen bomb in 1952. n28 The hydrogen bomb packs about a hundred to a thousand times the destructive power of the atomic bomb. n29 Once the United States perfected the hydrogen bomb, it solved the problem of not being able to ensure the destruction of Moscow--and much more. Of course, the Soviet Union did not lag behind for long, and it built a hydrogen bomb in 1955. n30 By the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union had both developed intercontinental ballistic missiles ("ICBMs"), which could be launched from one side of the world and hit a target on the other side. n31 And as technology improved and more potent weapons were developed, the amount of warning time a superpower could expect to have shrunk to only a few minutes. n32 Submarines, for example, could park just outside an enemy country's [\*117] waters and lob nuclear missiles with virtually no warning at all. n33 To be able to implement MAD under these conditions, a superpower needed to have enough of its own nuclear weapons such that even if it were devastated by a nuclear strike, it would still be able to strike back. This became known as "second strike capability," which drove the United States and the former Soviet Union to build more and more nuclear weapons. n34 In 1962, for example, the United States' nuclear strategy, embodied in the Single Integrated Operational Plan ("SIOP"), called for the launching of all American nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear war started by the Soviet Union. n35 An estimated 360 million to 525 million Russians and Chinese (who were also targeted) would die. n36 The image of a mushroom-shaped cloud rising above a devastated city is familiar to just about everyone today. The image, however, fails to convey the awesomely destructive potential of nuclear weapons. A nuclear blast similar in size to the one at Hiroshima would kill or injure people and destroy buildings due to (1) the incredible heat of the fireball, which would melt or vaporize everything close to it, (2) the overwhelming blast wave, which would strike "as a sudden and shattering blow, immediately followed by a hurricane-force wind directed outwards from the explosion," n37 and (3) neutron and gamma rays that would induce fatal radiation sickness at distances up to three-quarters of a mile or more. n38 That qualification (a Hiroshima-sized bomb) is crucial to understanding how destructive today's nuclear weapons can be. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had an explosive yield of 13.5 kilotons, or the equivalent of 13,500 tons of TNT. n39 By contrast, a United States' Minuteman III Mk-12A ICBM in service today carries three nuclear warheads, n40 each with an explosive yield of 335 kilotons, meaning that a single ICBM packs approximately 17.4 times the destructive power of the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima. n41 American nuclear submarines are even more devastating. A single [\*118] submarine launched into service in 1990, the Trident II Mk-5, can carry twenty-four submarine launched ballistic missiles ("SLBM"), each of which contains eight nuclear 475-kiloton warheads; one submarine can launch ninety-one megatons worth of destruction, amounting to 341 times the punch packed by Little Boy. n42 To put this in perspective, all of the explosives used by all countries in World War II amounted to five megatons. n43 How powerful is a one megaton blast that could be achieved by targeting all three Minuteman III warheads on a single city? A one megaton blast over London could be expected to kill 1.6 million people and to injure another 3.2 million. n44 Another commentator estimates that a single megaton nuclear bomb detonated one mile above a city would flatten virtually every structure within a radius of four miles, and it would heavily damage buildings within a radius of eight miles. . . . The fireball . . . would produce at least third-degree burns on the body of any person out in the open and within a radius of nine miles from the center of the blast. Those closer to it would be incinerated if they were not otherwise killed by the force of the explosion, the ensuing winds, and the falling structures. n45 $ Q In short, these weapons are designed to be city killers. n46 At the peak of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had thousands of such city killers aimed at each other. n47 France and the United Kingdom had their own nuclear arsenals, also aimed at the Soviet Union (and they were also targeted by the Soviet Union). n48 Today, things look much different. The Soviet Union has broken apart, and our former adversary, Russia, may well be invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")--the organization whose very existence was predicated on a joint alliance against the Soviet Union. n49 [\*119] One can legitimately ask whether MAD is still appropriate now that the Cold War has ended. As the current "war on terrorism" demonstrates, our greatest threat may come from non-state terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, rather than another nation-state. If we do not need to worry about preemptive nuclear strikes from other countries, do we still need MAD? A large scale nuclear weapon such as an ICBM, which has the purpose of destroying entire cities, is generally too unwieldy to use against non-state actors. n50 Perhaps MAD can be relegated to the trashbin of ideas that once seemed good but that have outlived their usefulness, like Niels Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom. But countries such as Iran, North Korea, and any others seeking to join the nuclear weapons club are probably still deterred by MAD. n51 Some believe that Saddam Hussein opted not to use any weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf War in 1991 because the United States had warned "Iraq's foreign minister that any use of nonconventional weapons would seal Iraq's destruction." n52 North Korea's recent decision to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and to reactivate its nuclear weapons program further demonstrates the continued need for nuclear deterrence, n53 especially as North Korea's defection may tempt other rogue nations to follow suit. n54 If the world is due for an increase in nuclear proliferation, particularly among the least stable countries (and perhaps the ones most likely to use nuclear weapons to blackmail the world into acceding to their demands), we may be forced to continue to rely on MAD (or at least, assured destruction) in the future. n55 B. Moral Implications of MAD There are two very disturbing implications about MAD. First, MAD is predicated upon the concept of countries' **holding each other's civilian populations hostage**. The fact that MAD appears to have kept the peace for over fifty years, one commentator asserts, "**blinds us to the fact that our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages--the mass killing of hostages**." In other words, one can plausibly argue that even if a nuclear power has no real intention of retaliating against an adversary with a nuclear strike**, simply threatening the innocent civilians of the adversarial nation is immoral.**

## Hegemony

### Link—Hegemony—1NC

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy—this fantasy of omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence—you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

McClintock ‘9 (Anne, chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia, “Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib,” Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74, MUSE, JS)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence.10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide.11 C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.”12 The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a political casus belli and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an immense boon: “There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland, which gives it some oomph.” In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, “Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden.” After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before.” Charles Krauthammer, for one, called for a declaration of total war. “We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.”13

### 2NC Hegemony—Root Cause/Error Replication

#### Dreams of hegemonic collapse are projected by elites—their framing is what caused massive expansion of presidential war powers, turns the case and makes structural violence invisible

Engelhardt 13 (Tom, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, The End of Victory Culture, runs the Nation Institute, 2013, “The Enemy-Industrial Complex,” <http://original.antiwar.com/engelhardt/2013/04/15/the-enemy-industrial-complex/>, JS)

All these years, we’ve been launching wars and pursuing a “global war on terror.” We’ve poured money into national security as if there were no tomorrow. From our police to our borders, we’ve up-armored everywhere. We constantly hear about “threats” to us and to the “homeland.” And yet, when you knock on the door marked “Enemy,” there’s seldom anyone home. Few in this country have found this striking. Few seem to notice any disjuncture between the enemy-ridden, threatening, and deeply dangerous world we have been preparing ourselves for (and fighting in) this last decade-plus and the world as it actually is, even those who lived through significant parts of the last anxiety-producing, bloody century. You know that feeling when you wake up and realize you’ve had the same recurrent nightmare yet again? Sometimes, there’s an equivalent in waking life, and here’s mine: every now and then, as I read about the next move in the spreading war on terror, the next drone assassination, the next ratcheting up of the surveillance game, the next expansion of the secrecy that envelops our government, the next set of expensive actions taken to guard us — all of this justified by the enormous threats and dangers that we face — I think to myself: Where’s the enemy? And then I wonder: Just what kind of a dream is this that we’re dreaming? A Door Marked “Enemy” and No One Home Let’s admit it: enemies can have their uses. And let’s admit as well that it’s in the interest of some in our country that we be seen as surrounded by constant and imminent dangers on an enemy-filled planet. Let’s also admit that the world is and always will be a dangerous place in all sorts of ways. Still, in American terms, the bloodlettings, the devastations of this new century and the last years of the previous one have been remarkably minimal or distant; some of the worst, as in the multi-country war over the Congo with its more than five million dead have passed us by entirely; some, even when we launched them, have essentially been imperial frontier conflicts, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, or interventions of little cost (to us) as in Libya, or frontier patrolling operations as in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Northern Africa. (It was no mistake that, when Washington launched its special operations raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan, to get Osama bin Laden, it was given the code name “Geronimo” and the message from the SEAL team recording his death was “Geronimo-E KIA” or “enemy killed in action.”) And let’s admit as well that, in the wake of those wars and operations, Americans now have more enemies, more angry, embittered people who would like to do us harm than on September 10, 2001. Let’s accept that somewhere out there are people who, as George W. Bush once liked to say, “hate us” and what we stand for. (I leave just what we actually stand for to you, for the moment.) So let’s consider those enemies briefly. Is there a major state, for instance, that falls into this category, like any of the great warring imperial European powers from the sixteenth century on, or Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II, or the Soviet Union of the Cold War era? Of course not. There was admittedly a period when, in order to pump up what we faced in the world, analogies to World War II and the Cold War were rife. There was, for instance, George W. Bush’s famed rhetorical construct, the Axis of Evil (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), patterned by his speechwriter on the German-Italian-Japanese “axis” of World War II. It was, of course, a joke construct, if reality was your yardstick. Iraq and Iran were then enemies. (Only in the wake of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have they become friends and allies.) And North Korea had nothing whatsoever to do with either of them. Similarly, the American occupation of Iraq was once regularly compared to the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan, just as Saddam Hussein had long been presented as a modern Hitler. In addition, al-Qaeda-style Islamists were regularly referred to as Islamofascists, while certain military and neocon types with a desire to turn the war on terror into a successor to the Cold War took to calling it “the long war,” or even “World War IV.” But all of this was so wildly out of whack that it simply faded away. As for who’s behind that door marked “Enemy,” if you opened it, what would you find? As a start, scattered hundreds or, as the years have gone by, thousands of jihadis, mostly in the poorest backlands of the planet and with little ability to do anything to the United States. Next, there were a few minority insurgencies, including the Taliban and allied forces in Afghanistan and separate Sunni and Shia ones in Iraq. There also have been tiny numbers of wannabe Islamic terrorists in the U.S. (once you take away the string of FBI sting operations that have regularly turned hopeless slackers and lost teenagers into the most dangerous of fantasy Muslim plotters). And then, of course, there are those two relatively hapless regional powers, Iran and North Korea, whose bark far exceeds their potential bite. The Wizard of Oz on 9/11 The U.S., in other words, is probably in less danger from external enemies than at any moment in the last century. There is no other imperial power on the planet capable of, or desirous of, taking on American power directly, including China. It’s true that, on September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers with box cutters produced a remarkable, apocalyptic, and devastating TV show in which almost 3,000 people died. When those giant towers in downtown New York collapsed, it certainly had the look of nuclear disaster (and in those first days, the media was filled was nuclear-style references), but it wasn’t actually an apocalyptic event. The enemy was still nearly nonexistent. The act cost bin Laden only an estimated $400,000-$500,000, though it would lead to a series of trillion-dollar wars. It was a nightmarish event that had a malign Wizard of Oz quality to it: a tiny man producing giant effects. It in no way endangered the state. In fact, it would actually strengthen many of its powers. It put a hit on the economy, but a passing one. It was a spectacular and spectacularly gruesome act of terror by a small, murderous organization then capable of mounting a major operation somewhere on Earth only once every couple of years. It was meant to spread fear, but nothing more. When the towers came down and you could suddenly see to the horizon, it was still, in historical terms, remarkably enemy-less. And yet 9/11 was experienced here as a Pearl Harbor moment — a sneak attack by a terrifying enemy meant to disable the country. The next day, newspaper headlines were filled with variations on “A Pearl Harbor of the Twenty-First Century.” If it was a repeat of December 7, 1941, however, it lacked an imperial Japan or any other state to declare war on, although one of the weakest partial states on the planet, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, would end up filling the bill adequately enough for Americans. To put this in perspective, consider two obvious major dangers in U.S. life: suicide by gun and death by car. In 2010, more than 19,000 Americans killed themselves using guns. (In the same year, there were “only” 11,000 homicides nationwide.) In 2011, 32,000 Americans died in traffic accidents (the lowest figure in 60 years, though it was again on the rise in the first six months of 2012). In other words, Americans accept without blinking the equivalent yearly of more than six 9/11s in suicides-by-gun and more than 10 when it comes to vehicular deaths. Similarly, had the underwear bomber, to take one post-9/11 example of terrorism, succeeded in downing Flight 253 and murdering its 290 passengers, it would have been a horrific act of terror; but he and his compatriots would have had to bring down 65 planes to reach the annual level of weaponized suicides and more than 110 planes for vehicular deaths. And yet no one has declared war on either the car or the gun (or the companies that make them or the people who sell them). No one has built a massive, nearly trillion-dollar car-and-gun-security-complex to deal with them. In the case of guns, quite the opposite is true, as the post-Newtown debate over gun control has made all too clear. On both scores, Americans have decided to live with perfectly real dangers and the staggering carnage that accompanies them, constraining them on occasion or sometimes not at all. Despite the carnage of 9/11, terrorism has been a small-scale American danger in the years since, worse than shark attacks, but not much else. Like a wizard, however, what Osama bin Laden and his suicide bombers did that day was create an instant sense of an enemy so big, so powerful, that Americans found “war” a reasonable response; big enough for those who wanted an international police action against al-Qaeda to be laughed out of the room; big enough to launch an invasion of revenge against Iraq, a country unrelated to al-Qaeda; big enough, in fact, to essentially declare war on the world. It took next to no time for top administration officials to begin talking about targeting 60 countries, and as journalist Ron Suskind has reported, within six days of the attack, the CIA had topped that figure, presenting President Bush with a “Worldwide Attack Matrix,” a plan that targeted terrorists in 80 countries. What’s remarkable is how little the disjuncture between the scope and scale of the global war that was almost instantly launched and the actual enemy at hand was ever noted here. You could certainly make a reasonable argument that, in these years, Washington has largely fought no one — and lost. Everywhere it went, it created enemies who had, previously, hardly existed and the process is ongoing. Had you been able to time-travel back to the Cold War era to inform Americans that, in the future, our major enemies would be in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Libya, and so on, they would surely have thought you mad (or lucky indeed). Creating an Enemy-Industrial Complex Without an enemy of commensurate size and threat, so much that was done in Washington in these years might have been unattainable. The vast national security building and spending spree — stretching from the Virginia suburbs of Washington, where the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency erected its new $1.8 billion headquarters, to Bluffdale, Utah, where the National Security Agency is still constructing a $2 billion, one-million-square-foot data center for storing the world’s intercepted communications — would have been unlikely. Without the fear of an enemy capable of doing anything, money at ever escalating levels would never have poured into homeland security, or the Pentagon, or a growing complex of crony corporations associated with our weaponized safety. The exponential growth of the national security complex, as well as of the powers of the executive branch when it comes to national security matters, would have far been less likely. Without 9/11 and the perpetual “wartime” that followed, along with the heavily promoted threat of terrorists ready to strike and potentially capable of wielding biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, we would have no Department of Homeland Security nor the lucrative mini-homeland-security complex that surrounds it; the 17-outfit U.S. Intelligence Community with its massive $75 billion official budget would have been far less impressive; our endless drone wars and the “drone lobby” that goes with them might never have developed; and the U.S. military would not have an ever growing secret military, the Joint Special Operations Command, gestating inside it — effectively the president’s private army, air force, and navy — and already conducting largely secret operations across much of the planet. For all of this to happen, there had to be an enemy-industrial complex as well, a network of crucial figures and institutions ready to pump up the threat we faced and convince Americans that we were in a world so dangerous that rights, liberty, and privacy were small things to sacrifice for American safety. In short, any number of interests from Bush administration figures eager to “sweep it all up” and do whatever they wanted in the world to weapons makers, lobbyists, surveillance outfits, think tanks, military intellectuals, assorted pundits… well, the whole national and homeland security racket and its various hangers-on had an interest in beefing up the enemy. For them, it was important in the post-9/11 era that threats would never again lack a capital “T” or a hefty dollar sign. And don’t forget a media that was ready to pound the drums of war and emphasize what dangerous enemies lurked in our world with remarkably few second thoughts. Post-9/11, major media outlets were generally prepared to take the enemy-industrial complex’s word for it and play every new terrorist incident as if it were potentially the end of the world. Increasingly as the years went on, jobs, livelihoods, an expanding world of “security” depended on the continuance of all this, depended, in short, on the injection of regular doses of fear into the body politic. That was the “favor” Osama bin Laden did for Washington’s national security apparatus and the Bush administration on that fateful September morning. He engraved an argument in the American brain that would live on indelibly for years, possibly decades, calling for eternal vigilance at any cost and on a previously unknown scale. As the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), that neocon think-tank-cum-shadow-government, so fatefully put it in “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” a year before the 9/11 attacks: “Further, the process of transformation [of the military], even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor.” So when the new Pearl Harbor arrived out of the blue, with many PNAC members (from Vice President Dick Cheney on down) already in office, they naturally saw their chance. They created an al-Qaeda on steroids and launched their “global war” to establish a Pax Americana, in the Middle East and then perhaps globally. They were aware that they lacked opponents of the stature of those of the previous century and, in their documents, they made it clear that they were planning to ensure no future great-power-style enemy or bloc of enemy-like nations would arise. Ever. For this, they needed an American public anxious, frightened, and ready to pay. It was, in other words, in their interest to manipulate us. And if that were all there were to it, our world would be a grim, but simple enough place. As it happens, it’s not. Ruling elites, no matter what power they have, don’t work that way. Before they manipulate us, they almost invariably manipulate themselves. I was convinced of this years ago by a friend who had spent a lot of time reading early Cold War documents from the National Security Council — from, that is, a small group of powerful governmental figures writing to and for each other in the utmost secrecy. As he told me then and wrote in Washington’s China, the smart book he did on the early U.S. response to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, what struck him in the documents was the crudely anti-communist language those men used in private with each other. It was the sort of anti-communism you might otherwise have assumed Washington’s ruling elite would only have wielded to manipulate ordinary Americans with fears of Communist subversion, the “enemy within,” and Soviet plans to take over the world. (In fact, they and others like them would use just such language to inject fear into the body politic in those early Cold War years, that era of McCarthyism.) They were indeed manipulative men, but before they influenced other Americans they assumedly underwent something like a process of collective auto-hypnotism in which they convinced one another of the dangers they needed the American people to believe in. There is evidence that a similar process took place in the aftermath of 9/11. From the flustered look on George W. Bush’s face as his plane took him not toward but away from Washington on September 11, 2001, to the image of Dick Cheney, in those early months, being chauffeured around Washington in an armored motorcade with a “gas mask and a biochemical survival suit” in the backseat, you could sense that the enemy loomed large and omnipresent for them. They were, that is, genuinely scared, even if they were also ready to make use of that fear for their own ends. Or consider the issue of Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, that excuse for the invasion of Iraq. Critics of the invasion are generally quick to point out how that bogus issue was used by the top officials of the Bush administration to gain public support for a course that they had already chosen. After all, Cheney and his men cherry-picked the evidence to make their case, even formed their own secret intel outfit to give them what they needed, and ignored facts at hand that brought their version of events into question. They publicly claimed in an orchestrated way that Saddam had active nuclear and WMD programs. They spoke in the most open ways of potential mushroom clouds from (nonexistent) Iraqi nuclear weapons rising over American cities, or of those same cities being sprayed with (nonexistent) chemical or biological weapons from (nonexistent) Iraqi drones. They certainly had to know that some of this information was useful but bogus. Still, they had clearly also convinced themselves that, on taking Iraq, they would indeed find some Iraqi WMD to justify their claims. In his soon-to-be-published book, Dirty Wars, Jeremy Scahill cites the conservative journalist Rowan Scarborough on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s growing post-invasion irritation over the search for Iraqi WMD sites. “Each morning,” wrote Scarborough, “the crisis action team had to report that another location was a bust. Rumsfeld grew angrier and angrier. One officer quoted him as saying, ‘They must be there!’ At one briefing, he picked up the briefing slides and tossed them back at the briefers.” In other words, those top officials hustling us into their global war and their long-desired invasion of Iraq had also hustled themselves into the same world with a similar set of fears. This may seem odd, but given the workings of the human mind, its ability to comfortably hold potentially contradictory thoughts most of the time without disturbing itself greatly, it’s not. A similar phenomenon undoubtedly took place in the larger national security establishment where self-interest combined easily enough with fear. After all, in the post-9/11 era, they were promising us one thing: something close to 100% “safety” when it came to one small danger in our world — terrorism. The fear that the next underwear bomber might get through surely had the American public — but also the American security state — in its grips. After all, who loses the most if another shoe bomber strikes, another ambassador goes down, another 9/11 actually happens? Whose job, whose world, will be at stake then? They may indeed be a crew of Machiavellis, but they are also acolytes in the cult of terror and global war. They live in the Cathedral of the Enemy. They were the first believers and they will undoubtedly be the last ones as well. They are invested in the importance of the enemy. It’s their religion. They are, after all, the enemy-industrial complex and if we are in their grip, so are they. The comic strip character Pogo once famously declared: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” How true. We just don’t know it yet.

### 2NC Hegemony—AT Violence Declining

#### This argument will win us the debate—it proves that the status quo generates uniqueness for a move away from the liberal ontology of warfare—but the aff creates a Telos peace enforced through liberal violence—their evidence proves that voting negative to refuse to partake in a self-fulfilling system of scenario-planning solves the case better by elevating non-violence as a priori—only a risk the aff naturalizes a more sanitized violence by over-determining peace—

Dalby 11 (Simon, Carleton University "PEACE AND GEOPOLITICS: IMAGINING PEACEFUL GEOGRAPHIES" Nov 2011 http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/PEACEFUL\_GEOGRAPHIES.pdf, JS)

This paper suggests this focus on war and violence has to be read against rapidly shifting geographies and the recent general trend of reduced violence in human affairs. Whether this is the promise of the liberal peace, a transitory imperial pax, something more fundamental in human affairs, or a temporary historical blip remains to be seen, but substantial empirical analyses do suggest that violence is declining(Human Security Report 2011). This stands in stark contrast to realist assertions of war as the human condition as well as to repeated warnings about the supposed dangers to international order of rising Asian powers. Likewise the remilitarization of Anglo-Saxon culture since 9/11 has suggested that warring is a routine part of modern life. But the nature of war has changed in some important ways even if contemporary imperial adventures in peripheral places look all too familiar to historians. Peace, all this crucially implies, is a matter of social processes, not a final Telos, a resolution of the tensions of human life, nor a utopia that will arrive sometime. In Christian terms the aspirational “Kingdom of God” is a work in progress. Nick Megoran (2011) in particular has suggested that the geography discipline needs to think much more carefully about peace making and the possibilities of non-violence as modes of political action. The key question is focused on in the Megoran’s pointed refusal to accept the simplistic dismissal of the efficacy of non-violence given the obvious prevalence of violence. The point of his argument is that non-violence is a political strategy in part to respond to violence, to initiate political actions in ways that are not hostage to the use of force. In doing so, especially in his discussion of resistance to Nazi policies in Germany during the war, Megoran (2011) underplays the important points about legitimacy as part of politics, and likewise hints at the important contrast between non-violence as a strategic mode of political action. Implied here is that while war may be politics by other means, to gloss the classic Clausewitzian formulation, non-violence is politics too. But politics plays in the larger geopolitical context, and this must not be forgotten in deliberations concerning the possible new initiatives geographers might take in thinking carefully about disciplinary contributions to peace research and practice. Contemporary social theory might point to Michel Foucault, and the argument drawn from his writings that politics is the extension of war rather than the other way round. Given the interest in biopolitics and geogovernance within the discipline these matters are obviously relevant but the connection to peace needs to be thought carefully beyond formulations that simply assume it as the opposite of wars (Morrissey 2011). This is especially the case given the changing modes of contemporary warfare and the advocacy of violence as an appropriate policy in present circumstances. The modes of warfare at the heart of liberalism suggest that the security of what Reid and Dillon (2009) call the biohuman, the liberal consuming subject, involves a violent series of practices designed to pacify the world by the elimination of political alternatives. The tension here suggests an imperial peace, a forceful imposition of a state of non-war. In George W. Bush’s terms justifying the war on terror, a long struggle to eliminate tyranny (Dalby 2009a). Peace is, in this geopolitical understanding, what comes after the elimination **of opposition**. In late 2011 such formulations dominated discussions of the death of Colonel Gadaffi in Libya. The dramatic transformation of human affairs in the last couple of generations do require that would-be peaceful geographers look both to the importance of non-violence and simultaneously to how global transformations are changing the landscape of violence and social change, all of it still under the threat of nuclear devastation should major inter-state war occur once again. The re-emergence of non-violence as an explicit political strategy, and in particular the use of Gene Sharp’s (1973) ideas of non-violent direct action in recent events pose these questions very pointedly. Geographers have much to offer in such re-thinking that may yet play their part in a more global understanding of how interconnected our fates are becoming and how inappropriate national state boundaries are as the premise for political action in a rapidly changing biosphere. But to do so some hard thinking is needed on geopolitics, and on how it works as well as how peace-full scholarship might foster that which it desires. Linking the practical actions of non-violence from Tahrir Square to those of the Occupy Wall Street actions, underway as the first draft of this paper was keyboarded, requires that we think very carefully about the practices that now are designated in terms of globalization. Not all this is novel, but the geopolitical scene is shifting in ways that need to be incorporated into the new thinking within geography about war, peace, violence and what the discipline might have to say about, and contribute to, non-violence as well as to contestations of contemporary lawfare (Gregory 2006). Whether the delegitimization of violence as a mode of rule will be extended further in coming decades is one of the big questions facing peace researchers. The American reaction to 9/11 set things back dramatically, an opportunity to respond in terms of response to a crime and diplomacy was squandered, but **the wider social refusal to accept repression and violence as appropriate modes of rule** **has interesting potential to constrain the use of military force**. The professionalization of many high technology militaries also reduces their inclination to involve themselves in repressing social movements, although here Mikhail Gorbachev’s refusal to use the Red Army against dissidents in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s remains emblematic of the changes norms of acceptable rule that have been extended in the last few generations. A geography discipline seriously interested in peace needs to link the social processes on the relatively small scale such as the non-violent protests Megoran (2011) highlights, and the peaceful accompaniment actions that Koopman (2011) documents, to the larger geopolitical transformations of our times, to make the eminently geographical point that peace activities vary widely from place to place, but now are an important part of larger contemporary geopolitical transformations. GEOPOLITICS IN HISTORY Geopolitics has mostly been about rivalries between great powers and their contestations of power on the large scale. These specifications of the political world focus on states and the perpetuation of threats mapped as external dangers to supposedly pacific polities. Much geopolitical discourse specifies the world as a dangerous place, hence precisely because of these mappings, one supposedly necessitating violence in what passes for a realist interpretation of great powers as the prime movers of history (Mearsheimer 2001). Geopolitical thinking is about order and order is in part a cartographic notion. Juliet Fall (2010) once again emphasizes the importance of taken for granted boundaries as the ontological given of contemporary politics. Politics is about the cartographic control of territories, as Megoran (2011) too ponders regarding the first half of the twentieth century, but it also about much more than this, despite the fascination that so many commentators have with the ideal form of the supposedly national territorial state. Part of what geographers bring to the discussion of peace is a more nuanced geographical imagination than that found in so much of international studies (Dalby 2011a). On the other hand much of the discussion of peace sees war as the problem, peace as the solution. Implied in that is geopolitics as the problem, mapping dangers turns out to be a dangerous enterprise insofar as it facilitates the perpetuation of violence by representing other places as threats to which our place is susceptible. But this only matters if this is related to the realist assumptions of the inevitability of rivalry, the eternal search for power as key to humanity’s self-organisation and the assumption that organized violence is the ultimate arbiter (Dalby 2010). Critical geopolitics is about challenging such contextualizations, and as such its relationships to peace would seem to be obvious, albeit as Megoran (2011) notes mostly by way of a focus on what Galtung (1969, 1971) calls negative peace. Given the repeated reinvention of colonial tropes in contemporary Western political discourse such critique remains an essential part of a political geography that grants peoples “the courtesy of political geography” (Mitchell and Smith 1991). Undercutting the moral logics of violence, so frequently relying on simplistic invocations of geographical inevitability, to structure their apologetics, remains a crucial contribution. Both the practical matters of recent history and the scholarly contributions by geographers do not allow simple binary distinctions of peace and war to be used as the premise of either scholarship or political practice. History and scholarship suggest rather that peace is what comes after war; the relationship is temporal, stages in matters of violence, geography and reorganizing facts on the ground. Historically in the era of European warfare, coincident with the rise of modernity, that many people hope is now near its end, peace was that which was imposed by the victors, who in turn were the most powerful in whatever contest was followed by a “peace”. Much recent geographical scholarship suggests that post conflict re-construction is a mode of peace building literally (Kirsch and Flint 2011). But those of us who would challenge war as a human institution, or think about non-violence as a strategy for a better world, will not be satisfied with a geography that is concerned only to pick up the pieces and reconfigure them after they have been shattered by the latest round of organized violence. The key points are that reconstruction is a violent transformation of society, a world where frequently neo-liberal globalization is seen as the imposition of social forms that will not resist its logics. Hence peace is what victors impose, an imperial peace that may eventually be quite welcome to those who benefit from the new arrangements. Is peace then post-war? Perhaps it can be understood in these terms. But the corollary is the equally important point that peace is also frequently what comes before the next war. The normal human situation these days is a matter of non-war, but it is far from clear where security is enforced that this is more than a limited form of negative peace. **Without large-scale de-militarization then peace is just what happens between wars.** But given this then one additional key point that geographers interested in war need to pay attention to is the matter of how peace fails, how conflict escalates and how geography matters in these processes (Flint et al 2009). Peacekeeping is frequently about geographical separation as the Orwellian names for contemporary walls in terms of lines of peace have it. But there is much more geographical thinking to be done about these matters and the scales of interactions across supposedly peaceful borders, not least where what matters most is state security and its ordering principles rather than local interactions across frontiers. This is so not least because of the marked current trend to build fences around states as the supposed solution to numerous security challenges (Jones 2011). Putting matters into historical context also suggests that war is not what it used to be, at least not after the events of the 1940s. Negative peace is about preventing conflict; non-violence is about political strategies to delegitimise violence, to challenge the human norms of behavior that allow cultures of violence. It is important to link this to the issues of what are now called lawfare (Morrissey 2011), the use of law as power and coercion to set the rules of social and political life too. This has been a key part of the US strategy for a long time; shaping institutions to the benefit of the US economy as been what much of international relations has been about, but the larger benefits of constraining conflict are part of the larger process that international law struggles to legitimize. Rules of conduct matter in the international system and the wide-scale repudiation of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated this point clearly. The United Nations effectively made war illegal although the number of ways round that formal restriction has been considerable. War departments were renamed defence departments the world over, and policing, surveillance, spying as well as military action became increasingly reconfigured in terms of security. The United Nations executive committee however was named the Security Council not the Peace Council, and the rhetoric ever since has suggested that peace has to be conjoined with security, with the latter not the former paramount. Apparently peace without security isn’t worth bothering about. It's peace and security. Which suggests that war is perhaps the opposite of security as well as of peace. But perhaps security is to be contrasted to violence instead? All of which requires careful conceptual thinking about the current geopolitical borders. Crucial, but unremarked upon by many political geographers, is the simple fact that there is now widespread agreement that borders between states are fixed finally (Zacher 2001). Demarcation disputes, and no doubt some very interesting arguments about changing coastal boundaries as sea levels rise in coming decades will continue, but the territorial fixity assumption has changed one fundamental facet of warfare between states. Given the importance of territorial disputes historically as a cause of wars this point is important. So too is the finding that it matters greatly how these disputes are handled. Treated as “realist” matters of power politics territorial matters are more likely to lead to war than if diplomacy and conflict resolution are taken seriously (Vasquez and Henehan 2011). The exceptions here do seem to prove the rule: Palestine and Kashmir are two flashpoints where attempts to move borders, or at least the refusal to accept their imposition, are key to continued violence. Fixing geographical borders removes one major historical cause of interstate warfare. Territorial aggrandizement is now mostly a thing of the past, as the reconstruction of Bosnia and the refusal to change antecedent boundaries illustrates, albeit very painfully. The title of Gearoid O’Tuathail and Carl Dahlman’s (2011) book is Bosnia Remade, not Bosnia Removed, and that matters in terms of how politics is now literally mapped. This norm matters greatly and the importance of agreement on frontiers and their delimitation tragically continues in the southern areas of what until recently was the singular state of Sudan in particular. CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES While there is optimism over the territorial covenant on both the small scale and the very large scale the fixity of boundaries has not prevented either the violence of what Mary Kaldor (2006) called the new wars after the cold war, nor imperial adventures by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and other metropolitan states. Indeed looking at the macro-scale patterns of imperial power the question is whether current Middle East warring is but the latest phase of “Anglosphere” imperial violence (Megoran 2009). Robert Fisk's (2006) subtitle to his huge book on the region is blunt in posing the matter as the conquest of the Middle East. Understanding the United States and the United Kingdom, with various settler colonies as extensions of an Anglosphere suggests only that the patterns of conquest, and indirect but violent rule have shifted to another region of the planet, from North America in the eighteenth century to South Asia and then Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, finally now the pattern is extended to the Middle East in the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. This shifting pattern of Anglosphere violence is the updated logic of Kevin Phillips (1997) argument about the Cousin's Wars as key to the rise of British and subsequently American power. Thus focusing on the specific geographies of the war on terror is a useful antidote to the hugely exaggerated claims of Islamic threats as a global phenomenon invoking the need for an American lead world war (Podhoretz 2007). But elsewhere violence has followed resources, at least to the sources of valuable ones and oil in particular (Le Billon and Cervantes 2009). Mary Kaldor’s (2006) analysis of the new wars suggests both that globalization matters in terms of the patterns of connection that fuel and fund violence, and also in that the role of political violence is often about control of population and economic assets rather than a matter of territorial control. Militias and gangs, as well as would be micro-nationalists are not the warring entities of nation states in violent competition invading each other’s territories; they are more diffuse arrangements, something more analogous to medieval geographies rather than the violent interactions of discrete clearly demarcated modern states. This is not unrelated to the imposition of the cartography of the territorial covenant, even if it has generated whole new categories of geopolitics, of ungoverned areas and regional peripheral regions where violence persists, and drones, interventions and mercenaries are commonplace. Over the last few decades the potential for major power warfare seems to have lessened, whatever about great power interventions in peripheral places. The global economy has, of late, required much greater cooperation between political elites. The looming crises of climate change that make unilateral action less efficacious, suggest the possibilities of less confrontational assumptions as the premise in geopolitics. While resource wars get headlines, much of environmental politics is about cooperation and treaty-making rather than warfare (Dinar 2011). Much of the contemporary violence that grabs the attention of headline writers is matters of conflict, competition and rivalry but it is not the classical war Clausewitz pointed to as the contest between two autonomous combatants in a struggle of wills fought until one forces the other to concede. Much of this might fit into his categories of small wars, but that in itself is significant if **it supports the contention that great powers have given up the use of major war, if not police actions, as policy.**

### 2NC Hegemony—Epistemology Indict/ AT Empirics

#### Relative propensity for conflict is much higher in a unipolar system

Montiero ’12 (Nuno, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale, “Unrest Assured,” <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf>, International Security 36.3 JS)

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given thatWohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole.49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers.50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.”51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conºict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### 2NC Hegemony—No Impact

#### No impact to heg collapse—elites control knowledge production and create fake scenarios to justify their apocalyptic fears of collapse—we have empirics

Chomsky 12 (Noam, American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, logician, political critic, and activist. He is an Institute Professor and Professor (Emeritus) in the Department of Linguistics & Philosophy at MIT, “The hysterical American decline,” 2012, <http://www.salon.com/2012/02/14/the_hysterical_american_decline/>, JS)

When the war ended eight horrendous years later, mainstream opinion was divided between those who described the war as a “noble cause” that could have been won with more dedication, and at the opposite extreme, the critics, to whom it was “a mistake” that proved too costly. By 1977, President Carter aroused little notice when he explained that we owe Vietnam “no debt” because “the destruction was mutual.” There are important lessons in all this for today, even apart from another reminder that only the weak and defeated are called to account for their crimes. One lesson is that to understand what is happening we should attend not only to critical events of the real world, often dismissed from history, but also to what leaders and elite opinion believe, however tinged with fantasy. Another lesson is that alongside the flights of fancy concocted to terrify and mobilize the public (and perhaps believed by some who are trapped in their own rhetoric), there is also geostrategic planning based on principles that are rational and stable over long periods because they are rooted in stable institutions and their concerns. That is true in the case of Vietnam as well. I will return to that, only stressing here that the persistent factors in state action are generally well concealed. The Iraq war is an instructive case. It was marketed to a terrified public on the usual grounds of self-defense against an awesome threat to survival: the “single question,” George W. Bush and Tony Blair declared, was whether Saddam Hussein would end his programs of developing weapons of mass destruction. When the single question received the wrong answer, government rhetoric shifted effortlessly to our “yearning for democracy,” and educated opinion duly followed course; all routine. Later, as the scale of the U.S. defeat in Iraq was becoming difficult to suppress, the government quietly conceded what had been clear all along. In 2007-2008, the administration officially announced that a final settlement must grant the U.S. military bases and the right of combat operations, and must privilege U.S. investors in the rich energy system — demands later reluctantly abandoned in the face of Iraqi resistance. And all well kept from the general population. Gauging American Decline With such lessons in mind, it is useful to look at what is highlighted in the major journals of policy and opinion today. Let us keep to the most prestigious of the establishment journals, Foreign Affairs. The headline blaring on the cover of the December 2011 issue reads in bold face: “Is America Over?” The title article calls for “retrenchment” in the “humanitarian missions” abroad that are consuming the country’s wealth, so as to arrest the American decline that is a major theme of international affairs discourse, usually accompanied by the corollary that power is shifting to the East, to China and (maybe) India. The lead articles are on Israel-Palestine. The first, by two high Israeli officials, is entitled “The Problem is Palestinian Rejection”: the conflict cannot be resolved because Palestinians refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish state — thereby conforming to standard diplomatic practice: states are recognized, but not privileged sectors within them. The demand is hardly more than a new device to deter the threat of political settlement that would undermine Israel’s expansionist goals. The opposing position, defended by an American professor, is entitled “The Problem Is the Occupation.” The subtitle reads “How the Occupation is Destroying the Nation.” Which nation? Israel, of course. The paired articles appear under the heading “Israel under Siege.” The January 2012 issue features yet another call to bomb Iran now, before it is too late. Warning of “the dangers of deterrence,” the author suggests that “skeptics of military action fail to appreciate the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond. And their grim forecasts assume that the cure would be worse than the disease — that is, that the consequences of a U.S. assault on Iran would be as bad as or worse than those of Iran achieving its nuclear ambitions. But that is a faulty assumption. The truth is that a military strike intended to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States.” Others argue that the costs would be too high, and at the extremes some even point out that an attack would violate international law — as does the stand of the moderates, who regularly deliver threats of violence, in violation of the U.N. Charter. Let us review these dominant concerns in turn. American decline is real, though the apocalyptic vision reflects the familiar ruling class perception that anything short of total control amounts to total disaster. Despite the piteous laments, the U.S. remains the world dominant power by a large margin, and no competitor is in sight, not only in the military dimension, in which of course the U.S. reigns supreme. China and India have recorded rapid (though highly inegalitarian) growth, but remain very poor countries, with enormous internal problems not faced by the West. China is the world’s major manufacturing center, but largely as an assembly plant for the advanced industrial powers on its periphery and for western multinationals. That is likely to change over time. Manufacturing regularly provides the basis for innovation, often breakthroughs, as is now sometimes happening in China. One example that has impressed western specialists is China’s takeover of the growing global solar panel market, not on the basis of cheap labor but by coordinated planning and, increasingly, innovation. But the problems China faces are serious. Some are demographic, reviewed in Science, the leading U.S. science weekly. The study shows that mortality sharply decreased in China during the Maoist years, “mainly a result of economic development and improvements in education and health services, especially the public hygiene movement that resulted in a sharp drop in mortality from infectious diseases.” This progress ended with the initiation of the capitalist reforms 30 years ago, and the death rate has since increased. Furthermore, China’s recent economic growth has relied substantially on a “demographic bonus,” a very large working-age population. “But the window for harvesting this bonus may close soon,” with a “profound impact on development”: “Excess cheap labor supply, which is one of the major factors driving China’s economic miracle, will no longer be available.” Demography is only one of many serious problems ahead. For India, the problems are far more severe. Not all prominent voices foresee American decline. Among international media, there is none more serious and responsible than the London Financial Times. It recently devoted a full page to the optimistic expectation that new technology for extracting North American fossil fuels might allow the U.S. to become energy independent, hence to retain its global hegemony for a century. There is no mention of the kind of world the U.S. would rule in this happy event, but not for lack of evidence. At about the same time, the International Energy Agency reported that, with rapidly increasing carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, the limit of safety will be reached by 2017 if the world continues on its present course. “The door is closing,” the IEA chief economist said, and very soon it “will be closed forever.” Shortly before the U.S. Department of Energy reported the most recent carbon dioxide emissions figures, which “jumped by the biggest amount on record” to a level higher than the worst-case scenario anticipated by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). That came as no surprise to many scientists, including the MIT program on climate change, which for years has warned that the IPCC predictions are too conservative. Such critics of the IPCC predictions receive virtually no public attention, unlike the fringe of denialists who are supported by the corporate sector, along with huge propaganda campaigns that have driven Americans off the international spectrum in dismissal of the threats. Business support also translates directly to political power. Denialism is part of the catechism that must be intoned by Republican candidates in the farcical election campaign now in progress, and in Congress they are powerful enough to abort even efforts to inquire into the effects of global warming, let alone do anything serious about it. In brief, American decline can perhaps be stemmed if we abandon hope for decent survival, prospects that are all too real given the balance of forces in the world. “Losing” China and Vietnam Putting such unpleasant thoughts aside, a close look at American decline shows that China indeed plays a large role, as it has for 60 years. The decline that now elicits such concern is not a recent phenomenon. It traces back to the end of World War II, when the U.S. had half the world’s wealth and incomparable security and global reach. Planners were naturally well aware of the enormous disparity of power, and intended to keep it that way. The basic viewpoint was outlined with admirable frankness in a major state paper of 1948 (PPS 23). The author was one of the architects of the New World Order of the day, the chair of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, the respected statesman and scholar George Kennan, a moderate dove within the planning spectrum. He observed that the central policy goal was to maintain the “position of disparity” that separated our enormous wealth from the poverty of others. To achieve that goal, he advised, “We should cease to talk about vague and… unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization,” and must “deal in straight power concepts,” not “hampered by idealistic slogans” about “altruism and world-benefaction.” Kennan was referring specifically to Asia, but the observations generalize, with exceptions, for participants in the U.S.-run global system. It was well understood that the “idealistic slogans” were to be displayed prominently when addressing others, including the intellectual classes, who were expected to promulgate them. The plans that Kennan helped formulate and implement took for granted that the U.S. would control the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, the former British empire (including the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East), and as much of Eurasia as possible, crucially its commercial and industrial centers. These were not unrealistic objectives, given the distribution of power. But decline set in at once. In 1949, China declared independence, an event known in Western discourse as “the loss of China” — in the U.S., with bitter recriminations and conflict over who was responsible for that loss. The terminology is revealing. It is only possible to lose something that one owns. The tacit assumption was that the U.S. owned China, by right, along with most of the rest of the world, much as postwar planners assumed. The “loss of China” was the first major step in “America’s decline.” It had major policy consequences. One was the immediate decision to support France’s effort to reconquer its former colony of Indochina, so that it, too, would not be “lost.” Indochina itself was not a major concern, despite claims about its rich resources by President Eisenhower and others. Rather, the concern was the “domino theory,” which is often ridiculed when dominoes don’t fall, but remains a leading principle of policy because it is quite rational. To adopt Henry Kissinger’s version, a region that falls out of control can become a “virus” that will “spread contagion,” inducing others to follow the same path. In the case of Vietnam, the concern was that the virus of independent development might infect Indonesia, which really does have rich resources. And that might lead Japan — the “superdomino” as it was called by the prominent Asia historian John Dower — to “accommodate” to an independent Asia as its technological and industrial center in a system that would escape the reach of U.S. power. That would mean, in effect, that the U.S. had lost the Pacific phase of World War II, fought to prevent Japan’s attempt to establish such a New Order in Asia. The way to deal with such a problem is clear: destroy the virus and “inoculate” those who might be infected. In the Vietnam case, the rational choice was to destroy any hope of successful independent development and to impose brutal dictatorships in the surrounding regions. Those tasks were successfully carried out — though history has its own cunning, and something similar to what was feared has since been developing in East Asia, much to Washington’s dismay. The most important victory of the Indochina wars was in 1965, when a U.S.-backed military coup in Indonesia led by General Suharto carried out massive crimes that were compared by the CIA to those of Hitler, Stalin and Mao. The “staggering mass slaughter,” as the New York Times described it, was reported accurately across the mainstream, and with unrestrained euphoria. It was “a gleam of light in Asia,” as the noted liberal commentator James Reston wrote in the Times. The coup ended the threat of democracy by demolishing the mass-based political party of the poor, established a dictatorship that went on to compile one of the worst human rights records in the world, and threw the riches of the country open to western investors. Small wonder that, after many other horrors, including the near-genocidal invasion of East Timor, Suharto was welcomed by the Clinton administration in 1995 as “our kind of guy.” Years after the great events of 1965, Kennedy-Johnson National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy reflected that it would have been wise to end the Vietnam war at that time, with the “virus” virtually destroyed and the primary domino solidly in place, buttressed by other U.S.-backed dictatorships throughout the region. Similar procedures have been routinely followed elsewhere. Kissinger was referring specifically to the threat of socialist democracy in Chile. That threat was ended on another forgotten date, what Latin Americans call “the first 9/11,” which in violence and bitter effects far exceeded the 9/11 commemorated in the West. A vicious dictatorship was imposed in Chile, one part of a plague of brutal repression that spread through Latin America, reaching Central America under Reagan. Viruses have aroused deep concern elsewhere as well, including the Middle East, where the threat of secular nationalism has often concerned British and U.S. planners, inducing them to support radical Islamic fundamentalism to counter it. The Concentration of Wealth and American Decline Despite such victories, American decline continued. By 1970, U.S. share of world wealth had dropped to about 25 percent, roughly where it remains, still colossal but far below the end of World War II. By then, the industrial world was “tripolar”: US-based North America, German-based Europe and East Asia, already the most dynamic industrial region, at the time Japan-based, but by now including the former Japanese colonies Taiwan and South Korea, and more recently China. At about that time, American decline entered a new phase: conscious self-inflicted decline. From the 1970s, there has been a significant change in the U.S. economy, as planners, private and state, shifted it toward financialization and the offshoring of production, driven in part by the declining rate of profit in domestic manufacturing. These decisions initiated a vicious cycle in which wealth became highly concentrated (dramatically so in the top 0.1 percent of the population), yielding concentration of political power, hence legislation to carry the cycle further: taxation and other fiscal policies, deregulation, changes in the rules of corporate governance allowing huge gains for executives, and so on. Meanwhile, for the majority, real wages largely stagnated, and people were able to get by only by sharply increased workloads (far beyond Europe), unsustainable debt, and repeated bubbles since the Reagan years, creating paper wealth that inevitably disappeared when they burst (and the perpetrators were bailed out by the taxpayer). In parallel, the political system has been increasingly shredded as both parties are driven deeper into corporate pockets with the escalating cost of elections, the Republicans to the level of farce, the Democrats (now largely the former “moderate Republicans”) not far behind.

## Soft Power

### Link—Soft Power—1NC

#### Soft power is war by other means—causes a violent enframing that restructures violence in the name of diplomacy—causes international backlash and turns the case

Takacs 13 (Stacy, Associate professor and director of American studies at Oklahoma State University, “Real War News, Real War Games: The Hekmati Case and the Problems of Soft Power,” American Quarterly Volume 65, Number 1, March 2013, MUSE, JS)

When Barack Obama was elected to the presidency in 2008, he promised to implement a “smarter” foreign policy strategy that balanced the use of hard and soft power assets on a situational basis. As if to affirm the demotion of hard power, he jettisoned the name “Global War on Terror” and adopted “Overseas Contingency Operation.”1 To speak of “visual culture and the war on terrorism,” then, is something of an anachronism. Yet, arguably, visual media play an even more important role now that soft power has been embraced as a complement to war. And, make no mistake, Obama’s “smart power” strategy is not a campaign to end war or replace it with diplomacy. As former CIA chief Michael Hayden recently declared, Obama’s foreign policy is the same as Bush’s, “but with more killing.”2 Like its forerunners, the Obama administration seeks to perpetuate American power and influence; it is just willing to do so by any means necessary. Thus smart power is less a departure from hard power than an extension of it into new realms. The case of Amir Mirzaei Hekmati, a US citizen recently arrested in Iran, convicted of spying for the CIA, and condemned to death, all for his association with the online gaming company Kuma Games, provides some insight into the shifting terrain of geopolitics in the information age. Specifically, it illustrates a change in the conceptions of hard and soft power, such that the two have become virtually indistinguishable. This change both derives from and perpetuates a broader move toward the militarization of the social field, which has important consequences for our capacity to imagine a condition of peace. Popular media have certainly played a role in this process by glorifying military institutions and exploits and celebrating soldier-subjects and their behaviors. As I argued in Terrorism TV, films, video games, and television shows have helped position militarism at the center of public policy and social life in the United States, and this process has been going on for decades.3 Kuma Games, which makes the online gaming series Kuma/War, figured prominently in that discussion. Following Roger Stahl, I argued that such games work like [End Page 177] advertisements for the military lifestyle, interpellating players into a military mind-set and turning them into “virtual citizen-soldiers,” ready to accept the legitimacy of hard power and willing to apply it to virtually any social problem. What I failed to ask at the time was how militarization might affect other populations: as a tool of soft power, how might such games help shape the field of geopolitical engagement? How might the militarization of social life, pursued in and through US popular culture, influence others in the global mediascape? The Hekmati case brings such questions to the fore and begs us to think more deeply about the nature of soft power in the contemporary context. Hekmati’s arrest should be situated in relation to two recent and troubling trends in US foreign policy. The first is the militarization of public diplomacy under the aegis of the war on terror. As State Department budgets have atrophied, military budgets have exploded, leaving the military as the only government entity with the operational capacity to engage foreign populations on behalf of the state. But military information operations tend to be short-term and highly instrumental, targeting populations to achieve a strategic advantage. Militarized public diplomacy treats information as a weapon and, thus, makes cross-cultural dialogue hard to sustain. The second trend multiplies and extends the first, for the privatization of militarism enables all sorts of independent actors to carry the banner for the US Armed Forces. Video games are an important example of this trend, for the most popular games are still the military-themed first-person shooters, which reduce geopolitics to a conflict structure and invite players to duke it out for supremacy. Diplomacy and compromise are not even options. Together these trends raise the following questions: What happens when soft power resources are used like weapons, “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG [US government] interests, policies, and objectives?”4 Will the United States be able to wield influence if its communications and diplomacy operations look and feel like psychological operations? And what will happen to international relations if hard power logics are placed at the center of cross-cultural exchange? If the military story becomes the only story US culture is interested in telling or selling, where does that leave non-Americans? The case of Amir Hekmati embodies this collapse of public and private, hard and soft power assets and thus can illuminate the likely outcome of the United States’ decision to privilege power over communication and exchange in the information age. Netwar on Iran Iran has been an early testing ground for the use of soft power to achieve instrumental, hard power goals. Since the 1979 revolution, the United States [End Page 178] has not had formal diplomatic relations with the Iranian regime. As a result, contacts have been irregular and informal, and all of them “have been used, either overtly or covertly, to promote regime change.”5 In 2006 the Bush administration established an Office of Iranian Affairs inside the State Department to coordinate its “transformational diplomacy” operations. The office received $66 million from Congress to “promote freedom and human rights in Iran.” Some of that money was used to establish Persian-language radio and TV operations under the Voice of America banner; the rest went “to support the efforts of civil-society groups” and dissidents operating inside Iran to promote democracy and effect regime change.6 Such overt attempts at public diplomacy were supplemented by an expansion of covert military and intelligence operations in the country. In 2007 President George W. Bush signed a presidential finding authorizing an increase in reconnaissance expeditions to “[gather] information [and] [enlist] support” for regime change efforts in the country. Congress provided $400 million to support these efforts, much of which went to fund attacks on Iranian security forces by extremist groups like Jundullah (a group the US State Department has labeled a terrorist organization).7 US Special Forces in Iraq, meanwhile, stepped up cross-border raids into Iran with the aim of kidnapping or killing high-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.8 The Obama administration came to power promising to reestablish formal diplomatic ties with Iran, but was forced by circumstances to embrace an equally informal combination of public diplomacy and covert military adventurism. Obama did eliminate the so-called Democracy Fund and has toned down the “regime change” rhetoric, but US funding for both overt and covert operations in the region has actually increased under his watch.9 He has authorized a “broad expansion of clandestine military activity” in the Middle East, including operations to gather “reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes . . . if tensions over [Iran’s] nuclear ambitions escalate.”10 In 2011 he helped the Israelis unleash a computer virus that wiped out up to one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, and he has authorized the target killing of Iranian nuclear scientists.11 Is it any wonder, then, that Iran has replied to these provocations with its own militarized campaign to counter and contain US influence in the region? When the United States began funneling money to prodemocracy groups inside Iran, the Ahmadinejad regime responded with a coordinated propaganda campaign to tar all such groups as CIA stooges.12 It instituted a crackdown on activists, teachers, intellectuals, women’s rights groups, and labor leaders, accusing them of receiving support from the United States and thus of committing treason. When the US Congress responded by appropriating [End Page 179] $30 million to document and publicize human rights abuses inside Iran, the Iranian authorities countered with their own $20 million program to expose human rights violations in the United States.13 Since then, Iran has banned or blocked access to cable, Internet, and cell phone transmissions during periods of strife and, under the guise of the “Iranian Cyber Army,” redirected Twitter and Facebook traffic to websites carrying anti-American slogans. The Iranian authorities have imposed stringent Internet filters and firewalls to preempt political speech in cyberspace and launched their own cyberattacks on sensitive computer systems in Israel and the United States. The Hekmati case must be placed squarely within this context of low-intensity conflict, or netwar. According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, netwar is “a comprehensive information-oriented approach to social conflict,” which extends the field of battle into civil society and blurs once-distinct boundaries between offense and defense, soldiers and civilians, combat operations and diplomatic endeavors.14 The concept is designed to account for the entry of nonstate actors into the fields of war and diplomacy and to describe how information works as a weapon within this extensive field of combat. On the one hand, information technologies can be used to create deep coalitions predicated on shared values or interests. Al-Qaeda’s use of the Internet to recruit soldiers and financial supporters is a model for this aspect of netwar. On the other hand, information can also be used as a weapon to confuse the enemy and preemptively deprive it of support. Tiziana Terranova has argued that the US response to the 1979 Iranian revolution was an early example of this strategy. US media outlets portrayed the revolutionaries as irrational zealots and the US hostages as sympathetic civilians in need of rescue. The resulting images bombarded viewers’ senses, provoking affective responses (revulsion, pity, anger) that short-circuited any attempt at rational argument or political dialogue. By “focus[ing] all public attention on building up a wave of resentment against the Iranians,” the State Department ensured the United States would assume the moral high ground.15 It was a technique for producing, rather than speaking to, a public. Thus it was not propaganda but information warfare. The truth or falsity of the representations mattered less than their capacity to mobilize a pro-US public. Arguably, this is the role that public diplomacy serves in the contemporary era. It is no longer about communicating values, exchanging information, or enlightening foreign publics; it is about “stirring people up” and controlling the battle space. The Iranian authorities seem to understand this quite well, which is why they have made popular culture into a prominent battleground in their low-intensity conflict with the United States. Viewing US entertainment [End Page 180] media as Trojan horses, they have banned American music, censored Hollywood films, prohibited the use of satellite dishes, shut down Facebook, and, most recently, pulled Barbie from store shelves for promoting “destructive” cultural and social habits. In one sense, Hekmati’s arrest is just an extension of such cultural warfare. In another sense, however, it is a deepening of that conflict, for it acknowledges the role of privatized commercial culture in the militarization of the social field. Like the state, Kuma/War and other such militarized video games frame politics in warlike terms. They produce a conflict structure that attracts others and ends up trapping the United States in its own nets/netwars. Militarized Gaming as Information Warfare In a videotaped “confession” aired on Iranian state TV, Hekmati admitted to receiving military intelligence training and working for Kuma Games, which he portrayed as a CIA front operation. The real aim of Kuma Games is not to entertain, he said, but “to convince the people of the world and Iraq that what the US does in Iraq and other countries is good and acceptable.”16 Among other things, Hekmati worked on game modules for the online series Kuma/ War, which the website describes as “an interactive chronicle of the War on Terror.”17 Each ten- to fifteen-minute “episode” allowed subscribers to replay military engagements from the recent past, using logistical material supplied by a team of military advisers. Popular episodes included “Operation Anaconda,” “Fallujah: Operation Al Fajr,” and “The Death of Osama Bin Laden.” Three episodes have focused on Iran and likely raised the hackles of Hekmati’s captors: a two-part series called “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” focused on “Operation Eagle Claw,” the aborted Delta Force mission to rescue US hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran during the 1979 revolution, and the speculative fiction “Assault on Iran,” which is described as “the most plausible scenario [for] delaying or destroying Iran’s nuclear arms capabilities.” More so than other episodes, these give a good sense of what Kuma/War is really about: chronicling US conflict so that players can invent or remake history as it suits them. Like other military-themed video games, Kuma/War places players in the shoes of the US military and asks them work through logistical information to achieve a mission. To enhance the realism, each episode is framed by a range of documentary intertexts, from faux news reports to logistical data, satellite imagery, and interviews with military experts and actual participants in the events. For example, the “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission” modules are framed by interviews with “the CIA’s former ‘Master of Disguise,’ Antonio Mendez” (he of the caper at the heart of the new film Argo). The series’ motto is “Real War [End Page 181] News. Real War Games,” but the ads for the site invite players to “re-create the news” and “remake history.”18 And, as the Iran modules demonstrate, there is plenty of room to make history up as you go. “Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” for example, is predicated on the understanding that you will succeed where US Delta Forces originally failed, and “Assault on Iran” invites players to live history before it happens. Likewise, Jennifer Terry reports that Kuma/War’s gamed version of the 2004 Marine assault on Fallujah (“Fallujah: Operation Al Fajr”) transforms US soldiers into protectors of Iraqi civilians trapped inside the battle zone. Though in reality it was the US military cordon that trapped the civilians in the first place and the US soldiers who constituted the gravest threat to their survival, in Kuma’s version, you get to be the defender, not the aggressor.18 As these examples illustrate, there is nothing subtle about Kuma/War’s biases. If it really was a CIA propaganda operation, one wonders why Kuma Games would bother making it seem like a private corporation.20 More likely, Iran’s attempt to draw attention to the games is not about the content or ownership but about the way video games, in general, have come to direct and modulate global attention. Games like Army of Two, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, and the Battlefield series all share an orientalist imaginary, which identifies Arabs and Muslims as enemies of the United States and constructs US heroism through their extermination. As propaganda, they are fairly ham-fisted, but as weapons in an information war over how to frame contemporary conflicts, they effectively mobilize enmity against Middle Eastern populations and produce publics willing to support US militarism as a solution to the problem. The Iranian authorities know full well that games like these are not state propaganda. However, they are also unwilling to let them stand unchallenged as a historical framework. By identifying Kuma Games as a CIA front operation, I think they mean to reframe the US story about its endeavors in the Middle East, thereby depriving the United States of “its attractiveness and legitimacy” in the eyes of others. In other words, the Hekmati arrest is an information operation designed to “[create] a disabling environment” for the delivery of US messaging.21 Iran and its allies are also taking their case against such games to the players themselves. In response to Kuma/War’s “Assault on Iran,” for example, the Association of Islamic Unions of Students in Iran designed its own game called Special Operation 85: Hostage Rescue. It is a first-person shooter game in which players work to free two Iranian nuclear scientists kidnapped by the United States. The Central Intelligence Bureau of Hezbollah has also created two first-person shooters (Special Force 1 and 2) that allow players to replay key battles from the conflicts between Lebanon and Israel in the 1980s and [End Page 182] 2006. Here, the Israelis are the enemy, and Hezbollah are the heroic underdogs from whose perspective the battles are fought.22 Kuma CEO Keith Halper describes these game design wars as a new form of political debate. “We have made a point,” he says, “they have responded.”23 Yet both Eastern and Western war-themed games tend to use a “shoot-and-destroy mechanic” that promotes a faith in militarism as the solution to all sorts of social problems. As a message about geopolitics, these games privilege a conflict-structure that is appealing in its simplicity and satisfying in its emotional charge. They are the video game equivalents of President Bush’s framing of the US response to 9/11 as a “war” on terror. Such phrasing may have been designed to empower and reassure distraught Americans, but the administration failed to take into the account the problem of multiple audiences. Al-Qaeda was attracted by this framing. It, too, prefers to see the world in warlike terms and has been more than happy to adopt the slogan for its own recruiting efforts. Indeed, a case can be made that the war frame helped Al-Qaeda more than it inspired the United States and its allies. Certainly it has fueled resentment against the United States and fostered a generation of angry young men who see guns and bombs as their salvation. Conclusion In his defense of “smart power,” Joseph Nye makes an impassioned case for the increased use of soft power to achieve American foreign policy objectives. “Promoting democracy, human rights, and development of civil society,” he argues, is “not best handled with the barrel of a gun.”22 True enough, but does the language of power in any manifestation really suit these objectives? Even if US diplomacy were not thoroughly militarized, would not the recourse to words like “soft power” and “smart power” still privilege coercion over persuasion, compulsion over attraction, militarism over diplomacy? The recent cultural wars with Iran, including the arrest of Amir Hekmati, expose the limits of the new smart power philosophy of global engagement. The low-intensity, tit-for-tat struggle to shape the interpretation of American power reveals a fundamental coherence between Iran and the United States around the question of power politics. Iran has clearly been attracted to and persuaded by the US framing of geopolitics as a militarized power struggle. This has not resulted in enhanced US credibility or trust, however. Instead, the use of soft power as a weapon has subverted cross-cultural dialogue and exchange and made peace harder to attain. Just ask Amir Hekmati—if he survives his current tour of duty on the front lines of contemporary netwar. [End Page 183]

### Link—Soft Power—2NC

#### Soft power rests on ideal of American superiority–ignores imperial coercion and violence.

Kennedy and Lucas ‘5 (Liam, Prof. American Studies @ University College (Dublin), and Scott Lucas, director of the Center for U.S. Foreign Policy, Media, and Culture @ Birmingham, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy.” American Quarterly 57.2 pg. 309-333. Muse, JS)

Members of the Bush Administration are fond of drawing analogies between the America of the early cold war and the America of the present, especially to emphasize the material preponderance of the United States at both historical moments and to underline the special responsibility that the nation bore and continues to bear in the execution of its power.65 Yet, even as the U.S. government promotes the assumption that “public diplomacy helped win the cold war, and it has the potential to win the war on terror,” it has established a framework for the waging of the contemporary battle that is very different from that promoted fifty years ago.66 In both instances, a “war of ideas” is evoked to frame a bipolar clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of “national security.” During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that of “containment,” which functioned to segment publics and information; in the war on terror the leading paradigm is “integration,” which seeks to draw publics into an American designed “zone of peace.” The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that “ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners.”67 Both paradigms, however, conceal strategic tensions. For many inside and outside U.S. administrations in the 1950s, containment pointed toward coexistence with the Soviet bloc and its captive peoples, precluding the extension of freedom through “liberation.” For many inside and outside the current administration, “integration” does not provide a solution for long-term war with rogue states and tyrants, a war that has to be waged by and for a U.S. “preponderance of power.” It is our contention that political warfare tries to bridge, if not resolve, these tensions. In 1950, NSC 68 concluded with the mandate not only to “strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations” but also “to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.”68 A half-century later Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department (and far from an acolyte of the “neoconservative” movement), easily moved from describing the goal of post– cold war U.S. foreign policy as “a process of integration in which the United States works with others to promote ends that benefit everyone” to acknowledging it is “an imperial foreign policy . . . a foreign policy that attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them.”

### 2NC Soft Power—AT Realism

#### Violence is a social construction—The epistemology of inevitability and rationality create a self-fulfilling prophecy

Burke, 06 (Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason 10:2 | © 2007 Anthony Burke War as a Way of Being: Lebanon 2006 (PhD, Anthony Burke was appointed to UNSW@ADFA in February 2008, after three years in the School of Social Sciences and International Studies at UNSW Sydney (2005-7) Theory & Event, Project Muse).

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory. In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides **a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.**85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that **war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that **it is** rather **the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence**. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic**.

### 2NC Diplomacy—AT Liberal IR Theory/Treaty Works

#### Conflict is inherent within diplomacy – verbal texts like treaties refer to latent military power that makes them credible, and military power gains its credibility through signaling of intentions – their transformation of the question into yes/no peace depoliticizes the fundamental question of types and trajectories of struggle and interpretation

McCanles ’84 (Michael, Prof. of English @ Marquette, Machiavelli and the Paradoxes of Deterrence, Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism, (Summer, 1984), pp. 12-19, JSTOR)

On the one hand, the verbal texts of dispatches, diplomatic missions, treaties, and ultimatums are, and have always been, understood as tissues of verbal signifiers referring beyond themselves to the “real” power that gives these whatever force they claim. Diplomatic discourse in this perspective is a set of signifiers that are empty unless they point toward a transverbal military signified. But on the other hand, Machiavelli saw that military maneuver—the deployment of men and *materiel*, the palpably visible pageant of cavalry, infantry, artillery, and impedimenta moving across the countryside, usurping the roads, routing peasants and poultry, approaching the watchtowers of city walls—is also a discourse, a set of signifiers. And as a set of signifiers such gestures can find their signifieds, their meanings, only in the discourses they evoke in the minds and mouths of those perceiving them. The deployment of armies remains a mute language, void of meaning and therefore impotent, until they are transcoded into discourse, and thereby given both a meaning and the power to threaten. The full significance of Machiavelli’s treating the reciprocity between military capability and verbal threats as a continual circulation of signs and interpretations of signs, can only be appreciated in the context of his experience as diplomat and head of the Florentine Second Chancellery (concerned with foreign affairs). Governing Florentine diplomacy’s strategies was, as Felix Gilbert has shown [*Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth*-*Century Florence* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 37ff], the assumption that men's political and military behavior is within certain margins predictable because all men can reasonably be expected to do what will best serve their interests. Machiavelli's own voluminous legations, his diplomatic reports to the Second Chancellery, show that for him the diplomat's function as listener, observer of gestures, and gatherer of information made him one terminus of a semiotic circuit, the other end of which was the committee of the Ten of War, whose business it was to interpret the many bits of information thus delivered to it. Since all men's modes of reasoning are essentially identical one could on this basis reconstruct the thinking and therefore the intentions of one's allies and enemies. All of this meant that the continual, week-by-week confrontation between centers of military and political power took place rarely on the battlefield, and most often in the exchanges of texts between diplomats. Military maneuver was itself only an extension of diplomatic display, just as diplomatic display was an extension of the aggrandizement embodied at its most extreme in military maneuver. Events themselves only became meaningful as either the consequences of previous texts or the causes of still further interpretive texts. Any intelligible account of events had to include the reasoning and intentions of the persons who initiated them, carried them out, and reacted to them. For Machiavelli writing the history of events meant reconstructing the texts by which events were generated and interpreted [Michael McCanles, The Discourse of "II Principe'" Humana Civitas Series No. 8, The Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, UCLA (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1983)]. Seen in this light, Machiavelli's various exhortations in Chapters Fifteen and following in II Principe, regarding the ways in which the successful prince must always prepare to project various false appearances, do not add up merely to the counsel to lie and lie mightily. Machiavelli is addressing the fact that the power to coerce others lies not alone in the personal and collective virtb of the Machiavellian prince and his army, but in another form of virtb, that invested in the prince's understanding that what coerces others is the power to threaten. All this means, however, something more than the obvious fact that others can always, up to a point, be persuaded as much by what one says as by what one does. It requires in addition understanding the first of four paradoxes of deterrence I shall develop in this paper, because only the prince who understands the intrinsic instability of deterrence will be able to use it without becoming subject to this instability in turn. To understand this paradox, and to prepare the way for my main subject, namely the paradoxes of deterrence as they arise from the world's present desperate situation of nuclear deterrence, one must first examine the nature of threats in general. In order for the prince to threaten successfully he must live in a political world which assumes that all threats, embodied in the texts of oaths, treaties, diplomatic orations, and dispatches, refer in fact beyond themselves to a transtextual domain of actual military power. People will respond to the power textualized in discourse only as long as they believe that such an entity as power distinct from discourse really exists, and remain ignorant that the prince, being always an emperor with no clothes on, becomes powerful only when they dress him in that power. In this connection the second half of II Principe calls the prince to recognize the profound equivocation that undergirds the threatening textualization of political and military maneuver. This equivocation is the circular validation of text by force and of force by text, a validation that asserts a "real" origin for a power that in fact only achieves the power to threaten posterior to textualization itself. The prince in order to use and not be used by the circulation of texts he participates in must recognize discourse's capacity to create what Roland Barthes calls the "illusion of the referent" [Roland Barthes, "Le discours de I'histoire," Social Science Information 6, No. 4 (1967), pp. 65-75]. To remain blind to this illusion is to remain blind to the semiotic circulation binding texts and military force, and ultimately to the ways in which texts may posit a source and origin for themselves in a transtextual reality of military force that in fact does not come into existence as a threat until the text posits it.

## Prolif/Arms Control

### Link—Prolif—1NC

#### The NPT and anti-prolif discourse treat Third World nations as unique threats- the logic of their plan assumes fundamental cultural differences between the West and its others that can be used as basis for making racist political divisions- you should be suspicious of their truth claims because they’re self-serving and polarizing

Gusterson ’99, (Hugh, Anthropologist @ MIT, Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology Vol. 14, No. 1 Feb. 1999 pp. 111-143, JSTOR)

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)(FN3) promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but **Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid."** Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric (FN4)--designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers--the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics--the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World--the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world **since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states** into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).     Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.(FN5) However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.(FN6) This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

### Link—Prolif—2NC

#### Proliferation as a security frame structures Western imagination so as to produce an irrational and dangerous “rogue” other. This discourse is racist and genocidal.

Gusterson ‘6 (Hugh, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies at MIT, April 2006, “A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?,” MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, 06-08)

According to the anthropological literature on risk, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared. The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program earlier, **are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination**. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to pursue “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty. Saying it enshrines a system of global ‘nuclear apartheid,’ Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly **legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms**. In view of recent developments in global politics—the collapse of the Soviet Union, two wars against Iraq, and international crises over the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran—**the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing**. It has become an increasingly important way of **legitimating U.S. military programs** in the post-cold war world, where “**rogue states” have supplanted the old evil empire** in the imaginations of American war planners. The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology was labeled “Orientalism” (albeit in a different context) by Edward Said. According to Said, orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a **series of binary oppositions** that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where “we” are rational and disciplined, “they” are impulsive and emotional; where “we” are modern and flexible, “they” are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where “we” are honest and compassionate, “they” are treacherous and uncultivated. 6 While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics and are applicable here.

#### The idea that other countries lack the technical maturity to safely own weapons is how we quell in our anxiety over our own arsenals. It is our nuclear amnesia which has legitimized a history of preparation for nuclear war and makes miscalculation inevitable.

Gusterson ‘6 (Hugh, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies at MIT, April 2006, “A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?,” MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, 06-08)

The third argument against horizontal proliferation is that Third World nations may lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. The Washington Post quotes an unnamed Western diplomat stationed in Pakistan, who, worrying that India and Pakistan lack the technology to detect an incoming attack on their weapons, said the United States has “expensive space-based surveillance that could pick up the launches, but Pakistan and India have no warning systems. I don’t know what their doctrine will be. Launch when the wind blows?”12 If one reviews the U.S. nuclear safety record, the **comforting dichotomy between a high-tech, safe “us” and low-tech, unsafe “them” begins to look distinctly dubious**. First, the United States has not always made use of the safety technologies at its disposal. Over the protests of some weapons designers, for example, the navy decided not to incorporate state-of-the-art safety technologies into one of its newest weapons, the Trident II, and it ignored the recommendation of an expert panel that the Trident II be redesigned to make it safer.13 Second, if one looks more closely at U.S. early-warning systems, one finds that they create risks of their own. For example, **it was the high technology Aegis radar system, misread by a navy operator, that was directly responsible for the tragically mistaken U.S. decision to shoot down an Iranian commercial jetliner on July 3, 1988**. Similarly, and potentially more seriously, in 1979, the U.S. military **began preparations for nuclear war** after a mistakenly inserted training tape led personnel in the strategic command apparatus to think a Soviet **attack was underway**. American interceptor planes were scrambled and air traffic controllers were told to bring down commercial planes before U.S. military commanders detected the error. As for the American safety record in transporting and handling nuclear weapons, there is more cause for relief than for complacency. There have, for example, been at least twenty-four occasions when American aircraft have accidentally released nuclear weapons and at least eight incidents where U.S. nuclear weapons were involved in plane crashes or fires.14 In other words, **the U.S. nuclear arsenal has its own safety problems** related to its dependence on highly computerized warning and detection systems, the cold war practice of patrolling oceans and skies with live nuclear weapons, and large stockpile size. Even where U.S. scientists have developed special safety technologies, they have not always been used. The presumption that Third World countries lack the technical competence to be trusted with nuclear weapons fits our stereotypes about those countries’ backwardness**, but it distracts us from asking whether we ourselves have the technical infallibility the weapons ideally require.** The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers’ massive arsenals of highly accurate, MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert were stable and that the small, elemental arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse**. This leaves one wondering whether prejudices about the weapons’ owners are not masquerading as technical concerns about weapons configurations and safety protocols.**

### Link—Arms Control—1NC

#### The rhetoric of arms control is nothing more than power politics—their construction of reality embraces a view of international relations manufactured by rigid forms of thinking that colonizes all resistance—ultimate conventional and nuclear escalation is the inevitable result of the Affirmative’s ontological violence because their praxis makes insecurity an ever-present condition of the world. The permutation colonizes resistance and brackets our alternative.

Walker 84 [RBJ, Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria, 1984, “Culture, Ideology, and World Order,” pg. 312-316]

The most immediately pressing aspects of contemporary militarism are undoubtedly those arising from the nuclear confrontation between the superpowers. It is certainly this particular issue, rather than the broader spread of militaristic tendencies, that has become the focus of public concern. Those who have been motivated primarily in universalist moral terms have come to be familiar with the arcane language of deterrence theory, to appreciate the difference between first and second strikes and the significance of counterforce technology. Similarly, socioeconomically oriented radicals have come to accept the need to make accommodation with advocates of minimum deterrence, and to assert the immediate priority of reversing and stabilizing the current arms race. 3 Despite the theoretical priority of universalist perspectives, in practice short-run survival comes first. This position is hardly surprising, but it involves a number of problems. Although the critique of contemporary militarism that arises from the strategic geopolitical argument does show very clearly the dangers that are intrinsic to nuclear deterrence, this same critique also accepts all the assumptions about the nature of world politics that are **rooted in the dominant discourse about international politics**. To attempt to develop any counter-hegemonic discourse at this level is to operate on terms **already set out by the dominant discourse**. These terms are not obviously the most productive starting point for developing a more coherent vision of world order or more appropriate modes of peace and security. The strategic-geopolitical critique begins with the **destabilization of the contemporary structures of nuclear deterrence**. It dwells on two main difficulties in particular: the move toward counterforce doctrines and missile vulnerability at the level of strategic deterrence forces, and the difficulties created by technologies of extended deterrence or flexible response in Europe. The overall drift is from a strategy of war prevention to one of war fighting**. The prescription involves some form of arms control**. Some versions can be quite sweeping in their recommendations: **hence proposals for nuclear free zones, pledges of no first use**, comprehensive **test bans, deep cuts, the substitution of conventional for some nuclear forces**, and so on. Most advocates of this way of thinking would like to restore some kind of minimum deterrence. And on the whole such prescriptions seem inherently sensible--until we ask what happens next. Beyond minimum deterrence lie suggestions for denuclearization, for the delegitimization of nuclear weapons in the resolution of international disputes**. These suggestions always introduce the increased risk of conflict escalation associated with conventional weapons**, which nuclear deterrence policies have to some extent been able to restrain. In any case, **to see the problem of contemporary militarism only in terms of nuclear weapons is to be aware of only the tip of a large iceberg.** So beyond denuclearization lies a more general demilitarization and the development of alternative forms of civilian defense and global peacekeeping. Yet in the conventional view, such things seem very, very far away, as they may well be. It is thus necessary to ask whether the conventional view of things is the appropriate one to take, and at this point the issues get much more difficult. They take us into a vortex of complicated theoretical and, indeed, philosophical problems with the main traditions of international political analysis. One of the most obvious but least noted aspects of Western theories of world politics--and I am thinking here primarily in terms of "the American science of international relations"--is that like all sociopolitical theories, they can be understood both as "theory" and as "ideology." They function both as systematic attempts to understand and explicate phenomena and, simultaneously, as ways of obscuring the phenomena. Attempts to analyse the nature of international relations theory as ideology have been few and far between, certainly when compared with other socioscientific disciplines. Yet there can be little doubt that **the dominant discourse about i**nternational **r**elations **has served to legitimize as well as to explain the prevailing international order.** To pursue this theme it is necessary to emphasize the way in which the prevailing discourse about international politics **embodies a particular ontology, a particular conception of the nature of international "reality."** Some aspects of this have already been noted in passing. Against those who think in universalist moral terms, it is argued that the international realm is essentially pluralistic and amoral. It is a matter of the continuous collision of particular states mitigated only by fragile and temporary structures of diplomacy and rules of accommodation. Against those who think in socioeconomic terms, it is argued that the state, the most fundamental form of pluralist fragmentation, is to a very large degree autonomous as a result of the "security dilemma." Yet it makes very little philosophical sense to speak of any notion of pluralism without also invoking its universalist polarity. Historically, the fragmented international political system seems to have developed as part of an increasingly integrated economic system. Thus in both cases, it can be argued that the predominant tradition of international relations theory has, at best operated with a **highly selective vision of "reality."** **The problem goes deeper**. Philosophically, traditions of pluralism are associated with those of historicism. The idea that the world is "one" is opposed by the idea that it is "many." The idea that the "one" is unchanging is opposed by the idea that the world is constantly changing. If the world is one and unchanging then it is possible to have a certain and unchanging knowledge of it; if not, then knowledge can only be relative to the time at which it is grasped. The problem goes back a long way. It is the pluralist and relativist challenge of Thrasymachus the Sophist in the Republic that sets Western political theory off in its most characteristic quest. It is Machiavelli's pluralist and historicist challenge to the universalist claims of Christianity that articulated the setting for modern secular political thought in general and for international political theory in particular. Where the political theory of civil society has subsequently managed to develop a more universalistic basis for political life, starting with the secularization of natural law and the development of social contract theory, international political theory has remained preoccupied by the problems of pluralism, relativism, and historicism. Ultimately it is on this philosophical basis that the claims of the dominant discourse of international politics over those who think in universalist moral or socioeconomic terms have been made. 4 And as a critical weapon against universalistic pretensions, relativism can be deadly. Ultimately, of course, it is self-defeating: if everything is relative, then the statement itself is contradictory. Even so, there are important philosophical issues here, issues that certainly do not justify the general disrepute into which pluralism, historicism, and relativism have fallen. Unfortunately, this old philosophical puzzle is not all there is to it. By the time the claims of historicism, pluralism, and relativism became dressed up in the garb of modern international relations theory, they became distorted in several important ways. 5 First, they became absolutized, either in terms of some concept of an unchanging human nature derived from Hobbes, ethology, or Protestant theology, or in terms of some notion of the eternal verities of power politics. Secondly, the claims of universalism and pluralism, the "one" and the "many," came to be reified into a mutually exclusive opposition rather than as moments of a dialectic. Thus on the one hand we have seen the development of a "science" of international politics to legitimize its claims to objectivity; and on the other we have seen all the rhetorical devices of relativism being deployed against any position that bases itself on some claim to universalism. The theoretical issues that arise from this are of great complexity. Considered in terms of ideology, however, the consequences are much simpler. over a long period of historical development, one way of thinking about international politics--what in its more "authentic" forms can be called pluralism or historicism, but now in a degenerate ahistorical form are known as "realism"--has come to dominate all others. And it has done so not because its conception of "reality" is more accurate, but because its partial grasp of that "reality" has been legitimized through some deeply rooted intellectual trickery. Consequently other forms of discourse have been delegitimized. And the discourses that have suffered most in this way are precisely those that give rise to the socioeconomic and universalist moral critiques of contemporary militarism. The discourse of dissent to contemporary militarism can therefore be dissected in two ways. It is possible to categorize the different forms of critique and to understand their characteristic impact in the political sphere. It is also possible to understand the internal dynamics of critique when considered as a totality. We then have two different ways of addressing the same basic issue of the extent to which the critique of contemporary militarism is able to undermine the hegemonic discourse of international politics. Although there is a clear convergence toward a common indictment of militarism from a number of different theoretical traditions**, they are in danger of being channeled in ways determined by the dominant discourse**. In effect, **they all confront a hegemonic discourse that is able to define the kind of opposition it can tolerate.** Once the critique of contemporary militarism is **trapped in this discourse** it becomes vulnerable to a wide range of difficulties. Most obviously **it is subject to delegitimation by being labeled as utopian or subversive**. Such labeling is not simply a political ploy. It is **rooted in the hegemonic discourse of international relations theory itself**. Less obviously, **the pluralistic ontological assumptions of this hegemonic discourse necessarily pose the "problem of the other**," or what has more recently come to be known as orientalism. The pluralist assumptions of the discourse **are constantly re-enforced by the stereotyping of some other state in ways that justify aggression**. The appeal to "realism" and the appeal to some "great enemy" constitute **a self-justifying and self-perpetuating system of assumptions**. Critiques of militarism can then be dismissed not only in terms of being utopian or subversive in general, but utopian and subversive with respect to some specific and historically constituted enemy. One is then not merely naive, but is a dupe of some devil personified. **Not only is the hegemonic discourse of international politics self-justifying and self-perpetuating, but to the extent that it recognizes its own limitations, it also circumscribes the solutions that are possible**. More specifically, it undermines the idea of a possible progression from nuclear deterrence to demilitarization and **prescribes only the stabilization of the status quo. The "realities" are said to indicate that nuclear deterrence of some sort will always be necessary, and that arms control is all that is possible, even if it is an arms control that can allow for some quite drastic reductions in the level of armaments.** **And in this way it is always possible to hide behind a rhetoric of arms control while continuing to play the game of bargaining chips and supremacy.**

### 2NC Arms Control—Turns Case

#### Arms control merely legitimizes and secures the US arsenal—this reinforces status quo nuclear institutions, locking an a statist understanding of IR and propelling a global drive towards nuclearization

Kaldor ‘9 (Mary, professor of global governance at the London School of Economics, Dismantling the global nuclear infrastructure, 8/11/09, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/dismantling-the-global-nuclear-infrastructure)

But how would such a summit be climbed? Most of these proposals have their origins in the period when the new anti-nuclear activists were politicians and when their main concern was to reduce the risks of the nuclear arms race while preserving the capabilities of existing nuclear powers. This was the essence of what were then known as ‘arms control' rather than disarmament measures. Reductions of American and Russian nuclear warheads will still leave both countries with enough nuclear capacity to destroy the world several times over. The NPT and the CTBT are designed to constrain the development of nuclear weapons by new powers but, in effect, legitimise existing arsenals. Indeed, it could even be argued that by implicitly endorsing the nuclear status of great powers, they represent an incentive for emerging powers like Iran or North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. The proposals for securing and limiting nuclear stockpiles are likewise designed to prevent nuclear capacity getting into the wrong hands while protecting the stockpiles of existing nuclear powers. But they cannot, of themselves, prevent the manufacture of weapons grade materials by Iran, say, or, a further example, the export of nuclear know-how by rogue elements in Pakistan. Arms control proposals are based on a geo-political statist understanding of the world. The possession and implicit threat to use nuclear weapons is associated with an absolutist view of state sovereignty. The possession of nuclear weapons implies an absolutist prerogative on the part of states to risk the lives of its own citizens on a massive scale not to mention citizens in other countries without any prior public debate or discussion. The use of nuclear weapons would constitute an unimaginable violation of human rights and hence the implication of their possession is that states have the right to inflict such an unimaginable violation. In Europe, where most nuclear weapons are still American, it is not even European states that have this absolutist character, it is the American President alone who is allowed to risk the lives of European citizens. The problem with arms control proposals is that they treat nuclear weapons as thought they were part of the normal armoury of states - they naturalise nuclear weapons. And yet we cannot ascend to the top of the mountain without changing those fundamental assumptions and without rethinking the implications of possessing nuclear weapons in to-day's globalised world.

### 2NC—Epistemology Indict

#### The aff’s arms control policy locks in a liberal ideological framework for viewing nuclear weapons—this epistemology is riddled with myth and makes their reading of IR suspect- only a prior interrogation of their method can challenge the flaws in their perspective

Krause ‘7, (Joachim, Professor for International Relations at the Christian-Albrechts-University at Kiel, Enlightenment and Nuclear Order, International Affairs 83: 3 (2007) 483–499)

Today’s processes of global governance and international regime-building are to an increasing degree shaped by so-called epistemic communities, and some of these have devised systems of beliefs and attitudes which, at least, raise the question whether they are working on the basis of ideologies that make them immune to contradictory evidence. Epistemic communities are usually valued as important forces of progress, since they often invest energy into global governance purposes. However, as John G. Ruggie has subtly pointed out, there might be a problem: ‘epistemic communities . . . may be said to consist of interrelated roles that group up around an episteme: they delimit for their members the “proper” construction of social reality’. Ruggie defines the term episteme—which he borrowed from Michel Foucault—as a ‘dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention’.9 It is no secret that the political agenda of arms control and, in particular, of nuclear non-proliferation has been influenced over the past four decades by the school of liberal arms control. This epistemic community has defined the basic tenets of international arms control and non-proliferation politics. It encompasses not only scholars and researchers, but also a large number of diplomats, politicians, bureaucrats and journalists. Members of this school have shaped US arms control policy since the 1960s, many experts from that community having served various US administrations. But the group has also found adherents outside the United States. International arms control diplomacy has been to a great extent the result of diligent and devoted efforts by liberal arms controllers from several parts of the world. Without this epistemic community, international arms control and non- proliferation efforts would not have been so successful. This epistemic community, however, is not immune to the disease of ideology. In fact, over the years it has devised an ideological belief system of common tenets and attitudes that has led to a growing divide between reality and what members of that group think and believe. The most relevant indicator for the existence of such an ideology is that its members cling to historical ‘facts’ that turn out to be myths as soon as one puts them to simple empirical tests. The article by William Walker is itself an example of how ideological tenets have taken over today’s liberal arms control school—with possibly negative political consequences. What makes things difficult is that there is today a competing ideological school: the several variants of assertive conservatism that have shaped the Bush administration’s policies. This assertive conservatism (mainly misnamed neo-conservatism, although neo-conservatism is just one strand) was promoted as an attempt to do away with the ideologies of the liberal arms control school. Unfortunately, what we have witnessed is the replacement of one ideology by another one. So much has been written on the ideologies and errors of the Bush administration that it would be futile even to list all these analyses. But the mere existence of an opposing conservative ideology is no excuse for failing to analyse critically the ideology of liberal arms control, since it is those ideological tenets that still dominate in the global arms control and non-proliferation community, and most likely will become more powerful again. This is where enlightenment comes in: first of all, it means to expose and debunk myths. Only on the basis of such an operation can one initiate an enlightened debate.

### 2NC—Epistemology/ Reps 1st

#### The aff’s framing of proliferation is not neutral- the 1ac is a series of interpretive acts that *constitute* both the subjects and objects of analysis- their choice to respond to proliferation with liberal international regimes relies on a series of problematic assumptions

Mutimer 2K, (David, Associate Professor, Political Science @ York University and Deputy Director @ Center for International and Security Studies, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security, pgs. 11-17)

**The prevailing view of the weapons proliferation problem** sees Iraq as the harbinger of a wider security problem in the twenty-first century, a problem produced by the proliferation of weapons and related technologies. That view looks on the actions I outlined in Chapter 1 as the sensible response of an international community to a threat it has recognized only just in time, if not a little late. It **is** a view neatly **presaged by** Charles **Krauthammer** in the same article in which he introduced the weapon state: The post–Cold War era is thus perhaps better called the era of weapons of mass destruction. The **prolif**eration **of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction and their means of delivery **will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. That is what makes a new** international order not an imperial dream or a Wilsonian fantasy but **a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new** regime **to police these weapons and those who brandish them.** [1](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239)  I want to draw attention to **several aspects of this quotation**, because they **reveal the assumptions on which** it, and **the proliferation agenda** more broadly, **are based.** The first key aspect of this short text is Krauthammer's claim **that weapons proliferation will constitute the greatest single threat to world security** for the rest of our lives. I do not want to contest or qualify the claim but instead to ask what it means—and perhaps as important, what is necessary for the claim to be meaningful. It would seem initially that the meaning of the sentence in question is self-evident: the process of weapons proliferation, of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to more countries in more parts of the world, threatens the world's security. Indeed, the meaning seems so apparent that explanation of its meaning are more difficult to read than the sentence itself. But is the meaning indeed so simple or, more to the point, so unproblematic? First, Krauthammer's claim **assumes a** single, identifiable phenomenon **that is “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery**. ” The way in which the weapons proliferation agenda was advanced following the Gulf War seems to suggest that this has not always been the case. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 3, for much of the Cold War period, issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery were not commonly assumed to be part of a problem known as proliferation. Krauthammer's claim also rests on the assumption that there is an unproblematic whole known as world security that can be threatened. He assumes, that is, that at some level the security of the world (whatever that may mean) is indivisible. But what of the last sentence of the quotation? Krauthammer argues that “it is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. ” Within the space of a few lines, the “world security” with which Krauthammer appeared to be concerned has become a problem confronting “the West. ” Who are “those who brandish” these weapons after proliferation? They are not individuals or even groups of organized criminals, as his use of “police” might seem to suggest. Rather, it is “what might be called the 'Weapon State'” [2](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) that is holding and brandishing these weapons. Weapon states are members of the international community— Krauthammer cited Iraq, North Korea, and Libya but suggested that it is possible for Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa to achieve this status. World security is perhaps less universal than first imagined. It is also worth considering the implications of Krauthammer's suggestion that the problem of proliferation, and the attendant growth of weapon states, is “slowly dawning” on the West. For this assertion to be meaningful, there must be a problem in the world somewhere (or in many places at once) that, for whatever reason, is hidden from the view of “the West. ” There must, in other words, be a rigid separation between the object in question—in this case, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the viewing subject—in this case, the West. What is more, there must also be a clear, unproblematic subject. The West is taken as a subject that can view, on which something can “dawn. ” Phrased in this way, perhaps the meaning of Krauthammer's short quotation is less obvious. Although we conventionally speak of something called “the West, ” it is not readily apparent that it is sufficiently singular for problems to “dawn” on it. What ties much of this together, what makes the passage coherent, is suggested by Krauthammer's use of prudence, the watchword of the traditional study and practice of international security, a study founded on political realism. In his classic statement of the principles of political realism, Hans Morgenthau writes, “Realism, then, considers prudence … to be the supreme virtue in politics. ” [3](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) Realism has been increasingly criticized in recent years in ways that resonate with the questions I have posed regarding Krauthammer's quotation. Realism, particularly the security study that forms a central element of its view of international relations, has been accused of serving Western—particularly U. S. —policy in the name of the international. What allows this political effect to pass unnoticed has been realism's claim to objectivity—to the separation of subject and object. Again, as Morgenthau puts it so succinctly, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature. ” [4](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) If international politics is governed by objective laws, then security is a neutral state of affairs rather than politically biased. This objectivity also requires that both the objects of study and the subjects who study or who view those objects are also objectively knowable. Realism takes the objects of social life and the subjects of social action to be constituted prior to their entry into that action. Charles Krauthammer's short summation of the problem of weapons proliferation is much richer in its meaning than it might first appear. His quotation is founded on a series of assumptions, which seem at least problematic once exposed to view. Michel Foucault has written that “practicing criticism is the art of making facile gestures difficult. ” [5](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) By making difficult what seems at first blush so simple, not just in Krauthammer's formulations but in the general understanding of the agenda of proliferation control, I am joining a growing body of scholars who aim to practice criticism on questions of security. This scholarship begins by suspending what is commonly taken as given: the objects of international security (and security policy), the identities of the subjects of international actions, and even the interests these actors pursue. Each of these—the objects, identities, and interests—is assumed to be self-evident in Krauthammer's quotation, as in security studies in general. In the rest of this chapter I will question their self-evidence and suggest a way of thinking about how the formation of the objects, identities, and interests of weapons proliferation can be investigated rather than assumed. Proliferation and Security Studies Ken Booth has characterized the traditional study of security as follows: The dominating security questions were: Is the Soviet threat growing? What is the strategic balance? And would the deployment of a particular weapon help stability? In that period of looking at world politics through a missile-tube and gun-sight, weapons provided most of the questions, and they provided most of the answers—whatever the weapon, whatever the context, and whatever the cost. [6](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239)  Security concerned the disposition of weapons and the use of those weapons to protect the state—in particular the United States and, somewhat more generally, its (European) allies but at root the state as an institution and an actor in international relations. With security considered in this way, through the missile tube, the development of a proliferation control agenda following the breakup of the Soviet Union is not overly surprising. The Soviet threat was no longer an issue, but weapons still exist. Krauthammer's suggestion that the weapon state might supplant the Soviet state as the source of threat is a direct response to this change within the context of security as traditionally conceived. Nevertheless, the idea that security is provided through the acquisition of weaponry, that security is what is achieved when you look at world politics through a missile tube or a gun sight, has come in for sustained criticism in recent years. This criticism was originally motivated by a recognition that it was more than just the potential for interstate violence that rendered people insecure—even during the Cold War with its ever-present possibility of nuclear annihilation. The edifice of traditional security, or strategic, studies proves much less stable than it might have appeared at its Cold War height. Once questions were asked about the adequacy of an exclusive focus on weapons as a source of security, the very foundations of that building needed to be reformed. [7](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) As with any conceptual building, security study rested on a set of foundational assumptions, which were usually unstated and unremarked. Once you probe a little into the sources of threat, you run into these assumptions, and it becomes difficult to the point of impossible to leave them unexamined. When you look a little more closely, they turn out to be the same set of assumptions I revealed in discussing the short passage from Krauthammer. Strategic studies has taken as given a number of important aspects of its field of study, of which the nature of the subject—the military nature of security—is first and foremost. Strategic studies also takes as given the referent object of that security and the subjects of security practice, which turn out to be one and the same. It is states that are to be secured through the deployment of particular weapons (or through their elimination, or some other alteration in the general disposition of the arsenal). It is also states that are to do the securing through the “threat or use of military force. ” [8](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) At the deepest and least examined level, strategic studies takes as given the interests pursued by states in seeking security. It is generally recognized, even by those who adhere to a traditional understanding of security, that problems other than military problems exist in international relations—they are just not to be considered problems of security. [9](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) Similarly, most would accept that there are actors other than the state and even that the reason for providing security for the state is ultimately to provide security for those who live in that state. Interests, however, are sacrosanct. These crucial aspects of the study of security can be restated using the same formulation I adopted earlier. Traditional approaches to security take as given the objects, the identities of those who act, and the interests they have. The critique of security studies began with the first of these, suggesting that the object of study in security was, at the least, too narrow. Once that was opened to question, however, identities of the actors could no longer be assumed. If, for example, as Ken Booth has argued, security is emancipation, then thinking of identities defined solely in terms of the state is nonsensical. [10](http://www.questia.com/read/105847240) Similarly, although perhaps less obvious, the nature of interests is also changed as the object at issue and the identities of the actors involved change—a point to which I return in some detail later. The critique of traditional security studies has therefore opened to question the objects of security study—and, by extension, the practices through which security is sought—as well as the identities of those who act to secure and, finally, the interests these actors pursue. In doing so, critical security studies connects with currents of critique that have been developing in the discipline of international relations and, more broadly, within social theory generally. Critique and Interpretation To say that strategic studies and the political realism from which it grows take aspects of their study as given means they are assumed to exist in an unproblematic fashion and that they are accessible to study and manipulation: there are states, they have interests, these interests are threatened. The goal of security studies is to identify threats and to develop means by which states can safeguard their interests in the face of those threats. This is true of the academic study of security and of the study that takes place within the apparatuses of states with a view to formulating security policy. Indeed, in many instances and particularly in the mainstream of security studies in the United States, these two activities are inextricably related. [11](http://www.questia.com/read/105847240) The trouble is that as solid as they may appear, states and interests, threats and problems are not unproblematically presented to the scholar's or even the policymaker's gaze. At the beginning of Writing Security, David Campbell made this point in reference to the Gulf conflict, which plays so central a role in the present story: On August 2, 1990, Iraq became a danger to the United States. For many, this was obvious—nothing could be more real and less disputable than an invasion of one country by another…. Yet, without denying the brutality of such an action, the unproblematic status with which this episode is endowed deserves analysis. After all, an event of this kind (particularly one so distant from America) does not in and of itself constitute a danger, risk or threat…. Indeed, there have been any number of examples in which similar “facts” were met with a very different American reaction: only a decade earlier, the Iraqi invasion of Iran (an oil-producing state like Kuwait) brought no apocalyptic denunciations or calls to action—let alone a military response—from the United States. Danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. [12](http://www.questia.com/read/105847240)  Campbell's point is that danger, threat, this central concept in the study of security does not slowly dawn on those who are threatened but rather is created through their interpretive acts. A further point is to be made concerning Campbell's work. The focus of *Writing Security* is not, in fact, on the way in which danger is interpreted—the manner by which the interpretation of risk and the consequent creation of threat occur. Rather, Campbell's argument shows the way in which the interpreting subject—in this instance the United States—is itself created by those acts of identifying danger. If we can accept that both the threats and the subjects of international security are created in acts of interpretation, it should be clear that the interests those subjects pursue are also consequences of these same acts. It would be difficult to argue that interests remain fixed when the bearer of those interests does not. Jutta Weldes has made the case with respect to interests: In contrast to the realist conception of “national interests” as objects that have merely to be observed or discovered, then, my argument is that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interests emerge out of the representations … through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them. [13](http://www.questia.com/read/105847240)  These “representations through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them” are central to my argument in this book. Rather than take the objects of study as given, I ask questions about the construction of a particular object, a particular set of identities and interests, and the specific practices through which proliferation is confronted. The key to answering these questions is to identify the way in which the problem is represented or, to use the language I deploy later, the image that is used to frame the issue in question. This image serves to construct the object of analysis or policy, to identify the actors, and to define their interests. It is therefore the image that enables the practices through which these actors respond to the problem of proliferation.

## Bioweapons

### Link—Bioweapons—1NC

#### The affirmative’s reactionary response to the bioweapon threat is an attempt to manage populations—their displacement of responsibility and politics makes the impact inevitable.

Fearnley ‘5 (Lyle, PhD candidate in Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. His primary research is on the design and implementation of new technologies of public health surveillance, “From Chaos to Controlled Disorder”: Syndromic Surveillance, Bioweapons, and the Pathological Future,” Report I Laboratory for the Anthropology of the Contemporary New York, <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2007/01/fearn_chaos_to_disorder.pdf>, JS)

The enlistment of syndromic surveillance as a technology of vigilance against bioweapons dramatically refigures the structures of security. In the circuits of warfare, technologies of vigilance are sentinels, mechanisms that ensure the enemy is visible and can therefore be repelled. As such, the boundaries of their vision are also the boundaries of the defendable, of the secure. As Manuel Delanda argues, the boundaries of security produce the interiority that is the civil, political domain. When radar was first developed, for example, its vigilance was technologically limited to the territorial perimeter of the state. Later, however, the United States expanded the radar curtain to enclose the entire continent and ultimately, through the development of the nuclear umbrella, “enlarged its ‘walls’ to global proportions.118 The enemy (and in particular nuclear armaments) had nowhere to hide. The assumptions and vigilance capacity of syndromic surveillance are far different than the integrated radar system, characterized by uncertainty rather than global vision. Even vigilance over the territory is considered impossible: Because of the incubation delays, no nation can protect itself (from biological attack) simply by screening travelers at its borders. Nor can a country such as the United States hope to inspect more than a fraction of the food it imports daily. As agricultural markets become increasingly global, the potential vulnerability of nations to food-borne natural or intentional disease will continue to increase.119 Rather than the territory of the state, the boundaries of syndromic vigilance run through the living bodies of the population. Only days after a bioweapon has been released, when the sick begin to appear at emergency rooms and hospitals, will any sign of the enemy’s presence emerge. Rather than looking for invasions across protected space (as radar does, for example), syndromic surveillance monitors fluctuations in syndrome levels over time. At stake is an assumed inability to prevent or defend against bioweapons attacks. As Dr. William Roper narrated, while “the public’s expectations, not surprisingly, called for 100% protection with no risks,” the “goal of public health is to minimize risks.” In this context, the task of syndromic surveillance is to “shorten the time from absolute chaos to controlled disorder.”120 Giorgio Agamben glosses Foucault’s concept of security in order to articulate the shifts in contemporary geopolitical rationality. He writes: While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder.121 Biodefense disease surveillance guides and manages the “controlled disorder” of the microbehuman ecology in an increasingly contagious world. One can perhaps imagine then a secured population spreading beyond the confines of the national territory. The future of war in an 'asymmetric' age certainly does not appear to be one that emphasizes the defense of borders. Rather, specific populations are watched and managed to ensure that the “controlled disorder” of global flows of goods, people, microbes do not develop into the chaos of epidemic. To conclude, I want to meditate on the temporality of syndromic observation and, subsequently, my own ethnographic observation. The objects and problems posed by these two modes of inquiry (technological and anthropological) are quite distinct. Yet both share the temporal space of the contemporary and the aspiration of understanding our time. In important ways, the semantics of temporality are in crisis. The history of progress that defined the modern imagination has begun to fade. The destructive consequences of so-called progress are ever more visible, particularly in ecological damage but also in global poverty and violence. At the same time, dreams of a perfectible future are ever more difficult to hold. From assymetric warfare to emerging infectious diseases, the future is increasingly presented as uncertain but potentially catastrophic. The rise of apocalyptic eschatologies is one social response to present uncertainty. The logic is not foreign to the bioterrorism discourse. Monica Schoch-Spana, for one, has demonstrated that bioterrorism scenarios used to imagine possible futures have an apocalyptic character.122 In these texts, computer games, or role-playing drills the threat of bioterrorism is assumed at the outset to be inevitable: in Schoch-Spana’s words, not a matter of if, but when. In turn, the inevitable threat is narrated in catastrophic terms. In the response-game Dark Winter, for example, smallpox quickly spread beyond the control of the role-playing government, infecting tens of thousands and quickly reaching pandemic scale. Or as Admiral Stansfield Turner sums up, biological weapons (like none other than nuclear) have the capacity to bring the US past the “point of non-recovery.”123 An alternative ethical approach to the late modern condition is characterized by the calculus of risk. Understanding the contemporary in terms of risk means acknowledging that decisions in the present shape an uncertain future with possible costs, though in uncertain ways. Yet this uncertain future is not wholly unknowable in the sense of an imminent danger. Risk “we construct between ourselves [while] danger is ‘out there,’” the way a map transforms land into a cultural and political medium.124 As Francois Ewald writes of insurance technologies, “for an event to be a risk, it must be possible to evaluate its probability.”125 Essential to the concept of risk is the moral imperative to act in the present to reduce risks. The future is not understood as an inevitable disaster that comes from somewhere ‘out there’. Rather, it is understood as uncertain and dangerous but ultimately our responsibility. I have argued that syndromic surveillance utilizes a statistics of risk, but unlike insurance technologies does not do so in order to discipline the future. In essence, it assumes the incomprehensibility of the future: the appearance of the epidemic from somewhere ‘out there.’ Rather than attempting to calculate the probability of a biological weapons attack, syndromic surveillance claims only to be able to identify (but not define) the improbable when it occurs. Syndromic surveillance refuses to understand the present in terms of risk-based decision making. All action is displaced into the future where it is formulated in terms of response rather than risk. If risks are eminently political, than syndromic surveillance is a sort of anti-politics machine. By displacing decisions into the future, the space of politics in which decisions are debated **is also displaced**. The system is designed to ensure that disasters are visible when they occur so that they can be ameliorated: so that “absolute chaos” can be turned to “controlled disorder”. In other words, syndromic technology ensures what Robert Paine calls the “no-risk thesis”: the refusal to turn a danger into a calculable risk. By defining the future as incalculable but controllable, syndromic observation avoids confronting the influence present actions may have on the future. By focusing on surveillance and response as the primary method of dealing with the bioterrorism threat, the United States displaces an understanding of how history has shaped the contemporary threat. **At stake for the United States is a denial of responsibility in the production of global insecurity and therefore the likelihood that present actions will continue to exacerbate risky circumstances.** Giorgio Agamben presents the political dilemma: Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. . . **It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction**–**and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.**126 The approach to emerging infectious diseases is revealing. The comparison is not random. Like the bioweapon, the future emergence and character of novel infectious diseases has been defined as highly uncertain. Proponents of syndromic surveillance argue that the system is technologically capable of detecting unexpected natural epidemics as well as deliberate ones. In short, if syndromic surveillance works, then an unexpected natural epidemic (like a bioweapons attack) becomes a controllable danger. Displaced by this logic, however, is the way present actions are responsible for producing infectious disease risks. The emergence of nearly every one of these new diseases has been ascribed to human actions: Responsible factors include ecological changes, such as those due to agricultural or economic development or to anomalies in the climate; human demographic changes and behavior; travel and commerce; technology and industry; microbial adaptation and change; and breakdown of public health measures.127 Even microbial adaptation (increased pathogenicity or drug resistance) has been largely fueled by human interventions such as the over-prescription of pharmaceuticals. And as Paul Farmer suggests, much of the contours and destructiveness of epidemics generally can be attributed to social inequality.128 Pouring funding into improved surveillance measures may be able to control or ameliorate an epidemic through early detection (although this, too, is **highly speculative**). However, the fundamental causes are displaced and the unequally distributed costs are ignored. Controlled disorder may be secure for those within the wealthy bastions of the world, where medical response and intervention is readily available. Yet as Farmer points out, while disease easily crosses borders, biomedical technologies and expertise are typically held up at customs.129 The circuits of war and politics enmesh the bioweapon even more tightly than the emerging infection. Bioweapons would often be artificially manufactured, altered through genesplicing, or dispersed through aerosols; they would always be deliberately released. This problematic hybrid of human intentions and natural properties cannot be dealt with in either exclusively scientific or political terms. Syndromic surveillance is built in response to the failure of both science and diplomacy to solve the bioterrorism problem. Yet instead of addressing the failing modern division of science from politics, syndromic surveillance **displaces the problem altogether.** The controlled disorder of syndromic observation makes no claim to a scientific cure for the bioweapon (such as rapid vaccine development); nor does it claim to a political cure (such as nonproliferation). It offers no cure at all, displacing all action to a future response and (all hopes to a controlled disorder.) The anthrax mailings of October 2001 offer a prime example of how response displaces responsibility. Leaving aside the fact that syndromic surveillance could not have detected such a small attack, the point is that a focus on emergency response displaced the historical origins of the event. Rather than an unknowable danger coming from ‘out there’, the roots of the anthrax attacks were fully internal to the United States. The attacker has yet to be identified. However, genetic investigations have determined that the bioweapon was the rare and particularly virulent Ames strain of anthrax. Military labs in the U.S. developed the Ames strains, either as an offensive weapon during the 1960s or for ostensibly defensive research after the global ban in 1972. The main custodian for the material is the U.S. Army lab at Fort Detrick, who had loaned the material to other labs for research purposes.130 By understanding attacks like these exclusively in terms of disaster response, **the responsibility of the U.S. military** (and in particular its biological weapons programs) **is displaced and forgotten. The costs are clear. Secret research on bioweapons within military institutions for allegedly defensive purposes continues and the probability of** a pathological future, **a future in which epidemic disorder becomes uncontrollable, increases.**

### Link—Bioweapons—2NC

#### Their notion of protecting the people from a biological weapon is nothing more than an attempt to solidify state control over the population. Attempts to control biological weapons simply re-create a zone of indistinction by furthering state control over the lives and deaths of the population

Pease ‘3 (Donald, Foundation Chair of the Humanities at Dartmouth, “The Global Homeland State” boundary 2 30.3 (2003) 1-18, MUSE, JS)

As we have seen, the Homeland enacted into law by the Homeland Security Act did not have reference to an enclosed territory. And it was not exactly a political order. The Homeland Security Act was the political instrument on whose authority the state transformed a temporary suspension of order erected on the basis of factual danger into a quasi-permanent biopolitical arrangement that as such remained outside the normal order. After the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the state of exception no longer referred to an external state of factual danger and was instead identified with the juridical-political order itself. This juridical-political apparatus thereafter authorized a biopolitical settlement that inscribed the body of the people into an order of state power that endowed the state with power over the life and death of the population. 5 This biopolitical sphere emerged with the state's decision to construe [End Page 11] the populations it governed as indistinguishable from unprotected biological life. Insofar as the Homeland State's biopolitical imperative to regulate the life and death of the population that it governed was irreducible to the denizens of the nation-state, the Homeland State's biopolitical regime became potentially global in its extensibility. The body of the people as a free and equal citizenry endowed with the capacity to reconstitute itself through recourse to historically venerated social significations was replaced by a biological population that the state protected from biological terrorism. The biopolitical sphere constructed by the provisions of the Homeland Security Act first subtracted the population from the forms of civic and political life through which they recognized themselves as a national people and then positioned these life forms—the people, their way of life—into nonsynchronous zones of protection with the promise that their future synchronization would resuscitate the nation-state. 6 In undergoing a generalized dislocation from the national imaginary through which their everyday life practices become recognizably "American," the National Peoples underwent a mass denationalization and were reconstituted as biological life forms. As vulnerable biological life under the state's protection, the biopoliticized population also could play no active political role in the Homeland State's reordering of things. The Homeland State thereafter represented the population as an unprotected biological formation whose collective vitality must be administered and safeguarded against weapons of biological terrorism. **The state's description of the weapons that endanger the aggregated population as "biological" in part authorized the state's biopolitical settlement**. In representing its biopolitical imperatives in terms of a defense against weapons of biological destruction, the state also produced an indistinction between politics and the war against terrorism. This redescription produced two interrelated effects: it transformed the population's political and civil liberties into life forms that were to be safeguarded by the state rather than acted on by the citizenry; more importantly, it turned political opponents of this biopolitical settlement into potential enemies of the ways of life that the state safeguards. [End Page 12]

## Disease

### Link—Disease—1NC

#### Their discursive construction of health and disease is mediated by colonialist understandings of the “foreign” and “dangerous” other—epidemiological discourses reproduce power relations that make disease a threat in the first place.

Lewis 07, [Bradley, Professor at New York University—Department of Psychiatry and the Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, 2007, “The New Global Health Movement: Rx for the World,” New Literary History, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 459-477]

Of course, *Rx* was made for popular audiences in the U.S. and so in its populist format, some may argue, it is more likely to reproduce these kinds of stereotypes than other more professional or expert discourses. This does not mean, however, that other medical discourses are devoid of these problematic "othering" stereotypes. All discourses deployed by the global health movement—whether they are political statements or funding agendas or the finite descriptions of disease behaviors in scientific papers—**are mediated by the culture, society, and politics in which they are produced.** Intentionally or not, they reproduce and relocate cultural, societal, and political ideas and constructions, including problematic **constructions of the contagious foreign "other."** The association of "foreignness" with contagion has **long been established in scientific discourses.** As Cindy Patton observes, the conflation of foreigners and "immigrants" with germs has been apparent since the emergence of "germ theory" in the late 1800s: a theory which was compounded by the emergence of immunology and virology in the twentieth century.36 This theory, and its more modern incarnations, represents germs—or, more belatedly, viruses—**as "foreign," "dangerous," "contagious," and a threat to the "pristine, clean, uninvaded, untouched**" body; a body which itself is commonly figured as "the 'virgin' land of the new world."37 Scientific discourses associated with HIV/AIDS—such as immunology and epidemiology—offer recent examples of the way these constructions continue to be reproduced. Immunologic discourses frequently deploy a language of **"foreignness and invasion"** in their accounts of HIV infection.38 Emily Martin cites one popular textbook that describes the process of "foreign antigen recognition" as the "human body's police force" being "programmed to distinguish between *bona fide* residents and illegal aliens."39 Epidemiological discourses on HIV/AIDS have similarly reinvigorated these stereotypes when they have designated entire populations—such as Haitians or sub-Saharan Africans—as "risk groups." The near consensus among AIDS immunologists and epidemiologists that Africa is the primary site of HIV also **powerfully reinstalls the link** between foreignness and contagion. Whether latent or manifest, **such exclusionary "othering" and racist stereotypes keep being reinstated**, *even* by the world health advocates (such as the makers of *Rx*) and scientists who are concerned with saving the globe against disease and ill health. If the global health movement does not take this into account it may well, in McFadden's words, **reproduce the very relations of exploitation, supremacy, and servitude underlying the social and survival crises that currently face our world.**

### Link—Disease—2NC Impact

#### Justifies extermination

Schell ’97 [Heather, Phd Candidate at Stanford University, 1997, Configurations 5.1]

**Being immobile** pathogens, **viruses need a host to bring them inside. The hosts** implicated in the virus texts I examine **are** invariably **outsiders** themselves, usually **socially disruptive elements**. Llewellyn Legters, who helped organize the "hypothetical global epidemic emergency" I mentioned earlier, creates one of the most suggestive images of a marginalized, infected traveler: " 'We' go there, 'they' come here, increasing the risk to United States citizens of exposure to tropical infectious diseases." "**We" and "they" carry strong** (if unspecified) **racial overtones** in this instance; in other contexts **they suggest membership in sexual**, gendered, **economic, and** most especially **national categories**. I will address these different implications as they rear their ugly little heads in my examples. In the meantime, the most important element of "us" and "them" lies in their flexible relationship, defined primarily by perceived hygiene and infection. **"We" are**, above all, the readers, **the ones whose survival** ultimately **matters. "They"** are the ones who probably **will not survive, and whose infectious resistance** to dying in anonymous isolation **endangers the rest of us**.

### 2NC AT Disease Reps Good

#### Turns their argument—securitized disease framing ensures a reactionary response—ensures surveillance and racialized violence

Schell ’97 [Heather, Phd Candidate at Stanford University, 1997, Configurations 5.1]

Although I like the implications of Haraway's and Martin's analyses, an examination of immune system discourses is incomplete without a complementary appraisal of the immune system's most formidable non-self: the virus. The self/non-self dichotomy has been so extensively explored by historians and mined of its last glitter of insight by theoreticians that we might easily be tempted to dismiss its continued operation in our everyday lives as the tailings from an abandoned excavation. Such dismissal would be a mistake. Society still deploys binarisms in blatant disregard of decades of sound, decisive scholarship. Debates about national and personal boundaries are unfolding within our anxious apprehensions of an approaching viral pandemic. The virus emerges as a dangerous foreign being: a fecund, primitive yet evolving, hungry, needy, African predator unleashed by modern travel from the last recesses of the wild. It wants to immigrate, with or without a visa. It demands attention in the form of resistance or capitulation. While ostensibly pondering the possible overthrow of the food chain, **virus discourse imagines the overthrow of the social order**. Viruses represent social change--frightening and enormous social change--and our drastic **fear of viral epidemics is** in part **a reactionary response to** **the possibility** **of** such **change**. **Virus discourse has become a** covert **means of negotiating identity** and contact in the increasing multiculturalism of the global village. **Western ideas of** the non-self, **the external threat**, have not kept pace with the postmodern flexible self. **The Other is still** that same, tired old Other, that **dark, unknowable** native lurking in that dark, unknowable continent, **waiting to erode our identity and leave us degenerated** or reborn. Marlow or Tarzan, the Westerner who makes contact with the indefinable essence of Africa has always emerged a transformed soul. The only postmodern element of virus discourse is that now the African transformative being has become a global passenger with no need for a green card. **Virus discourse** is **retell**ing old **imperialist nightmares that**, neutralized under cover of medical common sense, seem to **justify exclusionary practices, surveillance, and** general **prejudice** that we would otherwise find inexcusable as well as politically untenable. Like the Soviets in the 1980s, **viruses** in the 1990s **have** **become** almost reliable **villains**. Some now credit them as the cause of an impressive array of hitherto orphaned ailments, from cancer to dementia. 12 The most striking evidence of viruses' current sway over some people's imagination appears in the attenuation of the perceived menace from global warming, nuclear holocaust, starvation, disease, and so forth, and the growing perception of viral epidemics as the only source of danger. This is a striking change from as recently as 1977, when officials in Close Encounters of the Third Kind, brainstorming for a convincing lie to frighten all the locals out of the Devil's Tower area, reject an apocryphal virus epidemic in favor of a chemical spill. Simultaneously, the field of potential victims shrinks to humanity alone. This frequently occurs in virology articles, at the levels of both syntax and concept. For the syntax, notice how Richard Krause, senior scientific advisor at the Fogarty International Center, NIH, slips between "viruses" and "microbes": "The light of science must be focused on those forces that propel the emergence and migration of virus diseases. These events stem from attributes of microbes." 13 There are many types of microbes, of which viruses are only one. In the same essay, Krause uses the term emerging viruses interchangeably with epidemics and plagues, even though much of his discussion focuses on bacterial diseases. Stephen Morse makes the same shift: "Officials of all kinds . . . need to be aware of the infectious-disease implications of ecological and demographic changes. These are 'signals' for viral traffic." 14 Robert Shope and Alfred Evans, epidemiologists at Yale, similarly alternate in an unspecified manner between "host" and "human" in their discussion of viral evolution; at some points they are clearly discussing other animal hosts, but that use continually bleeds into a "host" that means only "human host." 15 Joshua Lederberg offers a conceptual example of the same narrowed focus: "A few vermin aside, Homo sapiens has undisputed dominion --and we could, where we choose, even eradicate rodent and insect pests" (although he allows that we might suffer a bit from the pesticides); "bacterial and protozoan parasites" will soon be eliminated, too--thus, "our only real competitors remain the viruses." 16 Lederberg has exterminated every single living threat from the global playing field. This anticipates the eradication of all our pests more than prematurely--even assuming that such eradication were a sensible goal--and entirely elides the hazard that our species poses to itself. More ominously, notice how Lederberg has framed the relationship between humans and other organic beings to include only predator-prey interactions; anything that we cannot kill is ipso facto a competitor.

## Economy

### Link—Economy—1NC

#### Their advantage is an imperialist construction used to legitimize colonization under the mantle of economic liberalism

Lipschutz ’95 [Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, On Security, pg 15-17)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a “secure” global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this “new security dilemma,” as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions for legitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of “competitiveness”; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold wars and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

### Link—Economy—2NC

#### Securitized economic predictions result in violent interventionism—this pre-emptionary logic has empirically has killed tens of millions of people in the name of capital accumulation.

Neocleous ‘8 (Mark, Prof. of Government at Brunel, Critique of Security, AM)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘**economic well-being’**, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance **helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people **to** **the desire to shape the world** in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently **violent strategy**. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; **the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘**every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’**.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. **The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers.** John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure **of six million people killed** – **and this is a minimum ﬁgure**. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, **the security policy of the world’s only superpower** in its current ‘war on terror’ **is** still **underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’.** The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of con tainment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

### 2NC Economy—Epistemology Indict

#### Economics as a science fails—their predictions are useless

Bergmann ‘5 (Barbara, Professor Emerita of Economics at Maryland and American and trustee of the Economists for Peace and Security, July, "The Current State of Economics: Needs Lots of Work," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sage Publications, JSTOR)

**More than two hundred years have passed since the publication of The Wealth of Nations, yet we are still** far from **having a science we can rely on to prevent major malfunctions of the economy or to treat them when they do occur. A nation's econ omy is a difficult entity to study. Yet the inherent difficulty of the subject matter is not the only problem. The study of the economy has not developed as have other sciences, in which direct observation and data collection by the scientists them selves play a large part.** Most members of the economics profession study and cre ate economic theory that is neither inspired nor validated by observation. There is little direct engagement by economists with people, businesses, banks, markets; little inquiry as to who does what and why; little observing at firsthand of any actual economic functioning.1 There are exceptions: a relatively small segment of the profession is doing hands-on research on the way people behave when faced with eco nomic decisions. However, they are only in the earliest stages of developing a body of knowledge that could inform economic policy making. And only a handful have yet ventured out of the laboratory, where observations are made on students play ing the part of the economic actors, to go into the field, where the behavior of real economic actors going about their business is to be seen**. One indication of the poor state of development of economics is the well-known and much ridiculed lack of agreement among professional economists on policy with regard to such vital issues as unemployment, budget deficits, taxes, inflation, international trade, the promotion of growth, and the government regulation of business. What is even more disturbing than the lack of agreement is the fact that political ideology quite** obviously determines **which side of any controversy about economic theory or economic policy any particular economist is likely to take.** The invasion of scientific argument by nonscientific considerations?sympa thies for particular groups, attachment to certain extrascientific beliefs or value judgments?is not totally unheard of in the physical sciences, but there its effect, unlike the situation in economics, is minor. A few professional biologists of some eminence are fundamentalist Christians who reject the theory of evolution. But the factual evidence for evolution is so overwhelming that their numbers remain tiny, and their influence on ongoing research and theorizing among biologists is nil. In economics, on the other hand, **evidence that has so far been collected on most of the important issues is scarce, indirect, difficult to interpret, and not well suited to provide answers that would settle the controversies.** This is particularly true in macroeconomics, **which deals with such issues as unemployment, inflation, and foreign trade. As a result, evidence is seldom decisive in winning adherents to a particular view of any economic issue.** The failure of appeals to evidence to settle controversies decisively and the pervasive influence of ideology combine to allow great freedom to the formulators of economic theory. Without fear of contradiction, at least from the faction to which they belong, economists can and do purvey far-fetched notions to considerable acclaim, some of which are referred to below. Material gain and career advancement also come into play Any particular eco nomic policy holds the possibility of adding to the income and wealth of some peo ple and subtracting from the income and wealth of others**. Politicians beholden to particular groups in the population can pick and choose among economists. This gives an incentive for economists to divide themselves into two camps, so that whichever party comes to power will have a ready-made corps of economists will ing and ready to recommend policies congenial to the party's constituency.** Again, the effect of material interests on views of natural scientists is not unheard of. Measures to fight global warming are expensive, and the industries affected by such measures and the politicians they support will find scientists who will help them to resist. Yet scientists are assiduous collectors of facts in a way that economists so far have not been, so that in the natural sciences factual evidence is more plentiful, more directly applicable to the issues, and clearer. Eventually, it is evidence that determines the outcome of any controversy.